See, for example, the index for measuring economic policy uncertainty based on newspaper coverage frequency developed by Baker, Bloom and Davies (2016). Although this fell in March compared with the previous month, it remains at an elevated level. See https://www.policyuncertainty.com Seasonal adjustment here and in the remainder of this text also includes adjustment for calendar variations, provided they can be verified and quantified. Energy-intensive industries include the economic sectors manufacture of chemicals and chemical products, the manufacture of basic metals, the manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products, the manufacture of non-metallic mineral products, and the manufacture of paper and paperboard. According to data from the German Association of the Automotive Industry, the number of passenger cars manufactured rose again in March 2024. However, this was not enough to elevate the total number of passenger cars manufactured in the first quarter of 2024 above the previous quarter’s level. See Deutscher Wetterdienst (2024). The annual rate of consumer inflation according to the national Consumer Price Index fell from 2.5 % to 2.2 %. For more detailed information, see Deutsche Bundesbank (2023a), p. 8. See Deutsche Bundesbank (2024a), p. 67. In many federal states, the advance payment for these tax shares for the fourth quarter is based on the cash revenue from the federal state’s income tax in the third quarter. In 2022, the one-off energy price allowance weighed heavily on state government revenue in the third quarter. As a result, the downward adjustments for the fourth quarter of 2022 were too small and the affected federal states made up payments at the start of 2023. Without this effect, local governments’ income tax shares would probably have developed in largely the same way as those taxes at the general government level. Local government taxes would then have grown by €3 billion (2½ percentage points) less. See Federal Statistical Office (2024). See Ministry of the Interior and for Sports of the State of Rhineland-Palatinate (2024). For the sake of simplicity, the term “ EU institutions” is used here to refer to “ EU institutions and bodies” as defined in the European System of National Accounts ( ESA ). In its press release of 28 March 2024 on Germany’s Maastricht debt level in 2023, the Bundesbank also reported the share of EU debt attributable to Germany for the first time, estimating this figure for 2023. See Deutsche Bundesbank (2024b). Note: The German debt ratio has now been revised downwards by 0.1 percentage point and is now reported as 63.6%. Lending by the European Financial Stability Facility ( EFSF ) would then also have to be factored out. This is already proportionally allocated to the official Maastricht debt levels of the Member States guaranteeing the debt. This official allocation is due to the EFSF ’s design and has not been applied to the debt of other EU institutions so far. In a recently published policy brief, the ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research applies an even broader approach. In addition to Germany’s share in consolidated EU debt as reported in this commentary, the brief shows Germany’s share of liability in loans granted by the EU to Member States. It also takes account of future borrowing for NGEU grants, NGEU loans and MFA loans that have been agreed but not disbursed. See Heinemann and Moessinger (2024). The residual item may be positive or negative. It results, first, from any differences between borrowing and lending at the ESM , EFSF and the European Commission (for the SURE , BoP and EFSM programmes). This can occur, for example, when these entities borrow and hold funds for subsequent disbursements. Second, the consolidated debt level changes when EU institutions hold claims on Member States that they do not finance through their own borrowing. This is the case, for example, with the ESM , which can also use its paid-up share capital for this purpose. (The share capital does not count towards EU debt.) As the claims on Member States reduce the consolidated debt level in such cases, too, the residual item may be negative. Given this kind of allocation, any change in a country’s share in EU GNI changes its absolute share in EU debt and deficits, but its share in relation to GNI remains the same. This also broadly true of the share as a percentage of GDP , as a country’s GNI and its GDP develop very similarly. The Bundesbank also uses this allocation key to report net contributions for NGEU . See also Deutsche Bundesbank (2022a), p. 39 and Deutsche Bundesbank (2023b), p. 80. Germany’s share of €60 billion includes repayment burdens of €46 billion arising from NGEU grants. This burden was already reported by the Bundesbank in the table of key central government budget data in its latest quarterly report on public finances. See Deutsche Bundesbank (2024a), p. 69. In the future, this table will also include the somewhat more broadly defined consolidated EU debt level used here. For details on taking this into account in the German debt brake, see Deutsche Bundesbank ( 2022b), p. 64. For details on taking this into account in respect of the national fiscal impulse, see Deutsche Bundesbank (2020), pp. 42 ff.
Commentaries Monthly Report – April 2024
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Monthly Report – April 2024 Commentaries
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Monthly Report – April 2024 Statistical Section Read — PDF, 5.13 MB