Demographic developments are putting considerable pressure on the German labour market and government finances. Longer working lives would counteract this. A key factor in this regard is when workers retire. Retirement timing is determined first and foremost by the statutory retirement age, this being the age at which most people paying into the statutory pension insurance scheme (insurees) first draw their old-age pension. However, many also retire earlier.The main consideration here is timing retirement in order to be able to receive a full pension with no benefit reductions (the 45-year rule). However, those insurees who are willing to accept a reduced pension are concerned with the earliest possible age at which they can retire, which is at 63. By way of contrast, only a small number of insurees work beyond the statutory retirement age and increase their pension entitlement. 

The most important variables when it comes to entering retirement are therefore the statutory retirement age together with the minimum ages for retiring early on a full pension and on a reduced pension. Given the demographic challenges, it would be particularly effective to establish links with these variables: the minimum retirement age and (after 2031) the statutory retirement age could be tied to life expectancy, and the option of early retirement without benefit reductions scrapped. The new Federal Government does not intend to make any changes in this regard. Instead, it wants to provide tax incentives to work beyond the statutory retirement age to encourage both people to work for longer and more people to work. Studies indicate only minor effects in connection with this, though. 

In principle, the Federal Government wants to make the transition from work to retirement more flexible. Reductions and increases in employees’ pension benefits for retiring early or late affect both the decisions they make regarding retirement and the finances of the statutory pension insurance scheme. This article outlines the relevant relationships here and advocates determining reductions and increases in the statutory pension insurance scheme based on transparent principles in future. An actuarial approach is one way of achieving this. This method can be used to calculate reductions and increases in such a way that, from the perspective of an individual with an average life expectancy, the time at which they retire is financially neutral. It would thus make sense, first, to stagger the reductions and increases per month of early or late retirement according to the difference between the age at which insurees actually retire and the statutory retirement age. Second, they should be regularly reviewed and adjusted as necessary for birth cohorts approaching retirement. Additionally, the standard calculations presented in this article indicate that the current reductions are set too low overall and the increases too high.

The minimum retirement ages in the statutory pension insurance scheme have a decisive impact on when insurees choose to retire (see the section entitled “Minimum ages in the pension insurance scheme are a key factor in when insurees choose to retire”). The statutory retirement age and the rules on pension entitlement when retiring early are important variables with respect to employment in old age. Longer working lives would counteract demographic developments and ease the burden on the labour market and government finances.

The new Federal Government does not intend to change the rules on pension entitlement (see the section entitled “Pension policy discussion and the new Federal Government’s plans”). In this respect, there are no quantitatively relevant pension policy measures planned to strengthen the potential labour force and extend working life in response to demographic developments.

The Federal Government wants to make the transition from work to retirement more flexible. Reductions and increases in employees’ pension benefits for retiring early or late retirement affect the decisions they make regarding retirement (see the section entitled “Calculating benefit reductions and increases for early or late retirement”). The article illustrates how reductions and increases work and shows how they can be calculated so that they are financially neutral. It discusses the assumptions necessary for this and the limitations of the approach used. 

The results show that it would make sense to adjust benefit reductions and increases (see the section entitled “Benefit reductions and increases: conclusions and reform options”).

When workers retire is an important factor for the labour market and government finances:

There are four types of old-age pension, which differ in terms of eligibility requirements (see Table 3.1): 

The pension options available to insurees depend on their period of insurance: these are the periods in which they themselves paid contributions or credited periods in which they paid no contributions (child-rearing periods, for example). In the case of old-age pensions for insurees with disabilities, these pension-qualifying periods must be accompanied by a degree of disability of at least 50 %. The remainder of this article will focus on the first three pension types. 

Retirement timing is determined first and foremost by the statutory retirement age. However, the rules on pension entitlement when retiring early are also important (see Charts 3.1 and 3.2). From 2012, the actual average retirement age 4 rose almost in parallel with the statutory retirement age. 5 The lowering of the minimum age for drawing a pension with no benefit reductions after 45 years of insurance to 63 in mid-2014 ended this trend: the actual retirement age initially fell significantly on average (see Chart 3.1). The statutory minimum age for drawing a pension with no reductions subsequently went up twice as quickly as the statutory retirement age up to 2023. This was one reason why that the actual retirement age rose again during this period, largely in parallel with the statutory retirement age. 6

The standard old-age pension (column (1) in Table 3.1) can be drawn from the statutory retirement age onwards. This retirement age is gradually rising, reaching 67 for the 1964 birth cohort (from 2031). If an insuree retires at exactly the statutory retirement age, their pension benefits will not be reduced or increased compared with their accrued entitlement. A minimum of five years of insurance is required to receive a standard old-age pension. An individual’s pension entitlement is determined by the pension entitlement points both earned and credited to them during the period of insurance. 7  

It appears that retirement timing continues to be determined first and foremost by the statutory retirement age (see Chart 3.2). 8 In 2023, around 40 % of insurees retired at the statutory retirement age. These were insurees born in 1957, aged 65 years and 11 months.

