Economic output in Germany was up somewhat in the first quarter of 2025. According to the Federal Statistical Office’s flash estimate, real GDP was a seasonally adjusted 1 0.2% higher than in the previous quarter, during which it had dropped by the same amount. Output in both industry and construction grew in the first quarter. The increase in industrial output was likely attributable not only to a somewhat better order situation overall, but also to anticipatory effects stemming from announcements that the US administration would raise tariffs. These effects likewise led to a significant increase in exports of goods. Private consumption also contributed to the increase in economic activity. 2 The former was still benefiting from the sharp rise in wages last year. The higher levels of both industrial output and private consumption are likely to have supported service providers. Despite the headwinds from a high degree of economic policy uncertainty and low industrial capacity utilisation, investment in machinery and equipment looks to have risen. 

Industrial output and exports of goods increased. Seasonally adjusted industrial output went up steeply on the month in March 2025. The average for the first quarter was also significantly higher than the previous quarter’s level. Prior to that, it had been declining virtually continuously for almost two years. The increase was observed in many industrial sectors. The order situation in industry has improved slightly of late. According to ifo Institute surveys, the share of firms with a shortage of orders fell significantly in April compared with January. It had already gone down slightly in January. Even so, at 36.8%, the share was still high in a long-term comparison. The somewhat better order situation had an impact on production. However, the fact that output has now risen so significantly is probably due also to anticipatory effects relating to US tariff policy. Production of pharmaceutical products saw particularly steep growth in March. The share of exports to the United States is especially high for these products. 3 Mechanical engineering and the automotive industry also recorded strong output growth. Anticipatory effects also had an impact on exports of goods. In particular, nominal exports of goods to the United States rose sharply. Total real exports of goods also went up significantly in the first quarter. 

Investment in machinery and equipment is likely to have risen in the first quarter. This is indicated by the sales of capital goods producers in Germany and data on imports of capital goods available up to February. These were up on the quarter in price-adjusted terms. Money was probably invested mainly in goods ascribed to other transport equipment (which includes ships and aircraft for military purposes as well as military combat vehicles). Excluding the volatile element of other transport equipment, though, domestic sales were down slightly. 

Construction investment increased again in the first quarter. This is indicated by construction output, at least, which went up in the first quarter in seasonally adjusted terms. While output picked up in the finishing trades and civil engineering, it fell significantly in building construction. Construction output benefited from favourable weather conditions in the first quarter. This is shown by ifo Institute surveys on the hindrance to construction output of weather conditions, as well as by the low number of ice days for the time of year. The order situation remained a limiting factor, by contrast. According to ifo Institute surveys, the share of firms in the main construction sector with a shortage of orders rose to 40% on average in the first quarter, the highest level in almost two decades.

Private consumption provided positive stimuli for growth. The sharp rise in wages last year provided further scope for additional consumer spending. Consumers are likely to have used some of this scope. This also benefited consumer-related service providers. Price and seasonally adjusted sales in the retail sector and in accommodation and food services increased in the first quarter compared with the previous three-month period. Consumers held back on motor vehicle purchases, however. According to data from the German Association of the Automotive Industry, private vehicle registrations fell sharply in the first quarter.

The labour market saw little change in the first quarter. After a sideways movement in the employment level in the fourth quarter, total employment remained unchanged on the quarter in the first three months of the year as well. As before, increased employment in services offset the decline in manufacturing. Unemployment saw a moderate uptick. The outlook remains subdued. 

The number of people in employment in the first quarter remained at the previous quarter’s level in seasonally adjusted terms. On average in the first quarter of 2025, 46.04 million people were in employment, a decrease of 7,000 compared with the average for the preceding quarter, according to the initial estimate by the Federal Statistical Office. While self-employment continued to decline, the number of employees rose marginally. There was no change against the fourth quarter in the number of employees subject to social security contributions and those in exclusively low-paid part-time work; data on these are currently only available up to February. Use of short-time work for economic reasons also remained at the slightly elevated level of the final quarter of 2024 up to February, according to the initial estimates of the Federal Employment Agency. 

