Bundesbank round-up

1 Economic activity and price developments

Unusually high inflation continued to shape the setting in 2023. However, the global wave of inflation eased markedly over the course of the year. This wave had been set in motion by the fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic and the economic policy responses to it and intensified by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. 1 In many places, it led to the strongest price increases in decades. Wage growth also accelerated considerably in response to the high inflation rates. This in itself helped push prices up further, particularly in the services sector. Moreover, some enterprises expanded their profit margins in the high inflation environment.

In the industrial countries, consumer price inflation stood at 7.8% on average in 2022 and still amounted to 4.9% in 2023. One major reason for the easing of inflation was the decline in energy prices, which had previously risen sharply. Core inflation, which strips out energy and food prices, also subsided in 2023. Having reached 5.2% in 2022, it still stood at 4.8% in the reporting period. 

The global economy expanded moderately last year. One of the reasons was the high level of inflation, which dampened private consumption. Moreover, the tightening of monetary policy in many regions slowed economic growth. However, there was no recession, not least because labour markets were robust. Nor was there any lasting impairment to the financial sector; intermittent turbulence in the spring had no noticeable impact on global economic activity. 

According to the projection published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the global economy is expected to have grown by 3.1% overall last year, compared with 3.5% in 2022. Global economic activity is set to expand at the same pace this year, with inflationary pressures likely to weaken further. Downside risks to the global economic outlook would emerge, in particular, if inflation did not ease as expected and the tight monetary policy stance had to be sustained for longer than currently assumed. Other risks are posed by the possible continued faltering of growth in China, a potential escalation of the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, and geopolitical tensions in other regions of the world. 

These uncertainties underline the importance of maintaining cooperation through international organisations. The decision to increase the financial resources of the International Monetary Fund in December 2023 is aimed at helping to achieve this; see the section entitled “The International Monetary Fund’s own financial resources are being augmented on a lasting basis”. This measure is an important element in ensuring future global financial stability. 

Supplementary information

The International Monetary Fund’s own financial resources are being augmented on a lasting basis 

After many years of negotiations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a quota increase in December 2023 under the 16th General Review of Quotas. The aim was to maintain its lending capacity beyond the end of 2024. The IMF’s financial resources, and thus the funds for its regular financial assistance, consist essentially of the financial contributions of its member countries in the amounts of their quotas. In addition to this quota funding, the IMF can, in times of crisis, draw on multilateral New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) or Bilateral Borrowing Agreements (BBAs) concluded with financially strong members, provided that certain conditions are met. This enables it to meet increased demand for financial assistance in the event of a crisis.

In December 2023, the IMF Board of Governors decided to increase IMF quotas by 50%. 1 This increase in quotas will allow the IMF to maintain its lending capacity at its current level after the scheduled expiry of the BBAs at the end of 2024. Germany’s quota will rise accordingly from SDR 26.6 billion to SDR 40 billion (€48.8 billion, as at end-2023). A country’s quota share is intended to reflect its relative position in the global economy. It also determines a country’s voting rights, its allocated amount of special drawing rights, and its limits on access to financial assistance.

Quotas are being increased proportionally for all member countries, so each country’s quota share will remain unchanged. Many emerging market and developing economies called for the quota formula to be adjusted in favour of faster-growing countries, but it was not possible to reach an agreement. The Bundesbank would have fundamentally supported a balanced adjustment of quota shares. Germany’s quota share remains unchanged at 5.6%. Germany therefore remains the fourth-largest IMF shareholder, after the United States, Japan and China. In order for the agreed increase in quotas to become effective, member countries representing 85% of the total quota volume must approve the increase in their individual quotas. It is expected that this will be achieved by mid-November 2024, after which the corresponding payments are to be made to the IMF. As the financial rights and obligations of the Federal Republic of Germany arising from its membership in the IMF are assumed by the Bundesbank, the Bundesbank will pay up Germany’s quota increase and report the correspondingly higher value of Germany’s IMF position as foreign reserves on its balance sheet.

As part of the review of quotas, it was also decided that there will be a reduction in NAB at the same time as the increase in quotas. This is intended to keep lending capacity constant, as the increase in quotas exceeds the volume of the expiring BBAs. In future, the IMF’s financing structure will thus be based to a significantly greater extent on quotas than on NAB. The Bundesbank’s contribution to the NAB will decline from SDR 25.8 billion to SDR 21.6 billion. Furthermore, the Bundesbank’s BBA with the IMF, which amounts to SDR 14.6 billion (€17.9 billion, as at end-2023), will expire at the end of this year. The Bundesbank’s overall contribution to the IMF’s financing will thus decline by SDR 5.5 billion. If the increase in quotas has not been implemented by the end of 2024, the Bundesbank would, if necessary, contribute to temporary lines of credit to the IMF in order to prevent a temporary drop in the IMF’s financial resources.

