Global and European setting Monthly Report – August 2024

Article from the Monthly Report

1 Global economy on moderate growth path

The global economy continued to expand moderately in the second quarter of 2024, albeit with regional differences. In China, flagging domestic demand dampened economic growth. In the euro area, the growth seen at the beginning of the year continued. However, there is no sign of a strong, broad-based upswing. By contrast, economic activity in the United States and the United Kingdom remained fairly buoyant. In Japan, real gross domestic product (GDP) expanded considerably after three weak quarters.

Indicators of industrial activity in large economic areas
Indicators of industrial activity in large economic areas

Global industrial activity continued to pick up in the second quarter, but the short-term outlook has recently deteriorated somewhat. Industrial output rose significantly, particularly in the United States and Japan. Vibrant output growth continued in the group of emerging market economies. The global industrial recovery thus broadened. The euro area remained a key exception. There, output continued to decline in the second quarter. Global trade increased in sync with global industrial output. According to the latest results of the survey among purchasing managers, however, the global industrial recovery may have recently stalled. Industrial output probably barely inched upwards in July, and new orders fell.

Commodity prices
Commodity prices

Many commodity prices declined given the slightly more muted outlook for industrial activity of late. Only European gas prices have risen markedly in the last weeks in the light of escalation in the war between Russia and Ukraine and in the Middle East. Prices for industrial commodities have fallen markedly since June. Crude oil prices also declined. In the first half of August, a barrel of Brent crude oil cost US$82 on average, and thus somewhat less than in May. Concerns about a possible slowdown in global economic activity likely counteracted price-supporting factors such as the ongoing cuts in production by OPEC and its partners and tensions in the Middle East. Despite the recent decline, most commodity prices still exceeded their previous year’s levels. This also held true of food commodity prices. The record-high global temperatures of the past 12 months are likely to have contributed to this (see supplementary information on the impact of seasonal temperature anomalies on global food commodity prices).

Supplementary information

The impact of seasonal temperature anomalies on global food commodity prices

Record peaks in global temperatures in the summer months of 2023 and 2024 may have contributed to the persistently high global market prices for food commodities. According to the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), global summer temperatures last year exceeded their long-term average by more than 1.5°C for the first time since records began. 1 For the summer of 2024, temperatures are expected to be somewhat higher still. 2 Such unusually high temperatures may potentially correlate with crop failures in some regions of the world and are therefore a possible reason for the currently high food prices. 3 In any case, having risen sharply from mid-2021 onwards in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, global food commodity prices remain well above their pre-pandemic levels. At last report, they were still almost one-third above the level recorded in 2019, whereas a greater normalisation of food commodity prices might actually have been expected given the fall in fertiliser and energy prices and robust Ukrainian grain exports.

Summer temperature anomalies in the northern hemisphere and food commodity prices
Summer temperature anomalies in the northern hemisphere and food commodity prices

Time series analyses show that above-average summer temperatures do indeed often correlate with a marked increase in global market prices for food commodities. 4 This is true, at least, of temperature anomalies over the land surfaces of the northern hemisphere. 5 If summer temperatures there are half a degree higher than the average of the previous ten years, as was approximately the case in 2023, for example, this is estimated to be associated with a rise in global market prices for food commodities that is around 15 percentage points higher in the first six months following the temperature anomaly. 6 Prices then remain at this elevated level for an extended period of time.

Grain prices, in particular, seem to react strongly to temperature anomalies. Examples include the prices of wheat, barley, oats, millet or maize. However, a correlation of that kind is evident for soybeans and some vegetable oils as well. By contrast, no significant effects are identified for other foodstuffs such as rice, or luxury crops such as sugar, coffee or cocoa.

Reaction of global food commodity prices to temperature anomalies*
Reaction of global food commodity prices to temperature anomalies*

The price increases are probably primarily due to crop failures. Higher summer temperatures in the northern hemisphere generally appear to correlate with reduced food production. 7 Accordingly, growth in the global production of various food commodities was rather weak in 2023, and initial estimates indicate that global grain stocks declined slightly. 8

The high summer temperatures in 2023 are therefore likely to have contributed to the persistently high global food commodity prices. The very high temperatures that are currently again being observed will probably further bolster prices. This could also somewhat impede the global disinflation process.