The divergence between the services sectors, where employment is being expanded, and the manufacturing sector, which is shedding staff, continued. In the manufacturing sector, layoffs are increasingly playing a role in addition to the previous adjustments via attrition and the reduced use of agency staff (see the supplementary information on firms’ labour hoarding and willingness to let go of staff ). Averaged over January and February, the decline in employment subject to social security contributions picked up to 0.5% compared with the average of the previous quarter and in seasonally adjusted terms. In addition, temporary agency employment saw a further considerable drop. By contrast, employment in the construction sector recently decreased only slightly. On the other hand, employment grew in virtually all services sectors. Wholesale and retail trade remained the only exception. The strongest relative growth was in the energy supply sector, while human health and social work continued to record the highest absolute growth. Both are sectors that are benefiting from the ongoing structural changes in energy and demographics. However, substantial recruitment is also still taking place in the public sector, business-related services (excluding temporary agency work) and accommodation and food services   

The labour supply grew a little in 2024 only because of immigration from third countries. The number of German nationals in the labour force is shrinking due to demographic developments. In the past, the labour force was boosted by high numbers of immigrants and their subsequent integration into the German labour market. However, immigration continued to decline significantly in 2024. It also weakened further at the beginning of 2025. According to provisional data from the Federal Statistical Office, net immigration from other countries dropped by 37% year on year in 2024, falling to 419,000 persons. In particular, immigration from other EU countries was negative in 2024 for the first time in 15 years, and thus also for the first time since free movement of workers was introduced for the former eastern European accession countries. This is also reflected in the employment figures by nationality. According to the Federal Employment Agency, in February 2025 there was a year-on-year drop in not only the number of employees subject to social security contributions with German citizenship (by 190,000 persons), but also in the number of those with a different EU nationality (by 24,000 persons). By contrast, the number of third-country employees subject to social security contributions rose by 281,000. Half of them were from Ukraine and the main countries of asylum origin. The other half is probably attributable to labour market-oriented immigration from the Western Balkans or India, for example.

Unemployment rose moderately in the first quarter of 2025. On average, a seasonally adjusted 2.90 million persons were registered as unemployed, around 38,000 more than in the final quarter of 2024. The unemployment rate went up by 0.1 percentage point to 6.2%. Registered unemployment rose only slightly in April, but the unemployment rate hit 6.3% due to rounding. Despite the high demand for labour in many services sectors, transitions from unemployment to employment were low by historical standards. In recent months, they have declined among people covered by the statutory unemployment insurance scheme, in particular, who normally find new employment relatively quickly. One reason for this is likely to be that, because of structural change, the qualifications of people who in many cases have left the industrial sector do not match the requirements of jobs in the services sector. Unlike in 2022 and 2023, the effects of immigration on unemployment, which tend to be reflected in the number of people receiving the basic welfare allowance, played only a minor role recently. 

The short-term outlook remains subdued according to leading labour market indicators. The ifo employment barometer, which reflects recruitment plans in trade and industry for the next three months, saw a relatively significant improvement in April, but nonetheless remains deep in negative territory. This mainly affects manufacturing and trade. By contrast, the IAB employment barometer for the economy as a whole recently stabilised in neutral territory. The number of vacancies reported to the Federal Employment Agency did not go down in April, bucking the persistent trend. New job offers subject to social security contributions sent to the Federal Employment Agency, which had been especially weak in the recent past, recovered slightly at a low level. Overall, while the employment outlook has not deteriorated any further recently, the leading indicators give no signs of a positive turnaround. The picture looks similar for unemployment over the next three months. Although the IAB unemployment barometer rose somewhat in April, it remained clearly in negative territory, indicating rising unemployment. 

Growth in negotiated wages was considerably weaker in the first quarter of 2025 than in the quarter before. Including additional benefits, they were up by just 0.9% on the year, compared with 5.8% in the fourth quarter of 2024. The lower wage growth was mainly driven by negative base effects stemming from the high inflation compensation bonuses in the first quarter of 2024. These were paid out at that time in the metals and electrical engineering industry and the public sector of the federal states, for example, and are not being paid this year. 4 In addition, some of the new wage agreements contained no year-on-year pay rises for the first few months. However, if special payments such as inflation compensation bonuses are factored out of negotiated wages and only basic pay is considered, year-on-year growth in negotiated wages in the economy as a whole was similar in the first quarter (6.7%) to the fourth quarter of 2024 (6.6%). The old wage agreements with higher incremental increases are still having an impact.

Recent wage agreements have mostly been lower than before. For example, the agreement in the public sector of central and local government was much lower than both the previous wage agreement of 2023 during the high inflation phase and the longer-term average since 2008. The pay rise recently agreed for the textile and clothing industry in western Germany and for auto repairs was also lower than before. Only cooperative banks have achieved an above average wage result. Their previous agreement had been negotiated before the period of high inflation rates. They have now negotiated partial compensation for the losses in real wages in the meantime. 