Insurees with a period of insurance of at least 45 years can retire before the statutory retirement age without their pensions being reduced ((2) in Table 3.1). The minimum age for retiring early on a full pension was introduced in 2012 when the statutory retirement age was raised. Initially, it was necessary to have reached the age of 65. In mid-2014, this minimum age was lowered by two years, giving insurees the option to retire at 63, and it has been gradually rising again over time since 2016. In 2023, the minimum age for retiring early on a full pension was 64 years and two months, and from 2029 it will be back at 65. 9 In the current legal landscape, it will then remain two years behind the statutory retirement age, which will be 67 from 2031 onwards.

Upon the introduction of early retirement pensions without benefit reductions, the share of insurees who retired early rose sharply. 10 At present, these pension recipients make up a large proportion (around 30 %) of all new old-age pension recipients (see Chart 3.2 and Chart 3.4). Most people who retire early on a full pension in this way retire at the relevant general minimum age. In 2023, just under 80 % of new pension recipients with an exceptionally long period of insurance retired at this point in time (see Chart 3.3, light blue line). The remaining 20 % did not start drawing their full pension until later. The reasons for this behaviour cannot be derived from the data: one reason could be that the necessary number of years of insurance had not yet been reached. These insurees may have also wished to further build up their pension entitlement. However, there would have been nothing stopping them from retiring early assuming they met the requirements to do so, as the cap on additional earnings was lifted in 2023. Overall, similar behaviour was observed in previous years.

Insurees can retire early on a reduced pension from the age of 63 after a period of insurance of at least 35 years ((3) in Table 3.1). For each month before reaching the statutory retirement age that they draw their pension, their pension benefits are permanently reduced by 0.3 %. 11

The third largest group of new pension recipients are insurees who retire at the earliest possible age of 63 on a reduced pension (see Chart 3.2). In 2023, almost one-quarter of new recipients of old-age pensions retired on a reduced pension (see Chart 3.4). Almost two-thirds of this group retired at the earliest possible age of 63, thus accepting the maximum reduction (see Chart 3.4, dark blue bar).

Insurees can also wait until after the statutory retirement age to start drawing their pension ((1) in Table 3.1). The statutory pension insurance scheme then permanently increases their overall old-age pension by 0.5 % for each month after they reach the statutory retirement age. In 2023, only 3½ % of new old-age pension recipients started drawing their pension later and received a pension increase as a result (see Chart 3.4). 12 Although the level is low, the share has risen by 1½ percentage points since 2010.

Many reform proposals for the pension insurance scheme touch on these minimum ages. These are aimed at generally reducing the financial pressures caused by demographic trends. In order to increase employment and ease the strain on pension finances, the following measures, in particular, are being discussed: 13

The coalition agreement between the CDU and SPD does not contain any changes to these retirement rules.This means that keylevers for meeting demographic challenges in pension policy are going unused.

The new Federal Government instead intends to make working beyond the statutory retirement age more attractive from a tax standpoint. However, there is some evidence to suggest that financial incentives are likely to extend the employment period only a little, and further preferential tax treatment has disadvantages. According to a survey in the Federal Government’s 2024 Old-age Security Report, 15 financial reasons play only a minor role (14 % of respondents) in employment among those aged 65 or older. The most frequently cited reason, at just over one-quarter, is enjoying work. Other reasons named after that include social aspects, such as continuing to have something to do or contact with other people. Thus, a financial advantage is more likely to have a free-rider effect. In order to achieve comparable effects to those attained by reforming minimum ages, more extensive government funding would have to be mobilised. There are also other reasons against introducing new preferential tax treatment instead of working on the minimum ages. Central government’s budget situation is already tight, and it would therefore be especially important to use efficient instruments that are cost-effective for central government. In addition, special tax rules generally open up opportunities for creative tax accounting. This creates extra work for the bureaucracy, by increasing monitoring for example. This runs counter to the Federal Government’s objective of reducing administrative burdens. 