Footnotes
  1. These are temperature anomalies over global land surfaces. The long-term average refers to the summer months (June, July and August) from 1901 to 2000; see National Centers for Environmental Information (2024).
  2. See, for example, The Copernicus Climate Change Service (2023, 2024).
  3. High global average temperatures can be accompanied by strong, sustained local heatwaves, which have a negative impact on crop yields. See Schlenker and Roberts (2009), Faccia et al. (2021) and Kotz et al. (2024). There might also be an accumulation of other extreme weather events, such as droughts, floods or storms, which could place an additional strain on agricultural production. See Lesk et al. (2016) and Bilal and Känzig (2024).
  4. The effects were estimated using local projections. The rates of change in global food commodity prices are regressed on temperature anomalies in the summer months over the land surfaces of the northern hemisphere. The temperature anomalies are calculated using the deviation of the average temperature in the summer months (June to August) from its average over the previous ten years. The estimation spans the period from 1992 to 2023. In addition to the main equation for the aggregate food commodity price index, further equations were estimated for individual foods. For a discussion of the estimation approach, see Jordà (2005).
  5. Temperature anomalies in the autumn months (September, October and November) are also likely to have an impact on global food prices, albeit to a lesser extent. By contrast, extreme temperatures in the southern hemisphere or over the oceans do not appear to have a comparable effect on global food commodity prices.
  6. When interpreting the effects, it is important to note that food commodity prices generally fluctuate quite strongly. For instance, the annual rate of change in the years from 1992 to 2023 was between ‑28% and +31%.
  7. This suggests at least a statistically significant, negative correlation between temperature anomalies in the northern hemisphere during the summer months and the rates of growth in global food production (according to data from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations).
  8. See United States Department of Agriculture (2024) and International Grains Council (2024).

 

Consumer prices in advanced economies*
Consumer prices in advanced economies*

Disinflation in the advanced economies is continuing to progress at only a slow pace. Up to July, the year-on-year rate of consumer price inflation in that group of countries declined to 2.7%. Three months earlier, it had stood at 3.0%. Efforts to contain core inflation achieved similarly modest progress. The inflation rate excluding energy and food stood at 3.0% in July, compared with 3.3% in April. A near-term return to the price stability targets is not yet on the cards because of, in particular, continued lively wage growth in many places. In labour-intensive services, upward pressure on prices remained stubbornly high through the end of the reporting period. 1

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) also recently stressed risks to the further disinflation process. In the regular update of its World Economic Outlook in July, the IMF staff essentially confirmed their April economic picture. 2 The IMF left the global economic growth projection for the current year unchanged at 3.2%. For the coming year, it has projected similarly modest growth of the global economy. At the same time, the staff revised its inflation forecast for the advanced economies upwards somewhat for this year and next. In this group of countries, inflation is thus likely to remain slightly above 2% in 2025. The IMF also stressed that the risks to the price projection were tilted to the upside. It cited as the main risk factors, in addition to persistently strong wage growth, potentially disappointing productivity developments and an escalation of trade disputes.

1.1 Weaker, two-speed economic activity in China

The Chinese economy was unable to maintain the pace of growth it showed at the start of the year. According to the official estimate, in the second quarter seasonally adjusted real GDP growth halved to 0.7% compared with the previous quarter. At 4.7%, the annual rate was also markedly lower than before. This was mainly due to the subdued dynamics of private consumption. Retail sales in the second quarter were only 2.6% higher than a year earlier, and services consumption also probably continued to lose steam. Against this backdrop, the rise in consumer prices remained extremely subdued: the consumer price index (CPI) rose by just 0.3% year-on-year. The weakness in private consumption is also likely to be related to the severe housing market crisis, which has continued in recent months. The Chinese economy remained on a growth path despite the many pressures because, in particular, export business continued to flourish persistently. Thus, economic development in China has remained at two speeds of late.

China’s export economy is coming under increasing pressure. Its industry recently significantly expanded its production capacity for high-end goods. Given that domestic demand was rather sluggish as well, it made inroads into foreign markets and put pressure on established providers there. Several trading partners have accused China of giving its enterprises unfair competitive advantages through subsidies. Most recently, the USA and EU announced the rollout of additional tariffs on Chinese imports, including electric vehicles. China’s government rejected the criticism and intends to stay its industrial policy course. In order to boost domestic demand, it announced further economic policy stimulus in recent weeks. The central bank eased its monetary policy somewhat in July.

Real GDP in selected major emerging market economies
Real GDP in selected major emerging market economies

1.2 Other large emerging market economies with roses and thorns

The strong economic upswing in India continued. In the first quarter, up to which national accounts are available, real GDP rose by just under 8% on the year. According to the latest indicators, the rapid expansion is likely to have continued and appears to have spread across large parts of the Indian economy. At 4.9% in the second quarter, consumer price inflation was almost as high as in the previous quarter. This meant that inflation remained in the upper range of the target corridor of the Reserve Bank of India, which left the key interest rate unchanged at 6.5%.