Wage demands are gradually declining, reflecting not only falling inflation rates but also the weak economic environment. The unions’ current wage demands range from 6.0% (textiles services) to 12% (insurance) for a term of 12 months. Most of them are therefore lower than in the period when inflation was peaking. By the end of the year, new agreements for only around 4½ million salaried employees will be negotiated. Owing to the period of economic weakness, uncertainty about future developments and lower inflation rates, wage agreements will probably continue to be much lower than in the past two years.

Actual earnings probably rose much more than negotiated wages in the first quarter of 2025. However, their increase was also smaller than in the previous quarter. The nominal wage index of the Federal Statistical Office suggests that this is the case. 5 Its annual growth rate stood at 3.5% at the start of the year, compared with 5.0% in the fourth quarter of 2024.

The independent Minimum Wage Commission will deliver a recommendation for the adjustment of the statutory general minimum wage to the Federal Government by the end of June. The Commission’s assessment is guided by previous wage developments and the reference value of 60% of gross median wages of full-time employees. It also takes into account the criteria of the EU Minimum Wage Directive. 6 The Minimum Wage Commission can freely and independently decide how to use its statutory scope. If the statutory minimum wage were to be quickly raised to €15 per hour, as some politicians are demanding and as described as achievable in 2026 in the new Federal Government’s coalition agreement, this would likely have a significant impact on negotiated wages in the craft trades, construction and labour-intensive services. The lower wage brackets in these sectors would then probably be raised substantially. 7

Inflation picked up somewhat in the first quarter of 2025. Consumer prices (HICP) rose by a seasonally adjusted 0.7% on the quarter, compared with 0.5% in the final quarter of 2024. This was due chiefly to the services sector. For administered services, the typical price increase at the beginning of the year was especially steep this time. This was partly because of the distinct price rise for the “Deutschland-Ticket”. In addition, energy prices went up again on average in the first quarter, after having fallen in the two preceding quarters. This was mainly due to the rise in fuel prices. Moreover, the further hike in the carbon price, in particular, had an impact. By contrast, prices for both non-energy industrial goods and food rose only moderately at the start of the year and much less than in the final quarter of 2024. Annual headline inflation picked up again slightly in the first quarter of 2025. It climbed from 2.5% in the fourth quarter of 2024 to 2.6%. Core inflation (HICP excluding energy and food), by contrast, held steady at 3.2%. 

Price rises were moderate overall in April. In seasonally adjusted terms, the HICP rose again by 0.2% (on the month). While energy prices were distinctly lower, this did not fully offset the significant increase in services prices, especially for travel. In the case of travel services, prices for package holidays and air travel, in particular, went up sharply in April. In the energy sector, fuel prices were the main prices that came down. This was due to falling crude oil prices in the energy markets. The appreciation of the euro against the US dollar had an additional dampening effect here. By contrast, prices for non-energy industrial goods and food were virtually unchanged. In the past few months, the prices of unprocessed food in the vegetable or meat category, in particular, had risen significantly. The annual inflation rate came down slightly from 2.3% in March to 2.2% in April. 8 By contrast, the core rate climbed steeply from 2.8% to 3.1% on account of dynamic services prices.  Underlying inflation remains elevated by other measures, too, but has lost a great deal of momentum since the high inflation phase. 9

The inflation outlook is particularly uncertain at present, with inflation currently expected to fluctuate around the 2% mark in the coming months. The still steep growth in the prices of services should gradually diminish. In addition, lower energy prices are likely to have a dampening effect on the inflation rate. The government measures with direct price effects announced in the coalition agreement will push energy prices down further (e.g. lowering electricity tax and grid charges.) However, it is still unclear when the measures will be implemented. The inflation rate in Germany could then fall below 2% for a while. 