IMF financial resources and the Bundesbank's contribution before and after the 16th General Review of Quotas becomes effective
IMF financial resources and the Bundesbank's contribution before and after the 16th General Review of Quotas becomes effective

Footnotes
  1. From SDR 477.1 billion to SDR 715.7 billion. Special drawing rights (SDRs) are a reserve medium created by the IMF and form part of the Bundesbank’s foreign reserves. For more details, see the section entitled Receivables from the IMF.

2023 was a challenging year for the German economy. In addition to the after-effects of the sharp rise in energy costs, weak foreign demand weighed on industrial output. Moreover, high inflation depressed private consumption. High wage increases therefore did not yet lead to a marked rise in consumption expenditure. The Eurosystem’s tighter monetary policy also curbed economic activity. Increased financing costs dampened investment, particularly in housing construction. Finally, government consumption fell sharply in the absence of pandemic-related expenditure on items such as vaccination and testing. 

Aggregate output
Aggregate output

On the other hand, the normalisation of supply chains, the high order backlog in industry and construction and the still stable labour market bolstered activity. According to preliminary data from the Federal Statistical Office, German economic output, measured in terms of price-adjusted and calendar-adjusted gross domestic product (GDP), fell slightly last year by 0.1% on the year. Borne mainly by more buoyant export activity and a pick-up in private consumption, aggregate output will return to an expansionary path this year, rising by 0.4% according to the Bundesbank’s December 2023 forecast

Inflation in Germany as measured by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) surpassed its peak in October 2022. Driven by falling energy prices, it has weakened considerably since then. Headline inflation in Germany came to an annual average of 6% in 2023, down from 8.7% in 2022. Core inflation, on the other hand, climbed from 3.9% in 2022 to 5.1% last year. According to the Bundesbank’s December forecast, headline inflation in Germany is likely to decline further to 2.7% this year and core inflation to 3%. 

The euro area economy, too, lost momentum last year. High inflation held back private consumption. Weak foreign demand weighed on industry. In addition, many of the support measures adopted in the wake of the pandemic and the energy crisis expired. Last but not least, the rise in financing costs also curbed the pace of growth. Overall, real GDP growth slowed from a calendar-adjusted average of 3.4%  in 2022 to 0.5% in the reporting period. According to the latest Eurosystem projections, the euro area economy could expand somewhat faster in 2024, at 0.8%.

Price pressures in the euro area eased significantly last year. As was the case for Germany, this was driven primarily by a marked decline in energy prices. Headline HICP inflation in the euro area came to an average of 5.4% in 2023, down from 8.4% in 2022. By contrast, core inflation in the euro area rose from 3.9% in 2022 to 4.9% last year. It will still be some time before inflation returns to the target rate of 2%. According to the Eurosystem's latest outlook for prices and costs, HICP inflation will still come to 2.7% this year. Only in 2025 will inflation be close to the inflation target rate, at 2.1%. Core inflation will stand at 2.7% this year and 2.3% next year. 

Consumer prices
Consumer prices

2 Monetary policy

Given the strong and persistent price pressures in the euro area, the Governing Council of the ECB continued to tighten its monetary policy in 2023, a process it had begun in 2022. Extensive measures were taken to ensure a timely return of inflation to its 2% target; for more details, see the Chronology of monetary policy decisions. These measures affected the key interest rates, in particular, but also the asset purchase programmes. After the Eurosystem ended net asset purchases under the pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP) and asset purchase programme (APP) in 2022, it also scaled back reinvestments of principal payments from maturing securities purchased under the APP from the beginning of March 2023, discontinuing APP purchases altogether at the end of June 2023. 

With regard to its interest rate decisions, the Governing Council of the ECB announced that it would not decide in advance on a specific interest rate path, but would take a meeting-by-meeting approach based on the incoming economic data instead. Given the persistently unfavourable price outlook, the Governing Council of the ECB raised key interest rates six times in a row in 2023; by 0.5 percentage point each in February and March, and by 0.25 percentage point at each of the next four monetary policy meetings. As a result, the interest rate on the deposit facility, which is currently the most relevant monetary policy interest rate, rose to 4%. The Governing Council of the ECB thus carried out the largest and steepest sequence of interest rate hikes in the history of the Eurosystem, totalling 4.5 percentage points in just over a year. The interest rate hikes decided by the Governing Council pushed up the cost of financing for households and enterprises, thus dampening aggregate demand and helping to ease high price pressures.

In the light of declining inflation rates, the Governing Council of the ECB decided at its October monetary policy meeting not to raise interest rates any further for the time being. This decision was informed by the Council's assumption that current interest rates were at levels that, maintained for a sufficiently long duration, would make a substantial contribution to achieving the price stability target. At its last monetary policy meeting of 2023, the Governing Council decided to keep interest rates on hold. However, it did not rule out further interest rate hikes if required by the price outlook. In order to ensure a timely return to price stability, the Bundesbank believes that the monetary policy stance should not be loosened too early. 