In Brazil, economic activity is likely to have lost momentum again in the second quarter. The Brazilian economy had gotten 2024 off to quite a good start: in the first quarter, real GDP rose by 0.8% on the quarter in seasonally adjusted terms. According to the available indicators, the pace appears to have slowed somewhat in the second quarter. Massive flooding in parts of the country, which temporarily led to severe economic disruptions, is likely to have been one of several factors. Average consumer price inflation over the second quarter dropped to 3.9%. It thus remained within the monetary policy target corridor. In May, the central bank reduced the policy rate by 25 basis points to 10.5%.

In Russia, the economy continued to expand strongly despite growing supply-side bottlenecks. According to data from Rosstat, real GDP rose by 4.0% year-on-year in the second quarter. The upswing in the Russian economy is being driven mainly by rising government spending, especially in armaments. Wages picked up very strongly as a result of increasing labour market bottlenecks – at last report, the unemployment rate was 2.5% in seasonally adjusted terms. This boosted private consumption, which further drove economic activity. All in all, there are mounting signs that the Russian economy is overheating. Consumer price inflation continued to accelerate in July to 9.1%. The central bank has therefore hiked its policy rate by 200 basis points to 18%.

1.3 Continued robust economic activity in the United States

The US economy remained in good shape in the second quarter. Real GDP grew by 0.7% on the quarter after seasonal adjustment after seeing even more modest growth in the first quarter. Domestic activity was the driving force behind the growth. Private households maintained their sizeable appetite for spending. In fact, enterprises actually increased their expenditure on machinery and equipment and on inventories relatively sharply. Government demand likewise picked up markedly. By contrast, the persistently unfavourable financing conditions in the construction sector made themselves felt. Commercial construction investment fell, as did investment in private residential construction. Imports increased significantly against the backdrop of buoyant domestic demand.

The US economy is likely to markedly lose momentum over the remainder of the year. Given the largely depleted pandemic-era excess savings, households are likely to be adjusting more strongly to moderate real income growth. Labour market utilisation, which had been very high, already began to decline from the beginning of the year. Enterprises advertised fewer vacancies, but at the same time it was increasingly easier for them to fill vacancies. The increased influx of workers from abroad is likely to have been a factor here. The solid employment growth that had occurred for a long time has recently weakened significantly, and the previously strong wage growth has also eased. Overall, the indicators suggest a moderation of economic activity. However, there are no signs of a hard landing.

The slowdown in wage growth is reducing enterprises’ cost pressures and is set to foster the continued process of disinflation. Between April and July, the year-on-year rate of consumer price inflation fell by 0.5 percentage point, but remained high at 2.9%. Core inflation (excluding energy and food) was even slightly above that. Against this backdrop, the Federal Reserve continued to refrain from lowering policy rates for the time being.

Real GDP in large advanced economies outside the euro area
Real GDP in large advanced economies outside the euro area

1.4 Japan’s economic output recovered somewhat after a period of weakness

Japan’s economic output increased significantly in the second quarter. According to initial estimates, GDP grew by 0.8% in seasonally and price-adjusted terms following three weak quarters. Motor vehicle production, which had slumped in the first quarter due to a production stoppage at one manufacturer, 3 made good progress towards recovery, alongside a corresponding recovery in industrial production. Exports also rose somewhat. Private gross fixed capital formation increased markedly, and households increased their consumption expenditure considerably. Consumers benefited from the fact that this year’s high wage rounds took effect and that real wages recently rose significantly. Driven by the wage growth and the depreciation of the yen, which made imports more expensive, headline inflation remained high by Japanese standards. In June, consumer prices were up by 2.8% year-on-year. Excluding energy and food, this figure stood at 1.9%. In July the Bank of Japan therefore raised its policy rate, the target corridor of which had previously been between 0% and 0.1%, to 0.25%.

1.5 United Kingdom economy regains its footing

The British economy continued to expand vigorously in the spring. In the second quarter, economic output rose by 0.6% compared with the winter quarter in seasonally and price-adjusted terms. This was mainly due to the further increase in activity in the services sector. By contrast, construction activity once again fell somewhat. The still unfavourable financing conditions and unusually heavy rainfall at the beginning of the quarter made themselves felt. Manufacturing, too, was not able to capitalise on its strong previous quarter. However, consistent with the positive momentum in economic activity overall, the Composite Purchasing Managers’ Index remained clearly in expansionary territory until July. Consumer sentiment continued to improve, with real income increases in recent months likely to have played an important role. Consumer price inflation has barely changed recently. In July, the annual rate of the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) stood at 2.2%. At 3.3%, the core rate, which excludes energy and food, was still quite high. Nevertheless, in August the Bank of England cut its key interest rate by 25 basis points for the first time since March 2020 owing to the success of the disinflation process to date.