The German economy could more or less tread water in the second quarter. A wide range of burdens persist and the US administration’s tightening of its tariff policy adds additional headwinds. This is particularly true for the export industry, already struggling with a difficult competitive position and weak demand. Foreign demand for German industrial products remains weak. The US administration’s trade policy is weighing on the export outlook not only in terms of imposed or threatened tariffs, but also through the steep appreciation of the euro associated with financial market responses. It is possible that the threat of even higher tariffs could lead to further anticipatory effects in the short term. In principle, however, bringing forward production or exports sooner or later leads to a rebound effect. Such burdens could well already emerge in the current quarter. Furthermore, the uncertainty associated with the tariff conflict affects planning certainty and thus firms’ propensity to invest. The latter is also being weakened by the still low capacity utilisation in industry. According to ifo Institute surveys, this increased slightly in April but remained well below its long-term average. The drag on investment from previously elevated financing costs is expected to gradually subside but banks tightened their credit standards for loans to enterprises again marginally in the first quarter amid uncertain macroeconomic conditions. Construction investment could more or less stagnate. This is because demand for construction work is not yet sufficiently stable to provide stimulus in the short term. There could be some impetus from private consumption again. In view of the weak labour market outlook and declining wage growth, labour income is not expected to provide any support in the short term. However, according to surveys conducted by the market research institution GfK, consumer sentiment brightened in April, accompanied by a significant decline in the propensity to save. By contrast, it is still unlikely that fiscal policy, which is expected to become significantly more expansionary, will have supportive macroeconomic effects in the short term. With a certain time delay, however, higher spending on infrastructure and defence, in particular, is likely to give the German economy a boost.

The US administration’s tariff policy is probably already holding German industry back in the current quarter. However, the beginning of the second quarter is likely to have been still positive. For example, the business situation of manufacturing sector firms improved according to ifo surveys, which were available up to April at the time of finalising this report. Short-term production expectations likewise improved. According to data provided by the German Association of the Automotive Industry, the number of passenger cars produced in April was below the level of March, but still significantly higher than in the previous quarter. The favourable start could have been boosted by further anticipatory effects, as, with the exception of base tariffs, the United States postponed its universal tariffs on the EU by 90 days, which means that higher tariffs are still looming. A positive development was seen in industrial new orders recently. In March, they rose significantly on the month in seasonally adjusted terms across most sectors. The increase was broad-based in regional terms as well. Averaged over the first quarter, new orders fell compared with the previous quarter. Excluding volatile large orders, however, they were up again. It is unlikely that anticipatory effects played a decisive role here. Orders from non-euro area countries rose but they were not the only factor driving the growth. Instead, there was an increase in new orders from Germany, in particular. The ifo export expectations in April, which worsened sharply, signal that US trade policy is likely to have a significant negative impact in the short term.

The outlook for construction is improving, but there is still no stimulus expected for the second quarter. Demand for construction work has now recovered somewhat from its very low level but has still not really taken off. Building permits rose sharply in the first quarter, following an already substantial increase in the previous quarter. However, according to the data available up to February, new orders in the main construction sector declined again somewhat in the first quarter, following three consecutive increases. This is due to the fact that civil engineering experienced a sharp fall in new orders in February. Fewer orders owing to central government’s interim budget management may also have played a role in this temporarily. 10 Overall, the business climate in the main construction sector improved in April, according to surveys conducted by the ifo Institute. The slight deterioration in the assessment of the situation was more than offset by the significantly higher expectations. 11

The measures agreed in the coalition agreement are likely to support economic activity in the coming years. However, until new infrastructure projects in the construction sector generate additional orders, planning, approval and procurement procedures must be followed in the first instance. Even if these are to be accelerated significantly, marked stimulus for construction output is not to be expected until next year at the earliest. Furthermore, its strength depends on the available production capacity. At present, capacity utilisation in civil engineering is rising and now stands only just below the average level of the last ten years, while building construction is still significantly underutilised. 12 With additional government investment, capacity utilisation in civil engineering is likely to increase further in the coming years. Potential bottlenecks will probably be cushioned to only a limited extent by the build-up of new capacity and the relocation of available capacity from building construction. The planned reduction of bureaucratic hurdles in housing construction is likely to support investment there, too. It is expected that plans for accelerated depreciation options will strengthen firms’ investment in machinery and equipment. After the necessary administrative lead time, higher defence expenditure will be reflected in higher government investment and consumption expenditure. While the higher demand is likely to partly support suppliers abroad, as a result of higher imports, it is not least domestic manufacturers of armaments, such as weapons and ammunition or military vehicles (which are classified as other transport equipment in the economic statistics) that are likely to benefit from this. The higher aggregate demand could lead to somewhat higher inflation rates in the medium term. However, the coalition agreement also includes some fiscal measures that temporarily dampen inflation directly, especially in the case of energy. 13 Specific macroeconomic effects of the more expansionary fiscal policy are estimated more precisely in the Bundesbank’s new Forecast for Germany. This will be published in June. 