Tighter monetary policy affects not only the cost of financing for households, enterprises and general government, but also the central bank’s balance sheet. Since the latest round of monetary policy tightening began, the Eurosystem’s balance sheet has contracted by around one-fifth, or just over €1.8 trillion in absolute terms. This was mainly because a large volume of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) matured or were repaid early by euro area banks. The ECB Governing Council’s adjustment of the previously very favourable interest rate conditions for this type of refinancing operation provided incentives for early repayments from the end of November 2022 onwards. The reduction of the balance sheet was supplemented by the discontinuation of reinvestments under the APP. The Governing Council decided that, from the second half of 2024 onwards, maturing securities under the PEPP will no longer be reinvested in full; by the end of 2024, it intends to discontinue purchases under the PEPP altogether.

The monetary policy tightening that commenced in 2022 shrank more than just the Eurosystem’s balance sheet. The profitability of euro area central banks also deteriorated significantly as a result of the rise in key interest rates. The Eurosystem’s holdings of bonds are predominantly long-term investments, whose relatively low returns have so far been largely unaffected by the interest rate reversal. By contrast, the interest rate hikes directly increase the Eurosystem’s interest expenditure, as banks are paid higher rates on their deposits with central banks. It was for this reason that the Bundesbank already reported a result of zero in its profit and loss account for 2022. In 2023, the tight monetary policy stance once again weighed on the Bundesbank’s profitability; see the section entitled “Interest rate risk on the central bank balance sheet”.

Supplementary information

Interest rate risk on the central bank balance sheet

Central banks in all G7 countries significantly decreased their policy rates and made large-scale bond purchases following the financial crisis. In doing so, they counteracted historically low inflation rates for the benefit of price stability. Both short-term and longer-term market interest rates fell as a result, boosting economic activity and helping central banks to achieve their objective of price stability. 

The Eurosystem has been making asset purchases under various monetary policy purchase programmes since 2009. These include, in particular, the asset purchase programme (APP) launched in 2015 and the pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP) launched in 2020. The holdings of securities purchased by the Eurosystem for monetary policy purposes amounted to €4.7 trillion as at 31 December 2023, of which €1.0 trillion was attributable to the Bundesbank. 

As balance sheets have expanded, the financial risks they contain have also increased considerably. The Bundesbank already highlighted these risks at an early stage. 1 While risk considerations feed into monetary policy decision-making, certain risks cannot be avoided in fulfilling the price stability mandate. In the current environment, these include interest rate risk, in particular. 

Prior to the commencement of asset purchases for monetary policy purposes, the Bundesbank’s balance sheet contained virtually no interest rate risk. The vast majority of the interest-bearing items on the assets side of the balance sheet had short maturities and were balanced out, in particular, by the non-interest-bearing banknotes in circulation. However, the asset purchases for monetary policy purposes have resulted in a large volume of fixed interest items with longer maturities on the assets side. At the same time, liabilities with short maturities, i.e. interest-bearing deposits of banks and other depositors with the Bundesbank, formed as balance sheet counterparts. 

The various maturity profiles have given rise to an open euro interest rate position, i.e. interest rate risk. This risk has materialised as a result of the necessary policy rate hikes in response to excessively high inflation rates. While the APP and PEPP holdings generate only low levels of interest income, the interest expense incurred by short-term deposits is growing as interest rates rise. This combination of long-term monetary policy holdings generating a low level of remuneration and short-term deposits remunerated at higher levels is giving rise to considerable burdens in the Bundesbank’s profit and loss account. These burdens are reflected in the profit and loss item “Net interest income”. They have also proportionally affected profit and loss item 5 “Net result of pooling of monetary income”. This is because the risk and returns arising from some securities held for monetary policy purposes are pooled across the Eurosystem as monetary income. The burdens arising from the ECB's securities holdings in 2023 constitute an exception:  the ECB Governing Council decided that the ECB’s losses for 2023 would not be assumed by the national central banks. This means that the ECB’s current losses are not reflected in the Bundesbank’s 2023 annual accounts. Looking further ahead, though, these losses will also proportionally weigh on the Bundesbank’s profit and loss account. 

In the past, the Bundesbank took precautionary measures against the backdrop of rising financial risks. Starting in 2010, it gradually increased its provisions for general risks to absorb potential losses. Risk provisioning was also the reason why the Bundesbank did not distribute profits for the 2020 and 2021 financial years. To offset the loss recorded in the 2022 annual accounts, a withdrawal of €1 billion was made from the provisions for general risks. To offset the loss for 2023, the remaining €19.2 billion in provisions for general risks will be released in full. The residual loss for the year will be offset by making corresponding withdrawals from the reserves.

The interest income from APP and PEPP holdings will remain low in the years ahead, while short-term deposits will generate a substantial interest expense owing to the higher key interest rates. Therefore, as things currently stand, the burdens in the Bundesbank’s profit and loss account are likely to be considerable over the next few years as well, although they will tend to shrink in size as APP and PEPP holdings mature. The exact magnitude of future burdens will depend on various factors, which are subject to a high degree of uncertainty. These include future changes in the key interest rates, in the size and structure of the Bundesbank’s balance sheet and in its other income. Against this background, the magnitude and duration of potential future burdens varies greatly with the assumptions made in each case. Should further burdens be incurred over the coming years, the Bundesbank will report a growing loss carryforward. Profits for future financial years would then have to be used to reduce the loss carryforward.