It would make sense to eliminate the burden of insurance contributions for people working beyond the statutory retirement age. The previous Federal Government had intended to do this in its growth initiative, but the plan was never adopted in the Bundestag. It is unclear whether the new Federal Government intends to adopt this proposal. At present, employees working beyond the statutory retirement age no longer have to pay their share of contributions, but the employer is still required to pay their share. No additional entitlements accrue from just the employer share. Employees can acquire additional entitlements exclusively in the statutory pension insurance scheme (not in the unemployment insurance scheme) by continuing to insure themselves on a voluntary basis. If they do so, they must pay both the employer and employee contributions to the statutory pension insurance scheme. It would make sense if, going forward, employers were to pay out the employer’s share of contributions for the unemployment and pension insurance schemes to employees. Employees could then decide whether they want to continue making contributions to the pension insurance scheme in order to acquire entitlements.

In principle, the Federal Government is aiming to make the transition from work to retirement more flexible. 16 This then makes the level of benefit reductions and increases relevant. This applies both to the decision to retire early or late, and to the associated financial impact on the pension insurance scheme. Reviewing the reductions and increases for early or late retirement has also been suggested in the debate on pension policy. 17  This article goes into more detail below. 

Benefit reductions and increases are intended to offset the financial effects of retiring early or late. Early retirement extends the period over which a pension is drawn. Late retirement shortens that period accordingly. In the case of early retirement, a reduction of monthly pension benefits offsets the longer pension-drawing period.

There are various approaches to determining reductions and increases. All approaches require assumptions to be made about key parameters. In addition, it is necessary to define what purpose the reductions and increases are meant to serve. Selecting the factors incorporated into the calculations also plays a big part. These decisions can have a significant impact on the results. One possible methodology is to determine reductions and increases from the perspective of pension finances. They are calculated in such a way that the time of retirement is neutral for pension finances and thus the contribution rate. However, this approach is complex and requires numerous additional assumptions. 18 This article therefore takes a different approach.

Below, we look at benefit reductions and increases from the perspectiveof the average insuree. 19 The pragmatic approach used enables us to calculate reductions and increases in a rules-based and understandable way. Key assumptions are explained and their implications discussed further below.

The approach calculates benefit reductions and increases such that the time of retirement is financially neutral for an average insuree (“neutral reductions and increases”). This means that average insurees have no financial incentives to retire early or late. Early retirement extends the period over which a pension is drawn. Viewed in isolation, this has financial benefits for insurees. Reductions of pension payments (over the longer period) are intended to cancel out this advantage. Insurees who retire late receive increases to their pension payments. These compensate for the financial disadvantage of the resultant shorter pension-drawing period. This approach is very common in the literature. 20 Specifically, the neutral reductions and increases are calculated in such a way that the present value of pension payments is independent of the age at which a person retires. The supplementary information below (“On what assumptions are neutral reductions and increases based?”) explains the necessary assumptions and simplifications. The neutral reductions and increases refer to an average insuree. For more on the problem of calculating reductions and increases based on population averages, see the supplementary information entitled “Adverse selection”.

For a given age group, the level of neutral benefit reductions and increases goes down for each month of earlier retirement(see Chart 3.5, left-hand section: curve rises). This means that for each additional month by which retirement is delayed, the additional neutral increases become higher. Conversely, the earlier retirement is brought forward, the lower the respective additional neutral reductions. These examples illustrate this effect: 

The greater the gap between entering retirement and the statutory retirement age, the higher the cumulative neutral benefit reductions and increases. Chart 3.5 (right-hand section) illustrates this using the cumulative neutral reductions and increases of an average person born in 1964. People born in this year are the first to reach the statutory retirement age of 67. Assuming that an insuree wishes to retire four years before the statutory retirement age, they would have to forgo 19 % of the pension amount they would have been able to claim from acquiring the same number of pension entitlement points up to that point for standard retirement. 21 Conversely, an insuree who postpones retirement by two years would have to receive an increase of just over 11 % on their pension. In this case, the current rules would envisage lower reductions or higher increases (see the section entitled “Current reductions and increases”). 

The level of neutral benefit reductions and increases depends on numerous factors. These include the probability of dying, the statutory retirement age, the annual pension adjustment and the discount rate used to calculate present value. The previous section presented results based on the standard assumptions made (see the supplementary information entitled “On what assumptions are neutral pension benefit reductions and increases based?”). This section shows how the results depend on selected assumptions. These sensitivity analyses illustrate how robust the standard results are for varying parameters.