The new Federal Government’s coalition agreement contains supply-side projects aimed at strengthening the German economy’s long-term growth. This is particularly true of measures to improve the business investment environment. These include projects to reduce bureaucracy, modernise government administration and digitalisation, as well as the planned tax incentives for investment. Measures to boost innovation, such as better access to venture capital for young firms, can also play a part. Individual measures, such as the abolition of the national Act on Corporate Due Diligence Obligations in Supply Chains (Lieferkettensorgfaltspflichtengesetz) or the improved depreciation options for spending on new machinery and equipment, have already been cited quite specifically. For many other projects, the impact on growth will depend in large part on the actual implementation. 

A coherent overall concept has yet to be drawn up for the energy transition. Energy transition costs can be limited through efficiency-enhancing measures and market-based mechanisms. Some of the new government’s plans are aimed in this direction. Especially since Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, energy costs in Germany have risen sharply. According to business surveys, they represent a burden on investment decisions in Germany and competitiveness. 14 At the same time, the rise in energy prices highlighted the risks of a high level of dependency on individual suppliers. Partly in order to avoid such dependencies it is important to press ahead with the energy transition. However, efficiency and planning security must be taken into account in order to limit energy costs. A sharp rise in grid costs should be avoided as far as possible from the outset. As a step in this direction, for example, it is planned to make greater use of the cost-effective overhead lines when expanding the grid. The announcement that the rollout of smart meters is moving ahead more quickly is likewise a welcome development, as dynamic electricity tariffs can be used to limit costs and also to improve stability of the grid. It makes sense to reduce electricity tax to the European minimum rate in order to contain retail energy prices somewhat. There does not seem to be such a plausible case for subsidising grid fees. These kinds of usage fees can send scarcity pricing signals. The envisaged industrial electricity price would also dampen such signals for energy-intensive industrial firms. In the case of large-scale subsidies, it is also important to keep an eye on the tight public finances. For decarbonisation, the coalition primarily wants to use carbon pricing, i.e. create price incentives. This concentration on market incentive mechanisms seems to make sense in principle. For efficient price incentives, however, there would have to be efforts at the EU level to ensure that carbon pricing is applied to all sectors as equally as possible and without exception – as in the case of agriculture. 

Individual measures strengthen the labour supply. For example, the planned civic allowance reform is likely to increase the incentives of unemployed persons to search for a job, thereby boosting the labour supply. By contrast, the measures to enhance the immigration of skilled workers are only convincing in part. A new digital work and stay agency is strongly welcomed, for example. Its task is to bundle and speed up all processes relating to the economic migration of persons from non-EU countries, including the recognition of their qualifications. It also makes sense to encourage people from non-EU countries who have earned professional or academic qualifications in Germany to stay. However, there are no details of specific measures yet. At the same time, however, the new government wants to halve the annual migration quota of 50,000 people under the Western Balkans arrangement. Even if the quota system was probably not fully exhausted in 2024, this would curb employment-oriented immigration. By contrast, extending the regulation to other countries of origin would be effective.

However, domestic labour supply reserves remain untapped in a number of areas. Demographic developments will weigh heavily on labour input and, above all, on Germany’s potential growth in the coming years. In order to mobilise labour market reserves for older people, the pension insurance scheme offers some effective approaches, in particular in view of full pensions without any deductions and a statutory retirement age. These are apparently not intended to be pursued, however. By contrast, the planned partial tax exemption for wages of workers working beyond the standard retirement age (“active pension”) is unlikely to help (see “Pension policy projects of the new Federal Government ” in the "Public finances" article). The coalition agreement does not provide any indication of major structural changes in terms of a higher female labour force participation either. Female employment in Germany is relatively high by European standards. However, women work comparatively fewer hours on average. A rapid expansion of childcare services as planned would therefore be welcome. In addition, the tax and social security contributions system promotes reduced employment in some cases (such as the promotion of “mini-jobs” and the non-contributory inclusion in statutory health insurance and long-term care insurance cover for couples). This is likely to contribute to the fact that childless women in Germany also only take up employment to a relatively minor extent. 15 However, it would appear that no changes are being planned here. Finally, significant rises in social security contributions threaten to thwart incentives to work (and – through higher labour costs – the competitiveness of the German export industry). In this regard, it is important that the review of the health and long-term care insurance scheme announced in the coalition agreement curbs the planned increase in expenditure.

(This article takes account of data up to 20 May 2025, 11:00)

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