1.6 Economic recovery in Poland strengthens

In Poland, the economic recovery strengthened in the second quarter. Industrial and service production rose significantly. On the expenditure side, the recovery in economic activity continues to be driven by the rise in private consumption, which is supported by the robust labour market situation and significant wage increases amidst a general subsiding of upward pressure on prices. Similar factors also boosted economic activity in the other central and eastern European EU Member States (see supplementary information “Fresh momentum for convergence in central and eastern Europe 20 years after EU accession?”). The unemployment rate rose only slightly in the second quarter and gross wages in the corporate sector rose by 11% on the year. The expiry of support measures is likely to have a temporary dampening effect. In April, the limited-time VAT exemption for basic foodstuffs (yet which had been extended once already) expired, leaving a clear, temporary mark on retail sales. In contrast to private consumption, investment is likely to have fallen once again. Construction output recently fell short of the level of the first quarter. As a result of the phasing-out of support measures, consumer price inflation increased from 2.0% in March to 2.6% in June, but remained within the monetary policy target corridor. HICP inflation excluding energy and food fell further to 3.6%. The central bank left its policy rate unchanged at 5.75%.

Supplementary information

Fresh momentum for convergence in central and eastern Europe 20 years after EU accession?

Economic activity in the central and eastern European EU Member States gradually recovered over the course of 2023. The central and eastern European EU Member States have been significantly affected by the economic impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine. 1 The resulting period of weakness extended into 2023 and has dissipated only gradually. The recovery in private consumption was a key factor behind the economic improvement. Against the backdrop of declining inflation and, in some cases, very strong wage increases combined with employment growth, households’ purchasing power bounced back. Exports, by contrast, increased only slowly. Demand from the euro area remained weak and price competitiveness had deteriorated. Investment activity continued to be supported by various infrastructure projects. 2 Overall, the real gross domestic product (GDP) of this group of countries rose by 0.6% in 2023, compared with 0.5% in the EU as a whole. The atypically low annual average GDP growth rate for this group of countries was mainly the result of the weak second half of 2022. The year-on-year change in the fourth quarter of 2023 was significantly more favourable, coming to 1.2%.

The economic situation improved in most central and eastern European EU Member States. Nearly every country whose economic output had declined over the course of 2022 due to the outbreak of the war and the energy crisis, including Poland and Hungary, recovered from recession. The situation also generally improved in the Baltic countries. Only Estonia saw continued economic decline. In the Czech Republic, which had not been as severely affected by the crisis in 2022, economic performance stagnated throughout 2023. The southern countries, especially Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia, benefited from buoyant tourism business and also from the relocation of production and transport chains as a result of Russia’s war against Ukraine. It is in this context that investment in maritime infrastructure was also stepped up. 3

Economic performance, unemployment and consumer prices in the central and eastern European EU Member States
Economic performance, unemployment and consumer prices in the central and eastern European EU Member States

Consumer price inflation moderated significantly in the central and eastern European EU Member States. Inflation in this group of countries, measured by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), fell from its peak in February 2023 (just over 16%) to 6.1% at the end of 2023 and then further to 3.3% in June 2024. Inflation rates in these countries initially spiked sharply higher after the outbreak of the energy crisis, not least because energy and food account for a particularly large share of consumption expenditure in these countries. Conversely, the later decline in energy prices also had a strong impact on consumer prices. The still subdued overall consumption environment is also likely to have had a dampening effect on inflation. The average inflation rate of the central and eastern European EU Member States recently exceeded that of the euro area by only around 1 percentage point. However, the range of inflation rates remained high, ranging from 1.0% in Lithuania to 5.3% in Romania. Core inflation excluding energy and food also declined, but had only contracted to 4.7% by June 2024.