The probability of reaching a certain age varies among insurees. For example, these probabilities differ systematically by birth year. People born in later years are more likely to survive to a certain age, on average. Life expectancy consolidates the survival probabilities into one simplified measure.

The higher the life expectancy, the lower the neutral benefit reductions and increases. Higher life expectancy extends the pension-drawing period (given the same statutory retirement age). Reductions are therefore made over a longer period and thus reduce the present value more. Neutral reductions are therefore lower. The same applies to increases: they are made over a longer period and neutral increases are accordingly lower. Chart 3.6 (left-hand section) illustrates this using the example of the neutral reductions and increases for people born in 1964 and 1976. The one-year increase in life expectancy for the 1976 cohort shifts the neutral reductions and increases downwards. 22

The statutory pension insurance scheme takes into account rising life expectancy insofar as the statutory retirement age has gradually risen to 67 since 2012. Raising the statutory retirement age shortens the expected pension-drawing period. Without this adjustment, the increase in life expectancy would lead to a longer pension-drawing period.

Raising the statutory retirement age pushes back the point in time from which increases rather than reductions are applied,and the size of the maximum possible reductions goes up(see Chart 3.6, right-hand section). A higher statutory retirement age leads to an overall increase in the reductions for early retirement at a given age: if a person born in 1964 retires two years early at the age of 65 (statutory retirement age: 67), the neutral reduction amounts to 9.7 %. If the statutory retirement age had been 66, the neutral reduction for retirement at 65 would be 4.8 %. If the statutory retirement age goes up while at the same time the minimum age for retirement remains unchanged at 63, the number of months in which reductions are possible also goes up. This could lead to major financial advantages or disadvantages if the reductions are not neutral.

The level of neutral benefit reductions and increases also depends on how much pensions rise over time. The slower the growth in pensions, the higher the neutral reductions and increases. Lower pension adjustments lead to lower pension payments in the future. Pension payments in the case of early retirement are less affected by this, as they are made in the near future. Lower growth rates are less relevant to them. In order to ensure financial neutrality, higher reductions are therefore necessary for early retirement. To illustrate this, assume that pensions grow by an average of 2 % per year instead of 2½ %. If a person enters retirement four years early, the cumulative neutral reduction would then be 20 % instead of 19 %, or 1 percentage point higher.

The level of the (discount) interest rate is an important factor. The higher the interest rate, the greater the neutral benefit reductions and increases. 23 A higher interest rate reduces the present value of pension payments. The further in the future the payment is, the greater this effect. This makes late retirement with higher, unreduced pension payments less attractive. Financial neutrality therefore requires larger reductions when interest rates are higher in order to offset the lower present value.

The standard calculations used are based on a discount rate of 2½ %. This roughly corresponds to the current yield on ten-year Bunds and thus a safe investment. With investments that are explicitly used for retirement provision, most investors are unlikely to want to take on greater risk in the later stages of life. Any steeper losses will then be virtually impossible to offset and will have a direct impact on the remaining lifetime income. This suggests that holders of funded pensions should rebalance away from more volatile, higher-yielding assets towards lower-yielding but safer assets over the course of their lives. The standard calculation of neutral reductions and increases in this article is based on this kind of safe asset, using the yield on German government bonds for the discount rate. In Chart 3.7, the middle line shows the standard result. The neutral reductions and increases are different if a different discount rate is used. 24

Neutral benefit reductions and increases go up when applying a higher discount rate (based on expected long-term returns on equity investments, for example). The expected returns are higher for these than for Bunds, but so is the associated risk. If the discount rate is 3½ %, for example, the monthly neutral reductions and increases are 0.049 percentage point higher (upper line in Chart 3.7). Similarly, a lower discount rate requires lower neutral reductions. Returns on savings deposits are usually lower than those on Bunds, for instance. If the discount rate is 1½ %, the monthly neutral reductions and increases would be 0.046 percentage point lower (bottom line in Chart 3.7). 

Currently, early retirement entails a benefit reduction of 0.3 % per month, while delayed retirement results in an increase of 0.5 % per month. These monthly reductions and increases apply irrespective of the exact date of retirement. 

The benefit reductions and increases in the pension insurance scheme have remained unchanged since they were established in 1992. 25 Yet there have since been significant shifts in the previously discussed framework conditions for determining neutral reductions and increases. For instance, life expectancy beyond the age of 65 has risen by just over 3 years, while the statutory retirement age is currently just over 1 year higher. These two effects on neutral reductions and increases, for example, have thus only partially offset each other overall.