The Bundesbank’s balance sheet is sound. The Bundesbank has considerable assets, which are significantly in excess of its obligations. The degree to which the Bundesbank’s balance sheet is sound is reflected, amongst other things, in its sizeable revaluation reserves. At the end of 2023, they amounted to almost €200 billion; see “Capital and reserves”. In addition, the Bundesbank anticipates that its financial burdens will pass and that it will subsequently make profits again.

Even given the visible prospect of a loss carryforward, the Bundesbank thus remains able to fully discharge its tasks. It is committed to its primary objective of maintaining price stability. In view of this objective, the actions and the balance sheet of a central bank cannot be compared to the actions or balance sheet of a private credit institution. The Eurosystem and the Bundesbank must, and will, do everything necessary to ensure price stability, even if this puts a temporary strain on their own profitability.

Footnotes
  1. See, in particular, Deutsche Bundesbank, Management of financial risks, Annual Report 2012, pp. 127 f.;
    Deutsche Bundesbank, The development of government interest expenditure in Germany and other euro-area countries, Monthly Report, July 2017, pp. 33 ff.;
    Deutsche Bundesbank, Government finances: Central bank bond purchases increase sensitivity to interest rate changes, Monthly Report, June 2021, pp. 39 ff.;
    and Deutsche Bundesbank, Interest rate risk on the central bank balance sheet, Annual Report 2022, pp. 16 f.

3 Fiscal policy

Public finances in Germany improved last year. The government deficit ratio fell from 2.5% in 2022 to 2% in 2023. The government debt ratio reached 64.8% in the third quarter of 2023, compared with 66.1% at the end of 2022. Public finances benefited from the gradual phasing out of the temporary COVID-19 support measures. This outweighed the mounting burdens presented by the likes of the support measures related to the energy crisis, defence, higher interest expenditure or unfavourable economic developments. However, excluding temporary crisis measures and cyclical effects, the deficit has risen.

The ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court of 15 November 2023 strengthens the binding effect of the debt brake. 2 This specifies, in particular, that emergency loans must not be transferred into special funds for use in future fiscal years. The ruling relates to central government, but is also relevant to state governments. The Bundesbank pointed out constitutional risks to budgetary and financial planning in this respect. 3 Having numerous, large-scale off-budget entities may impair the transparency and monitoring of public finances. 4 Ultimately, only binding fiscal rules can ensure sound public finances. But this does not preclude a stability-oriented reform of the rules. 5

The deficit ratio will continue to decline this year and next, with the debt ratio thus likely to continue to approach 60%. The deficit ratio is falling because temporary energy crisis measures are expiring, especially this year, and because adverse cyclical factors will subside over the course of the year. In structural terms, however, the deficit ratio will probably continue to rise. Expenditure on defence is likely to grow, in particular. This will be compounded by other burdens, such as the abolition of the renewable energy (EEG) levy, collective labour agreements and rising pension payments. How central and state governments adapt their plans to the Federal Constitutional Court ruling remains to be seen, especially for 2025.

Last year, public finances in Germany and the EU were still heavily influenced by the energy crisis, to begin with. Central governments continued to provide substantial support to households and enterprises. Given the bottlenecks in the supply of energy, it was particularly important that such assistance measures entailed incentives to save energy – in Germany, for instance, these incentives were successfully incorporated into the energy price brakes. Generally speaking, it would have been beneficial to direct the measures more precisely towards those in need. This would have weighed less heavily on public finances, helping to make monetary policy more effective in curbing inflation. 

Despite the easing of the energy crisis, Germany and the other euro area Member States face fiscal challenges. These include the foreseeable rise in the interest rate burden, the fallout from geopolitical conflicts, the decarbonisation of the economy and demographic developments. Sound public finances will be key to successfully overcoming these challenges. They also facilitate stability-oriented monetary policy. Credible fiscal rules will help to maintain confidence in sound public finances. 

The existing EU fiscal rules have not been sufficiently firm in promoting sound public finances. Several Member States have very high debt ratios, some well above 100%, and high deficit ratios that are significantly in excess of 3%, even without crisis measures. Last year, there was intense debate about a reform of the fiscal rules, with the Bundesbank also putting forward stability-oriented proposals. On 20 December, the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) agreed on changes to the rules. 