Domestic price pressures remained high in the face of tight labour markets in most central and eastern European EU Member States. Inflation dynamics have recently been increasingly driven by domestic factors and, in particular, by sharply rising labour costs. Wages, as measured by compensation per employee, rose by 13.1% on average in 2023, up from 11.9% in the previous year. At 12.9% in the first quarter of 2024, the rate of expansion remained very high on the year, mainly owing to further rising growth rates in Poland and Croatia. In most other countries, by contrast, wage growth moderated somewhat. At the same time, productivity rose only moderately. Cost competitiveness therefore deteriorated markedly in a number of countries. The high wage pressures are likely to largely be due to the previous erosion of purchasing power. However, some countries have now seen real wages clearly exceed their pre-energy crisis levels. In addition to the remarkably strong increase in minimum wages in several countries at the beginning of 2024, the high labour market tightness in this group of countries is likely to have contributed to this state of affairs. 4 In any case, the situation in labour markets has seen little decline since the first quarter of 2024. The unemployment rate 5 remained extremely low by historical standards, despite the spell of economic weakness.

Some of the central banks in non-euro area central and eastern European EU Member States had already begun to cautiously cut interest rates last year. They had previously responded rather early to the mounting inflation with significant tightening. Poland's central bank was the first to lower its key interest rate in September 2023, followed by Hungary's. Others followed later. But even so, interest rates, just like inflation rates, are in some cases still well above those in the euro area and the rest of the EU. As a result, several countries failed to meet the necessary conditions for adopting the euro in the June 2024 convergence assessment. Bulgaria, in particular, had been looking to adopt the euro at the beginning of 2025. 6 Although the Bulgarian lev is firmly pegged to the euro under a currency board arrangement, the country failed to meet the price stability criterion. Public finances improved in most central and eastern European EU countries, partly due to the phasing out of pandemic-related support measures and the gradual reduction of assistance measures meant to cushion high energy and food prices. However, several countries did not comply with EU budgetary rules. These came back into effect in April of this year, having been suspended during the pandemic. As a result, the European Commission recommended opening the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) against Poland, Hungary and Slovakia. 7

Economic convergence of the central and eastern European EU Member States came to a standstill for the first time in 2023. This was mainly due to the severe economic impact of Russia's war against Ukraine on these countries. In the three Baltic states, there were even noticeable real income losses compared with the EU average. The relative income position in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary remained virtually unchanged. Convergence advanced further in other countries, including Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia.

In the 20 years since the major Eastern enlargement of the EU, convergence progress has been significant. At the time of enlargement in 2004, 8 GDP per capita for this group of countries, calculated in purchasing power parities, stood at just under 58% of the EU average at the time. It was just under 70% ten years later, and just over 80% in 2023. It is noteworthy that there were no significant setbacks in convergence either during the global financial and economic crisis of 2008‑09 or during the COVID-19 crisis and the difficult period that followed. Empirical evaluations suggest that almost one-third of the current standard of living in this group of countries can be attributed to EU accession. This corresponds to around half of the increase in GDP per capita between 2004 and 2019. 9 The major Eastern enlargement of the EU can thus be regarded as a considerable success in economic terms.

Per capita GDP in the central and eastern European EU countries
Per capita GDP in the central and eastern European EU countries

The convergence process in the central and eastern European EU Member States is expected to make noticeable progress again after taking a breather in 2023. This assertion is supported by the uptick in GDP growth in this group of countries since the beginning of the year. This shows that the underlying forces that propelled economic growth in the years before have lost none of their power. The considerable EU funding the central and eastern European countries are receiving, not least from the newly created NGEU instrument, is also playing a role here. 10

In the medium term, however, the convergence process of the central and eastern European EU Member States is likely to lose momentum, mainly due to demographic pressures. Populations in central and eastern European EU Member States are shrinking and ageing particularly quickly. 11 A contraction in labour supply and depressed productivity growth due to ageing, coupled with mounting pressure on public finances driven in part by demographic factors, are likely to significantly slow economic growth and thus also the convergence process. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that this group of countries is facing the demographic challenges at an earlier stage of development than many advanced economies. However, there are certainly ways to counteract the productivity-dampening effects of demographic change. This includes, above all, improving institutional conditions. In recent years, however, there have actually been some noticeable setbacks here. At least, that is what the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators 12 on regulatory quality, government effectiveness, control of corruption and the rule of law are showing for Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary. By contrast, framework conditions in the Czech Republic and Romania improved recently, albeit from a depressed level.

