# Overview * [*1 Global economy, international financial markets and monetary policy*](#tar-1 "1 Global economy, international financial markets and monetary policy") * *[*1.1 Global economic activity resilient as consumer price inflation rises further*](#tar-2 "1.1 Global economic activity resilient as consumer price inflation rises further")* * **[*1.2 Yields on long-term euro area and US government bonds up distinctly*](#tar-3 "1.2 Yields on long-term euro area and US government bonds up distinctly")** * ***[*1.3 ECB Governing Council raises key interest rates by 25 basis points*](#tar-4 "1.3 ECB Governing Council raises key interest rates by 25 basis points")*** * ***[*2 German economy and fiscal policy*](#tar-5 "2 German economy and fiscal policy") * *[*2.1 Recovery continues; inflation rate likely to increase after the turn of the year*](#tar-6 "2.1 Recovery continues; inflation rate likely to increase after the turn of the year ")* * **[*2.2 Public finances expansionary, deficit high*](#tar-7 "2.2 Public finances expansionary, deficit high")** * ***[*2.3 Comply with EU rules and safeguard sound public finances*](#tar-8 "2.3 Comply with EU rules and safeguard sound public finances")****** ****Non-final working translation****{#par-e2e959} ***1 Global economy, international financial markets and monetary policy*** {#tar-1} ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ### ***1.1 Global economic activity resilient as consumer price inflation rises further*** {#tar-2} *****The global economy remained on a growth path in the third quarter of 2026, despite the headwinds from the ongoing conflict in the Middle East** . In the United States, the already buoyant growth accelerated. Economic activity in China picked up somewhat, but remained moderate. Real in the euro area rose distinctly again after expanding strongly in the second quarter.***{#par-i1eu7e} *****Booming investment in artificial intelligence continued to provide significant impetus for the global economy.** Given that production of the goods required for is deeply integrated into international value chains, this boosted global trade activity and particularly a number of Asian economies. In addition, the latest business surveys suggest that activity is picking up outside the technology sector.***{#par-a5a362} *****Energy commodity prices soared again significantly at times.** Attacks on energy infrastructure and shipping once again restricted supplies from the Gulf region, especially in September and October. In those two months, spot prices for Brent crude oil averaged just under $120 per barrel, which was roughly 30 % up on August. Prices for mineral oil products went up noticeably, too. European natural gas prices climbed further as well, in part because storage levels were abnormally low. November saw energy commodity prices fall back distinctly amid easing concerns that the military conflict might flare up again. Even so, they persisted well above February 2026 pre-war levels.***{#par-e1i4u9} *****The renewed rise in energy prices amplified consumer price inflation in the advanced economies.** The group of advanced economies saw annual consumer price inflation up to October rise to 3.9 %. Core inflation, which strips out energy and food prices, increased distinctly, rising to 2.8 %. Enterprises passing on some of the sharply increased energy costs to their customers is likely to have played a part in this. In addition, the cost of computers and other products rose as prices for semiconductors and storage media increased sharply.***{#par-iu7i71} ### ***1.2 Yields on long-term euro area and government bonds up distinctly*** {#tar-3} *****Long-term government bond yields in the United States and the euro area are up significantly on the end of June.** This was due in part to robust activity and inflation-related expectations of higher policy rates going forward. Concerns about persistently high inflation rates intensified in the face of the repeated flare-ups of the conflict in the Middle East and higher energy prices. This is the backdrop against which central banks on both sides of the Atlantic tightened their policy rates. Market participants expected monetary policy to be tighter up to and including the middle of 2027, compared with their expectations at the end of June.***{#par-u8eu2a} *****Spreads widened in European bond markets, while euro area and** **equity markets held largely steady overall.** Concerns about the sustainability of France's public finances weighed on that country's government bonds. Those worries also contributed to the euro's depreciation against the dollar. Spreads widened on corporate bonds, especially high-yield and financial paper. Doubts around the prospective earnings from the heavy investment in artificial intelligence weighed on tech stocks. All the same, profit expectations for firms in general rose significantly on both sides of the Atlantic.***{#par-ua1879} ### ***1.3 Governing Council raises key interest rates by 25 basis points*** {#tar-4} *****At its monetary policy meeting in September 2026, the** **Governing Council decided to raise its three key interest rates by 25 basis points each.