From the Bundesbank’s point of view, the reform does not remedy the main weaknesses of the existing rules. It is important to implement the reformed rules sufficiently stringently that high debt ratios do actually fall rapidly and deficit ratios reach sustainable levels. In this context, it is helpful for the procedure for a deficit ratio above 3% to remain essentially unchanged, even after the reform. The new rules agreed by ECOFIN also include other essential targets and objectives, such as the safety margin with regard to the 3% ceiling. Whether the targets are achieved, however, depends on plans that are intended to be in place for many years and which are strongly assumption-based. Another concern is that each Member State should negotiate its fiscal plan bilaterally with the European Commission. In addition, there is still discretionary scope to ease the rules in many areas. Unfortunately, this reform will not make the EU fiscal rules any simpler or more transparent. This will place the onus for implementing them strictly all the more firmly on the European Commission and ECOFIN.

4 Banking supervision and financial stability

The banking turmoil in the United States and Switzerland in the spring of 2023 caused significant stress in terms of its scale and scope. In the United States, several regional banks had to be liquidated in March of last year after interest rate and liquidity risk materialised. 6 In Switzerland, years of mismanagement at Credit Suisse – in particular deficiencies in corporate governance, business strategy and risk management – ultimately resulted in the bank being taken over by UBS. In response to these events, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) published a report highlighting the importance of “full and consistent” implementation of all elements of Basel III in all member jurisdictions. It also announced that it would review the functioning of individual regulations. These include liquidity standards, the treatment of interest rate risk, the role of additional tier 1 (AT1) instruments and the scope of application of Basel III. The Financial Stability Board (FSB) also published a report highlighting potential areas in which the resolution framework could be improved.

At the beginning of December of last year, EU legislators agreed on a legislative text to implement the internationally agreed Basel III reforms in the European Union. The revised EU banking package (Capital Requirements Regulation and Capital Requirements Directive, CRR/CRD) will increase banks’ resilience and strengthen their supervision and risk management. In particular, the Basel III reforms aim to make the way banks calculate their risks more transparent and comparable.

In addition to implementing the Basel III reforms, the revised EU banking package contains various other issues that should be seen as responses to current challenges. One example is the harmonisation, as a consequence of Brexit, of EU supervision of third country banks’ branches in the EU. In addition, banking regulation will now incorporate environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks. 7 The final legal text has yet to be formally adopted by the European Parliament and the Council. Publication in the Official Journal of the EU is expected in the spring of 2024. The new CRR rules will then apply from 1 January 2025, and the new CRD provisions will have to be transposed into national law by the specified deadlines.

The macro-financial environment in 2023 was challenging for the German financial system: the historically sharp rise in interest rates marks a turning point. In addition, economic developments in Germany were subdued. Moreover, the structural change ahead requires adjustments not merely in the real economy but also in the financial system. The transition to net zero, demographic developments and the increasing digitalisation of all areas of life, in particular, will involve fundamental change.

So far, the German financial system has proved stable, but adjustment to the new macro-financial environment is not yet complete. Last year, net interest income buoyed profitability in the banking sector. Whether net interest income comes back down again in 2024 will depend on how banks’ interest income develops in relation to their interest expenditure. For instance, lower loan demand makes it more difficult to offset rising interest costs with higher interest rates on new loans. Higher financing costs and lower credit growth are intended monetary policy effects. This is a necessary interim step in order to dampen aggregate demand and thereby price pressures. Given the sharply higher lending rates and weak economic activity, the risks associated with loans to enterprises are likely to increase in the coming quarters as individual enterprises’ debt sustainability declines. Some firms are already experiencing heightened default risk, particularly in the commercial real estate sector.

The financial system has to be resilient enough to cope with increased risks and heightened uncertainty. Besides real economic and financial risk, this also includes operational risk, such as, for instance, cyber risks. In view of potential future strains, banks should use their currently good earnings situation to further shore up their resilience. Overall, the package of macroprudential measures adopted in 2022 continues to make an important contribution to making the banking system more resilient. 8

Commensurate with the risk situation, the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) and the Bundesbank have defined supervisory priorities as part of the National Supervisory Programme 2024-26. Four areas are of particular relevance for institutions under national supervision this year: first, the economic environment and high inflation; second, interest rate developments; third, IT security; and fourth, the commercial real estate market. Priorities set under the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) were also taken into account. In the medium term, the National Supervisory Programme also incorporates other supervisory priorities: digital transformation in conjunction with demographic change, governance, and climate change, sustainability and economic transformation.

5 Payments

Cash remains the most commonly used means of payment in Germany. In a study, 93% of respondents agreed that they would, in future, like to continue to have the option of whether to use cash or a cashless method wherever they make a payment. 9 Demand for banknotes increases especially in times of emergency and crisis. With geopolitical crises on the rise, it is therefore particularly important to ensure a reliable supply of cash. “Secure cash supply – even in a crisis” was thus the title of a symposium hosted by the Bundesbank in Berlin in June 2023. The particular importance cash holds over and above its function as a pure means of payment was discussed. 

The Bundesbank will continue to promote an exchange of ideas on issues relating to cash. In February 2024, it organised the inaugural National Cash Forum. The purpose of this forum is to give participants in the cash cycle the opportunity to exchange information on developments in cash in an ongoing and structured manner. A functioning cash cycle requires, amongst other things, a network of cash sources, which must also be able to cope with spikes in demand. Credit institutions’ branches and ATMs play a very prominent role in supplying the population with cash. Currently, however, cash is also increasingly being withdrawn at the point of sale.