Footnotes
  1. See Deutsche Bundesbank (2023).
  2. This is due to the fact that 2023 was the last year in which EU funds from the 2014‑2020 programming period could be allocated; see European Commission (2024a).
  3. See European Commission (2022, 2023a and 2024b).
  4. See Lübker and Schulten (2024), p. 14.
  5. Using the ILO definition.
  6. See European Commission (2024c).
  7. See European Commission (2024d).
  8. Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007 and Croatia in 2013.
  9. See Grassi (2024). According to the study, this increase came without cost to existing members.
  10. See European Commission (2024e).
  11. According to the European Commission’s projections, the EU population will decline by 4% by 2070. In the central and eastern European EU Member States, except Estonia and the Czech Republic, the decline will be stronger, especially in Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, where a decline of more than one-fifth is expected. Accordingly, the old-age dependency ratio (the ratio of the older population to the working population) will rise sharply in these countries (see European Commission, 2024f).
  12. See Kaufmann and Kraay (2023).

2 Continued moderate expansion in the euro area

In the euro area, the moderate expansion of economic output continued in the second quarter of 2024, and there are no signs yet of a strong, broad-based upswing. According to Eurostat’s flash estimate, GDP rose by 0.3% on the quarter in price and seasonally adjusted terms, as it had done in the first quarter. Growth was driven primarily by services. By contrast, the period of sluggishness in manufacturing continued. The impetus from the global economy appears to have had barely any impact on euro area industry. There is no sign of any improvement in this area for the current quarter, either. Services activity is still holding up well, despite a certain slowdown. The notable divergence of economic activity, which has been ongoing since the beginning of 2023, therefore appears to be continuing.

Private consumption continued to recover. Retail sales increased markedly in price-adjusted terms, and expenditure on services probably also rose again. By contrast, the number of new car registrations declined again. Marked gains in purchasing power are likely to have been the key factor behind rising household demand. Labour income grew strongly, whilst inflation eased. As hitherto, though, only part of these gains in purchasing power probably fed through to expenditure. The saving rate had already risen significantly again in the first quarter, and the propensity to save remained high according to surveys.

Investment activity probably declined. 4 Construction investment, in particular, is likely to have fallen in the second quarter in seasonally adjusted terms, after having benefited from the exceptionally mild winter weather in the previous quarter. Construction output fell markedly in April and May compared with the average of the first quarter. There is also likely to have been a decline in investment in machinery and equipment across much of the euro area, given the persistent slump in industry. Capital goods producers’ domestic sales decreased in April and May after price adjustment. By contrast, expenditure on information and communication technologies and on intellectual property is likely to have risen further as the trend to go digital continued.

Exports probably markedly lost steam in the second quarter, despite buoyant global trade. Exports of capital goods are likely to have fallen once again, and the increase in exports of intermediate goods probably slowed distinctly. Exports of goods thus continued to lag behind rising global demand. One major reason for this loss of market share is likely to be the deterioration in the competitiveness of euro area industry. Industrial enterprises have been assessing their competitiveness in global markets as not good for some time in European Commission surveys. In addition to the burden of high energy costs, product range effects are probably also a factor here, especially in the automotive sector. By country, exports to China, in particular, probably declined markedly, whilst exports to the United States and the United Kingdom increased. Euro area services exports are likely to have risen again, albeit less strongly than before, according to balance of payments data. Imports of goods from third countries probably increased notably in the second quarter, primarily imports of non-durable consumer products, which is probably associated with the recovery in private consumption.

Euro area goods exports, foreign demand and competitiveness
Euro area goods exports, foreign demand and competitiveness

In manufacturing, the slump continued and industrial capacity utilisation fell further below its long-term average. Production of intermediate and capital goods contracted in the second quarter. By contrast, consumer goods production, including the manufacture of motor vehicles, recovered somewhat after the decline in the previous quarter. In addition to the weakness in competition in international markets, the subdued investment activity in the euro area was also important here. Producer price pressures remain low. Producer and import prices of intermediate products fell year-on-year through the end of the reporting period but have been rising again month-on-month since March. For finished products, price growth weakened year-on-year and remained subdued month-on-month.

Expansion in the services sector continued. While the activities of the information and communication sector, in particular, probably picked up markedly, the activities of business service providers also probably saw a similar rise. Business activity seems to have levelled off again only in the hotel and restaurant sector. According to European Commission surveys, a shortage of labour continues to weigh on the services sector.

In most Member States, economic growth continued in the second quarter. However, there were still considerable disparities. Economic growth took place mainly in countries where tourism plays a major role and where substantial projects are funded by the European Recovery Fund. Conversely, the ongoing weakness in manufacturing dampened growth in countries with a high industrial share, including, above all, Germany. 5

Real GDP in the euro area and selected Member States
Real GDP in the euro area and selected Member States

In France, economic output rose markedly again in the second quarter. According to preliminary estimates, real GDP increased by 0.3%, as in the previous quarter. Economic growth was largely driven by strong exports. Tourism was also buoyant. Domestic demand remained muted, however. Although investment rose somewhat for the first time in three quarters, private consumption stagnated again, with a marked increase in demand for services but weak goods consumption. On the supply side, business developments in the services sector remained buoyant. The hotel and restaurant sector gained significant momentum after making a weak start to the year, and activity in business services and in the information and communication sector remained high. By contrast, industry and construction activity contracted.