** This Governing Council decision was driven by the inflation pressures generated by the conflict in the Middle East and the expectation that inflation would remain well above target for an extended period. The Governing Council left the key interest rates unchanged in October.***{#par-ua6311} ***2 German economy and fiscal policy*** {#tar-5} ------------------------------------------------- ### ***2.1 Recovery continues; inflation rate likely to increase after the turn of the year*** {#tar-6} *****The German economy continued its recovery in the third quarter of 2026** . According to the Federal Statistical Office's flash estimate, real rose by 0.2 % on the quarter after seasonal adjustment. That means economic growth was only a little less brisk than it had been in the first half of the year and that the economy was more robust than expected. Growth impulses probably came primarily from some services sectors as well as higher consumption. Household consumption, however, probably increased only marginally as high energy prices strained their purchasing power. Commercial investment in machinery and equipment is likely to have declined further. Industrial capacity utilisation was down on its long-term average, despite improving in October. This is dampening incentives to invest in expanding capacity. Loans to enterprises are weak again. This suggests that a sweeping recovery in banks' corporate banking business is unlikely to materialise, and is in line with German firms' subdued propensity to invest. At the same time, banks also tightened their lending policies for loans to enterprises.***{#par-i2u314} *****Industry and construction suffered a setback in the third quarter.** Output and price-adjusted sales in industry declined. Consistent with this, the considerable growth in exports did not continue. The downturn in output was particularly significant in the chemical industry. Competitive advantages that chemicals firms briefly enjoyed in the previous quarter faded, and low water levels on key waterways hampered input deliveries and inflated transport costs. Output of electrical equipment and of computers, electronic and optical products, meanwhile, grew strongly, benefiting from booming global investment in artificial intelligence. In addition, military armament probably buoyed the production of weapons and ammunition as well as other transport equipment. Construction output fell as higher interest rates and costs for construction weighed on residential building, in particular.***{#par-u5846i} *****The labour market softened again slightly.** Employment shrank at a similarly moderate pace in the third quarter as it had in the previous quarters. There was a particularly strong drop in the number of people working exclusively in low-paid part-time jobs. Employment subject to social security contributions, on the other hand, stabilised recently. Seasonally adjusted unemployment increased only marginally, with the unemployment rate remaining at 6.4 %. A decrease in the labour force is also likely to have played a role here. A large number of people are reaching retirement age, while immigration this year is barely helping to stabilise the labour supply. Leading indicators are sending the first signals that the decline in employment will at least slow in the coming months and that unemployment will not rise any further.***{#par-u9i63i} *****Signs of second-round effects from the energy price shock via the wage channel are absent so far.** At 2.8 % year-on-year, growth in negotiated wages in the third quarter was somewhat stronger than before. But wage developments remained moderate all the same. The latest negotiated wage agreements, too, were again markedly lower than in previous years. And the trade unions' wage demands in ongoing negotiations are not excessively high. Actual earnings are likely to have outpaced negotiated wages. Nominal wages were 4.1 % up on the previous year in the July-September period. This was due, in part, to bonus payments, particularly in manufacturing, which also include severance payments.***{#par-eaeea5} *****Inflation strengthened in the third quarter.** Inflation rose from 2.6 % in the second quarter to 3.0 % in the third quarter, largely on the back of higher energy prices. Meanwhile, services disinflation continued, though inflation remains higher than average by historical standards. Core inflation excluding energy and food rose from 2.4 % to 2.6 %. The increase in fixed amounts and prescription charges, which entered into force on 1 July, contributed to this rise. Disregarding that adjustment, the core rate would actually have fallen slightly. October saw inflation shrink to 2.9 %. The fuel rebate had a dampening effect on prices. Furthermore, the sizeable crack spreads (the difference between the prices of crude oil and the corresponding refined oil products) narrowed to a degree.***{#par-o69ui1} *****Inflation is likely to rise sharply at the beginning of 2027, though.