Another issue is the sustainability of cash. The Bundesbank has participated in a Eurosystem study on the sustainability of banknotes. On the basis of the insights the study provided, the Bundesbank will strive to render the cash life cycle even more sustainable going forward.

The Bundesbank is also involved in the Eurosystem’s project to develop a third series of euro banknotes. Two Europe-wide surveys ascertained public preferences on possible themes for the new euro banknotes. German consumers took part in particularly large numbers. Based on the results of the two surveys, the Governing Council of the ECB decided to move forward with “European culture” and “Rivers and birds” as possible themes for future euro banknotes. The ECB is expected to decide in 2026 on the final designs of the new banknotes and on when to produce and issue them. 

Despite the continued importance of cash, the share of cashless payments has edged up over the past few years. 10 Especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, consumers paid more frequently using electronic payment methods such as cards or smartphone payment apps. In Germany, for example, the girocard procedure has moved forward considerably. Instant payments are also likely to become increasingly established in conventional retail outlets and in e-commerce. EU law will, in fact, require all banks effecting payment transactions to offer instant payments from 2025 onwards. The Bundesbank expressly supports the Eurosystem’s call for a private digital payment solution that can be used throughout Europe. Progress was made in 2023 with the European Payments Initiative (EPI), which is supported by a large part of the German banking industry. A first workable product is expected for 2024.

The desire to preserve the anchor role of central bank-issued currency in the digital world is one reason for the increasingly strong interest in central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) around the world. 93% of the central banks surveyed worldwide reported in a survey conducted by the Bank for International Settlements that they were looking at CBDC. 11 There are two forms of CBDC and the Eurosystem has projects dedicated to both of them, with the Bundesbank closely involved in both.

Wholesale CBDC is intended for transactions between commercial banks. The question the Eurosystem is looking at here is how financial market participants can securely settle the cash leg of transactions in central bank currency if assets are held and transferred using distributed ledger technology (DLT) or on blockchain platforms. With DLT, the centralised databases currently used for the transfer of cash and assets would be replaced by a decentralised network. In April 2023 the Governing Council of the ECB decided that conceptual considerations should be followed in 2024 by a trial period with interested market players in order to gain a better, practice-based understanding. Alternative approaches besides the issuance of CBDC are also being discussed. For example, the Bundesbank will bring to the table its trigger solution, which provides a bridge between the DLT approach and the TARGET payment system. 

Retail CBDC is defined as default-free and risk-free digital central bank money for households and enterprises. In this context, the Eurosystem launched the digital euro project in 2021. Last year, the project entered the preparation phase; see the section entitled “A digital euro for everyone”.

Supplementary information

A digital euro for everyone

In mid-October 2023, the ECB Governing Council decided to proceed to the preparation phase of the digital euro project. The digital euro would be a risk-free, central bank-issued digital currency and thus an electronic equivalent to cash. The first part of the preparation phase began on 1 November 2023 and is scheduled to last two years. During this time, the digital euro rulebook will be finalised. Providers that could potentially develop a platform and infrastructure for the digital euro will also be identified. In addition, greater testing will be carried out during this phase in order to refine the concept of the digital euro even further. The digital euro should meet both the requirements of the Eurosystem as well as the needs of its users, for example in terms of user experience, data privacy, financial inclusion, and environmental footprint. In this context, the ECB will continue to engage closely with the public and other stakeholders. After this two-year period has elapsed, the ECB Governing Council will decide whether to proceed to the next stage of the preparation phase. 

The decision by the ECB Governing Council followed the conclusion of the Eurosystem investigation phase, which began in October 2021. Its objective was to analyse options for how the digital euro should be designed and made available. Based on these investigations, and with the involvement of market representatives, a possible concept for the digital euro was drafted. According to this concept, the digital euro would be provided via supervised intermediaries, such as banks, and would be accessible to individuals and enterprises. 

The digital euro would complement euro cash, not replace it. Based on the same principles as cash, the digital euro could be used for all payments across the entire euro area. These include payments between individuals, payments at the point of sale, transactions with public authorities, as well as online transactions. It would be possible to use the digital euro both online and offline throughout the euro area. The digital euro would be free to use for end users and would offer the highest degree of privacy.

Households and enterprises should not be able to shift large volumes of deposits out of the banking sector and into the digital euro as a risk-free CBDC. This is because this could entail risks for the financial system. For this reason, it is planned that there will be a cap on the amount of digital euro that users will be able to hold. The exact cap is to be determined at a later point in time. 

The transition to the preparation phase does not mean that any decision has been made as to whether to actually develop and implement the digital euro. The ECB Governing Council will only be able to deliberate on this possible decision once the necessary European Union legislative processes have been completed. At the end of June 2023, the European Commission presented a draft regulation for the potential issuance of a digital euro. Amongst other things, this legislative proposal envisages that the digital euro, like euro cash, will be granted the status of legal tender. The draft regulation is currently being examined by the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. Based on current estimates, the digital euro could see phased introduction in four to five years’ time at the earliest.