In Italy, economic activity increased once again. According to preliminary estimates, real GDP rose by 0.2%, following an increase of 0.3% in the previous quarter. The main boost was delivered by an uptick in domestic demand. Private consumption and investment are likely to have increased slightly. By contrast, goods exports probably fell, which also reflects the weakness of Italian industry. As in the previous quarter, industrial output declined. By contrast, service providers’ activity rose.

Spain’s strong upswing continued. According to preliminary estimates, real GDP picked up by 0.8%, as in the previous quarter already. Growth was driven by an increase in private consumption and higher investment. In addition, exports once again rose markedly. On the other hand, imports fell slightly. On the supply side, manufacturing and services output increased significantly. By contrast, activity in the construction sector pretty much treaded water.

In almost all smaller Member States, economic output continued to rise in the second quarter. Real GDP rose significantly in Cyprus, Ireland, Lithuania, and the Netherlands. Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Slovakia and Slovenia saw moderate growth. In Austria and Portugal the economy stagnated, while activity declined significantly in Latvia.

The labour market situation remained favourable in the second quarter. The unemployment rate remained close to its all-time low at 6.5% in June, and the number of employees rose again slightly. At the same time, labour market tightness eased further, as the job vacancy rate fell, a European Commission indicator showed that labour hoarding declined somewhat, 6 and employment expectations for the next three months diminished. Wage growth was also comparatively high in the second quarter, however, at a projected figure of between 4% and 5% on the year.

Inflation barely eased in the second quarter and remained elevated. Measured by the HICP, consumer prices rose by 0.6% on the quarter in seasonally adjusted terms, corresponding to an annualised rate of 2.4%. The continued comparatively strong inflation was driven by the persistent strong upward dynamics in services prices, where the strong wage growth has had a particularly profound impact. By contrast, food prices rose only slightly. For non-energy industrial goods, inflation came to a complete standstill. Energy prices, having still risen slightly in the first quarter, fell somewhat.

Contributions to the euro area inflation rate (HICP)
Contributions to the euro area inflation rate (HICP)

Price inflation remained virtually unchanged year-on-year, too. At 2.5% in the second quarter, the inflation rate was only slightly lower than in the previous quarter (2.6%). Services prices made by far the largest contribution year-on-year here, too. Here, inflation has remained entrenched at around 4% since the end of 2023. It is therefore significantly higher than for the other components of the HICP and also markedly stronger than its long-run average. By contrast, price dynamics for food and non-energy industrial goods weakened distinctly. At 2.6% and 0.7%, respectively, inflation rates here were roughly the same as their long-run averages. This suggests that the disinflation process for goods is largely complete. After falling on the year for four quarters, energy prices have now reached a level similar to those of the previous year. Core inflation excluding energy and food continued to fall somewhat, dropping from 3.1% to 2.8%.

Although the inflation rate rose slightly again in July, it is initially set to decline somewhat thereafter. According to Eurostat’s estimate, inflation rose in July to 2.6% from 2.5% in June. Energy prices, in particular, rose more strongly than before. Concerning the other components, inflation was roughly as strong as before. The core inflation rate therefore held steady at 2.9%. As expected, the disinflation process thus took a breather. Over the next few months, however, the inflation rate is likely to temporarily decline again somewhat before then probably going back up in the final months of this year. These fluctuations are mainly attributable to base effects from energy. Only at the beginning of 2025 should the generally downward trend in inflation re-emerge more prominently.

Sentiment indicators for the euro area
Sentiment indicators for the euro area

In the current quarter, the macroeconomic recovery in the euro area could continue at roughly the same pace as before. Private consumption can be expected to carry on supporting the underlying upward economic trend. Consumer confidence, at least, improved steadily until July. Households, in particular, assessed their financial situation better. Their willingness to make bigger-ticket purchases has also risen significantly recently. In industry, on the other hand, the signs continue to point towards contraction. Sentiment has declined, probably because of the deterioration in the competitive position of euro area firms and a certain increase in gloom regarding global industrial activity. The outlook for the construction sector remained subdued. According to surveys, orders declined once again and the number of building permits for residential buildings remained entrenched at a low level. By contrast, the services sector is set to continue its expansion, even if the generally upbeat sentiment has eased somewhat. A strong and broad-based upswing will probably only occur once industry overcomes its pronounced period of weakness and private consumption picks up even more momentum.