** That is when the fuel rebate will expire and other government action will have an inflationary effect. Taken together, these factors could push up inflation by roughly half a percentage point. In addition, gas tariffs are likely to be raised markedly. On top of this, higher energy and input costs are expected to gradually feed through into the prices of other goods and certain services.***{#par-eo6521} *****The fourth quarter will probably see stronger** **growth again.** Expansionary fiscal policy remains a source of impetus. Industry is benefiting from both growing domestic demand and expanding global trade. Both output and exports are therefore likely to pick up. Against the backdrop of higher interest rates and with capacity utilisation still depressed, firms' propensity to invest will probably remain low. The increased mortgage rates are dampening demand for construction work. Civil engineering activity, though, will probably carry on benefiting from government investment in infrastructure. Private consumption is likely to remain muted, even if the time-limited fuel rebate goes some way towards cushioning the impact of high energy prices.***{#par-e13o36} ### ***2.2 Public finances expansionary, deficit high*** {#tar-7} *****German fiscal policy is highly expansionary.**The general government deficit ratio could climb to around 4 % this year and grow further in 2027 (2025: 2.9 %). Additional defence expenditure is the main factor driving the expansionary fiscal policy. And spending by the social security funds is rising briskly overall. As of 2027, though, measures to dampen spending by the health and long-term care insurance schemes will throttle expenditure. What is more, higher interest burdens are part of the reason for the rising deficit ratio.***{#par-u2uao4} *****Central government deficits are especially high.** Defence and infrastructure spending are rising from their 2024 levels. But that additional expenditure is significantly smaller than borrowing via the exemption for defence spending and the Special Fund for Infrastructure and Climate Neutrality. Hence, central government is making extensive use of the expanded scope for borrowing for other purposes. Furthermore, the previous borrowing limit under the debt brake still applies. Central government is making full use of that scope in the adjusted draft budget plan for 2027. Further additional borrowing outside the scope of the debt brake is now also being planned for Autobahn , the off-budget entity for German motorways. With deficits high overall and debt levels rising sharply, this marks a further step away from the goal of achieving sound public finances.***{#par-u1a3i5} ### ***2.3 Comply with rules and safeguard sound public finances*** {#tar-8} *****Irrespective of the broad national fiscal rules, a correction is necessary to comply with the** **rules and to safeguard sound public finances.** The current debt brake does indeed permit significantly higher general government deficits than the rules, as shown by the Federal Ministry of Finance's latest projections. These indicate that the debt brake is met in the planning period up to 2030, but that the 3 % deficit ceiling under the rules is exceeded as of 2026. That is also the case if the exemption for defence expenditure is considered. Based on the Finance Ministry's projections, the Stability Council assessed whether the fiscal requirements are met. The Stability Council is a German body made up of all the finance ministers from central government and the federal states. They fear that Germany will breach the rules. However, no countermeasures have been proposed. It would appear the Stability Council is counting on an extension of the exemption for defence spending, which would relax the rules.***{#par-eii39e} *****Central and state governments need to take action in order to reliably comply with the** **rules.**One step could be to tie the expanded national scope for defence and infrastructure more closely to the actual objectives. If central government defines additional infrastructure and defence expenditure more narrowly and uses the expanded scope for borrowing only for these objectives, deficits will then also be lower. Comparable standards could apply to state and local governments' access to borrowing under the Infrastructure and Climate Neutrality Fund.***{#par-e21o3e} *****Resilient public finances and effective** **fiscal rules are not an end in themselves. Rather, they are the prerequisite for a German fiscal policy that has agency and a stability-oriented monetary union.** This is another reason why the debt brake needs to be reformed: tighter and strictly binding national borrowing limits could prevent borrowing from clashing with the rules and thus reinforce those rules again. At the same time, this would also make German public finances crisis-proof going forward.*** *[EU]: European Union *[GDP]: gross domestic product *[ECB]: European Central Bank *[AI]: artificial intelligence *[**ECB**]: European Central Bank *[**GDP**]: gross domestic product *[ICT]: information and communications technology *[**EU**]: European Union *[**US**]: United States *[GmbH]: Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung *[US]: United States