The digital euro would represent an additional means of payment in the future. It is not intended to replace private payment solutions, but to complement them. In this way, consumers are free to choose how they make their digital payments. Furthermore, they will be able to conveniently manage their liquidity if payment service providers integrate the digital euro into their apps and link it to their customers’ current accounts.

Last year, the Bundesbank also participated in other major projects to enhance the cashless payment infrastructure. The Eurosystem’s new TARGET platform went live in March 2023. It consolidates the technical and functional features of TARGET2 in payments and TARGET2-Securities (T2S) in securities settlement. Credit institutions and market infrastructures such as central counterparties benefit from various improvements offered by the new TARGET platform relating to, say, liquidity management, cost efficiency and resilience to cyberattacks.

In addition to consolidating TARGET2 and T2S, the Eurosystem has also moved forward with the Eurosystem Collateral Management System (ECMS), which will constitute a unified Eurosystem platform for managing monetary policy collateral. Project work on the ECMS entered the user test phase in the summer of 2023, with the Bundesbank supporting its counterparties intensively. The “ECMS Customer Forum – User testing”, which was set up in September 2023, has an important role to play in this context. It allows participants to exchange ideas and to share test experiences on a regular basis. In November 2023, the Governing Council of the ECB decided to reschedule the launch of the ECMS from April to November 2024 in order to give all stakeholders sufficient time to prepare. 

Cyberattacks are an increasing challenge for German financial sector enterprises. To test the resilience of particularly significant financial industry enterprises to cyberattacks, the Bundesbank employed TIBER-DE (Threat Intelligence-Based Ethical Red Teaming) again in 2023. Hacking exercises were used to attack companies and expose any vulnerabilities in their IT infrastructure. This allows businesses to identify protective measures in need of further improvement. The TIBER approach has proved very useful in Europe and has been incorporated into the European regulation on digital operational resilience for the financial sector, in the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA). DORA prescribes mandatory threat-led cyber tests for important enterprises as of 2025. The Bundesbank will continue to provide operational support to enterprises in the German financial sector and support them in their efforts to improve their cybersecurity.

6 Bundesbank round-up continued

The Bundesbank itself must also avert cyberattacks, and such attacks actually increased significantly last year. In particular, there was a general rise in ransomware and distributed denial-of-service attacks against financial market infrastructures. 12 In order to address the ever more technically sophisticated attacks, the Bundesbank stepped up its efforts to further strengthen the resilience of its IT infrastructure and to equip it for future challenges.

In response to the current challenges, the Bundesbank has stepped up its interaction with policymakers. It opened a representative office in the newly founded House of the Euro in Brussels, thereby strengthening the Bundesbank’s foreign network. The ECB and national central banks are working closely together there to ensure Eurosystem positions are included in European discussions at an early stage. The Capital City Reception, which takes place once a year, is an opportunity to engage with policymakers in Berlin. Last year, it again brought together many high-ranking representatives from the spheres of banking, associations, government ministries and academia as well as numerous members of the German parliament. The dialogue with civic organisations that began in 2020 when the Bundesbank reviewed its monetary policy strategy has also become an established annual event in Berlin.

Moreover, the Bundesbank further expanded its dialogue with the general public in 2023. It did so using both tried-and-tested and new formats. For the first time, the Bundesbank was present at the digital society festival “re:publica 23” in Berlin with an information stand, numerous lectures and discussion rounds. Established communication and education formats were successfully continued. In 2023, more than 16,000 people attended the Bundesbank’s open days in Hamburg and Munich to learn more about the Bundesbank’s tasks in a fun and engaging way. The Bundesbank was also involved in the festivities to celebrate German reunification in Hamburg, presenting an exhibition on the history of German monetary union that attracted thousands of visitors. Meanwhile, visitor numbers at the Bundesbank’s Money Museum in Frankfurt am Main returned to their high pre-COVID levels. The museum was also a key contributor to the exhibition “Inflation 1923. War, Money, Trauma” that ran at the Historical Museum Frankfurt from May to September 2023.

Last year, the Bundesbank also expanded its digital media offerings. Numerous Bundesbank events were streamed live on the internet. These included the Bundesbank Invited Speakers Series, a new series of talks organised by the Research Centre featuring international guests from academia and from the scientific community. The range of digital materials and new media formats on offer for economic education has also been continuously expanded. The Bundesbank e-book “Understanding money” (Geld verstehen digital) was awarded the prestigious Comenius-EduMedia medal. The e-book features a diverse mix of media and interactive applications and answers everyday questions on all things money-related.