Three key variables for the timing of retirement are the statutory retirement age together with the minimum ages for retiring early on a full pension and on a reduced pension: if an extension of working lives is desired, reforms should focus on these variables. Data on the actual retirement age show just how important the specific minimum ages are. Moreover, it has become apparent that when the minimum ages are raised, the actual retirement age follows the statutory retirement minimum ages fairly closely. To extend working lives, it is therefore all the more important to link the statutory retirement age (for the period after 2031) and the minimum age for retiring early on a reduced pension to life expectancy and to revoke the option to take early retirement on a full pension.

The new Federal Government wishes to make the transition from work to retirement more flexible.The size of benefit reductions and increases is a key component in this endeavour. Benefit reductions and increases play into an individual’s decision to bring forward or delay retirement. They have a lasting impact on the finances of the pension insurance scheme. The suggestion to review reductions and increases has also featured in the pension policy debate. The analyses in this article yield the following conclusions: 

1 Calculate benefit reductions and increases on the basis of clear and transparent principles and review them regularly.

Benefit reductions and increases are built into the design of the pension insurance scheme. It is advisable to ensure that they are calculated on the basis of clear and transparent principles. One way of doing this is to use an actuarial approach with standard assumptions, as in this article. The approach is based on models commonly used in the literature and calculates reductions and increases from the perspective of the “average” insuree. Other approaches and assumptions are also conceivable, however. What matters is that the selected approach and assumptions are clearly justified and made transparent.

Given the changing framework conditions, it would be advisable for benefit reductions and increases to be subject to regular review and, where required, undergo rules-based adjustments. For example, there may be changes in life expectancy or in what discount rate is deemed appropriate. Benefit reductions and increases should then be adjusted in advance for future retirement cohorts and applied when these individuals enter retirement. This process could, for example, be carried out every five years, or whenever the Federal Statistical Office publishes new population projections, and then applied to future retirement cohorts (with a certain time lag). 

2 Stagger benefit reductions and increases according to distance from the statutory retirement age

There is much to suggest that reductions and increases in retirement benefits should be staggered according to distance from the statutory retirement age to make them neutral. Under current legislation, reductions and increases in retirement benefits both apply irrespective of the exact date of retirement. While fixed percentages are easier to communicate, they do not systematically reflect the impact of the timing of retirement. This article calculates benefit reductions and increases that should compensate financially for this impact. The standard results show that, as the distance from the statutory retirement age increases, neutral benefit reductions for each additional month fall and benefit increases rise (see Chart 3.8, left-hand panel: rising line).

A pragmatic approach would be to apply different reductions and increases according to insurees’ age of retirement. Here, monthly averages can be set for specific age groups. For example, for people born in 1964, the reduction between the ages of 63 and 64 is 0.37 % per month. Those retiring between the ages of 66 and 67 would see a monthly reduction of 0.42 %. A similar approach is already being applied to the increase in minimum ages and the taxable share of pensions. The respective limits change according to birth cohort.

3 The presented standard calculations point to the need to raise current benefit reductions and lower increases

The standard calculations presented in this article suggest that the current reductions are too low. This makes early retirement more attractive and imposes financial burdens on the statutory pension scheme. Overall, the earlier retirement takes place, the greater the financial burden: an individual in the 1964 birth cohort retiring at the earliest possible age of 63 incurs cumulative reductions of 14.4 % (0.3 % x 48 months). These reductions are thus around 4½ percentage points below the neutral reductions calculated in this article (see Chart 3.8, right-hand panel).

Under the standard assumptions outlined here, benefit increases are currently rather too high. If retirement is delayed by two years, this currently results in cumulative increases of 12 % (0.5 % x 24 months). This is around 1½ percentage points more than in the case of the neutral increases calculated here (see Chart 3.8, right-hand panel). 

Moreover, for the pension insurance scheme’s finances it may also make sense, in general, to deviate upwards from the neutral benefit reductions and deviate downwards from the neutral increases. Choosing when to enter retirement is an option open to insurees. It is up to each individual whether to use it or not. Options have a tendency to increase the pension insurance scheme’s total expenditure. This is because each insuree chooses the option that is likely to be most favourable for them – which they are probably relatively well able to identify (see the supplementary information entitled “Adverse selection“). With this in mind, it would also be reasonable to set reductions on the higher side and increases on the lower side.

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