 

List of references

Bilal, A. and D. R. Känzig (2024), The Macroeconomic Impact of Climate Change: Global vs. Local Temperature, NBER Working Paper No 32450.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2024), The global disinflation process and its costs, Monthly Report, July 2024.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2023), The central and eastern European EU Member States between decelerating growth and persistent inflation, Monthly Report, August 2023, pp. 18‑20.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2018), Activities of multinational enterprise groups and national economic statistics, Monthly Report, October 2018, pp. 65‑78.

European Commission (2024a), European Economic Forecast, Spring 2024, Institutional Paper 286.

European Commission (2024b), Commission approves €126 million Romanian State aid scheme to support ports facing increased trade flows due to Russia’s war against Ukraine, press release, 11 January 2024.

European Commission (2024c), Convergence Report 2024, Institutional Paper 294.

European Commission (2024d), Report prepared in accordance with Article 126(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 19 June 2024.

European Commission (2024e), Mid-Term Evaluation of the Recovery & Resilience Facility. Strengthening our Union through ambitious reforms & investments, Institutional Paper 269.

European Commission (2024f), 2024 Ageing Report. Economic and Budgetary Projections for the EU Member States (2022‑2070), April 2024.

European Commission (2023a), InvestEU: EIB extends €50 million loan for a new grain terminal at Bulgaria’s Black Sea port of Varna, press release, 27 June 2023.

European Commission (2023b), European Business Cycle Indicators – A new survey-based labour hoarding indicator. 2nd Quarter 2023, European Economy Technical Paper 066, pp. 20‑29.

European Commission (2022), Projects of Common Interest in energy infrastructure in the Central and South-Eastern region, December 2022.

Faccia, D., M. Parker and L. Stracca (2021), Feeling the heat: extreme temperatures and price stability, ECB Working Paper No 2626.

Grassi, B. (2024), The EU Miracle: When 75 Million Reach High Income, CEPR Discussion Paper No 19114.

International Grains Council (2024), Grain Market Report, July 2024.

International Monetary Fund (2024), World Economic Outlook Update: The Global Economy in a Sticky Spot, July 2024.

Jordà, Ò. (2005), Estimation and Inference of Impulse Responses by Local Projections, American Economic Review, Vol. 95(1), pp. 161‑182.

Kaufmann D. and A. Kraay (2023), The Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2023 update.

Kotz, M., F. Kuik, E. Lis and C. Nickel (2024), Global warming and heat extremes to enhance inflationary pressures, Communications, Earth & Environment, Vol. 5(116).

Lesk, C., P. Rowhani and N. Ramankutty (2016), Influence of extreme weather disasters on global crop production, Nature, Vol. 529, pp. 84‑87.

Lübker, M. and T. Schulten (2024), WSI-Mindestlohnbericht 2024: Reale Zugewinne durch die Umsetzung der Europäischen Mindestlohnrichtlinie, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut, Report, No 93.

National Centers for Environmental Information (2024), Climate at a Glance: Global Time Series, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, July 2024, accessed on 23 July 2024.

Schlenker, W. and M. J. Roberts (2009), Nonlinear temperature effects indicate severe damages to U.S. crop yields under climate change, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 106(37), pp. 15594‑15598.

The Copernicus Climate Change Service (2024), June 2024 marks 12th month of global temperature reaching 1.5°C above pre-industrial, press release, 4 July 2024.

The Copernicus Climate Change Service (2023), Summer 2023: The Hottest on Record, press release, 5 September 2023

United States Department of Agriculture (2024), World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates, 12 August 2024.

Footnotes
  1. For an analysis of the current disinflation process, see Deutsche Bundesbank (2024).
  2. See International Monetary Fund (2024).
  3. A Japanese motor vehicle manufacturer that had manipulated the results of safety tests had to halt production for several months. As a result, Japanese motor vehicle production fell by 17% in the first quarter. In May, the affected manufacturer resumed production.
  4. Excluding Ireland. For several years now, the statistical recording of investment as a whole and of investment in intellectual property in particular, has been strongly influenced by the strategic planning of multinational enterprises in that country. See Deutsche Bundesbank (2018).
  5. For more, see the article “The German Economy”.
  6. Labour hoarding is said to happen when an enterprise states that employment will remain unchanged or will increase while at the same time expecting output to decline; see European Commission (2023b).