The Bundesbank also set its course for the future in areas other than information technology. As part of a comprehensive modernisation programme dubbed “Wandel” (Change), it is realigning its strategy and steering capacity. This process includes a review of its organisational structure and leadership culture. The aim is to allow an even faster response to complex and changing requirements going forward and to help the Bundesbank fulfil its role as an important and formative partner within the Eurosystem and in European banking supervision as best as possible. The desired changes are to be implemented by the end of 2027. Amongst other things, this includes improving the conditions for data analysis and comprehensively addressing sustainability issues. With a view to meeting the first objective, the role of Chief Data Officer was newly created in April 2023, while the second objective was addressed by the creation of a cross-sectional division, details of which are given in the section entitled “Bundesbank enshrines sustainability as a cross-sectional issue”, which also takes a look at selected work on sustainability-related issues.

Supplementary information

Bundesbank enshrines sustainability as a cross-sectional issue

Sustainability is a key issue for the Bundesbank, affecting all of its areas of activity. To do justice to this far-reaching cross-sectional issue and pool knowledge and expertise, the Bundesbank created a separate Sustainability Hub in August 2023. As the central division for relevant expertise, strategy and coordination, it works in close cooperation with other business units to advance projects and analyses in the area of sustainability.

Research is one important element. The Spring Conference held by the Bundesbank’s Research Centre in May 2023 focused on the topic of “Climate Change and Central Banks”. It showcased the latest findings on issues at the interface between economics and biodiversity, climate change and price stability, as well as climate change and innovation. The interactions between climate change and financial markets feature prominently in the Bundesbank’s research programme, as reflected by numerous Bundesbank discussion papers covering topics such as green bonds, transition risk and the impact of natural disasters on the banking sector. 1

Climate risk stress tests, like those the Bundesbank performed on the financial sector in 2023, as in 2021, are another important element. These stress tests examined the vulnerability of individual banks, insurers and funds and of the German financial system as a whole to risks arising from the transition to a climate-neutral economy. They found that carbon-intensive firms in particular may be vulnerable to losses stemming from credit and market risk. These would be manageable for the financial system, but would place an additional burden on financial institutions in any economic or financial crises. In its credit assessment for monetary policy purposes, moreover, the Bundesbank enhanced its methodology for taking account of climate-related risks for enterprises. 

The Bundesbank also lends its expertise to the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS). Central banks and supervisory authorities have joined forces in this global network. The fourth, revised vintage of the NGFS climate scenarios was published in November 2023. Most notably, this iteration contains an enhanced methodology for taking account of acute physical risks and increased geographical granularity. The selection of scenarios was also updated to be better able to reflect developments in climate, economic and energy policy. In addition, the NGFS issued various publications last year on the development of short-term scenarios and the analysis of nature-related financial risks, as well as an initial stocktake on financial institutions’ transition plans and a practice-oriented blended finance handbook.

Footnotes
  1. See Giovanardi, F., M. Kaldorf, L. Radke and F. Wicknig, The preferential treatment of green bonds, Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper No 51/2022; 
    Meinerding, C., Y. S. Schüler and P. Zhang, Shocks to transition risk, Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper No 04/2023 as well as Shala, I. and B. Schumacher, The impact of natural disasters on banks' impairment flow – Evidence from Germany, Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper No 36/2022.
Footnotes
  1. See Deutsche Bundesbank, Annual Report 2022, p. 11.
  2. See Deutsche Bundesbank, Federal Constitutional Court issues ruling on debt brake, Monthly Report, November 2023, pp. 69–71.
  3. See, for example, Deutsche Bundesbank, Public finances, Monthly Report, May 2023, pp. 57–75 (in this case, p. 63).
    The Advisory Board to the Stability Council had also flagged risks; see, for example, Independent Advisory Board to the Stability Council, 20th statement on compliance with the limit for the structural general government financing deficit pursuant to Section 51(2) of the German Budgetary Principles Act (HGrG), May 2023, p. 23.
  4. See, in particular, Deutsche Bundesbank (2023), The growing significance of central government’s off-budget entities, Monthly Report, June 2023, pp. 63–82.
  5. See Deutsche Bundesbank, Central government’s debt brake: options for stability-oriented further development, Monthly Report, April 2022, pp. 49–66.
  6. See also Deutsche Bundesbank, The failure of the United States’ Silicon Valley Bank, Financial Stability Review 2023, pp. 27 f.
  7. For more on such ESG risks, see also Deutsche Bundesbank, Sustainability risks in banking supervision, Monthly Report, April 2023, pp. 75–95.
  8. See also Deutsche Bundesbank, Financial Stability Review 2023.
  9. See Deutsche Bundesbank (2024), The outlook for cash – a systematic look at the future of cash, Monthly Report, January 2024, pp. 31–49. 
  10. See Deutsche Bundesbank (2022), Payment behaviour in Germany in 2021, p. 25.
  11. See Bank for International Settlements, BIS Annual Economic Report 2022, p. 102.
  12. Ransomware is malware that typically encrypts victims’ data. It then demands a ransom payment for decryption. In distributed denial-of-service attacks, a very large number of requests are sent to a server in a coordinated action in order to overwhelm it.