1 Energy efficiency in the context of climate policy
2 The importance of energy efficiency and how it relates to energy intensity
3 Energy efficiency improvements in Germany
Measuring energy-saving technological progress
See Hassler et al. (2021). The Joint Economic Forecast (2022, 2023) also calculates energy-saving technology for Germany using a single-sector model that has a different production structure than EMuSe . Energy-saving technology can be calculated as a residual, similar to the Solow residual. This can be done using the factor demand functions for energy and intermediate inputs in general. These equations derive from the optimisation problem of enterprises. The parameter \( \alpha_{H,s} \) denotes the production elasticity of the intermediate inputs and the long-term share of production factor \( H \) in output in sector \( s \) . The production elasticity of labour, by contrast, is indicated by \( (1 – \alpha_{H,s})\alpha_{N,s} \) and the long-term share of labour as a factor of output in sector \( s \) . The parameter \( \alpha_{NE,s} \) , meanwhile, stands for the long-term share of non-energy intermediate inputs in the total intermediate inputs used in sector \( s \) . For negative values of \( \sigma_{H} \) , energy and non-energy intermediate inputs have a low level of substitutability in production; positive values mean that they are readily substitutable. Perfect competition in factor and product markets is a standard assumption made as part of a medium-term analysis of the effects of technological progress on the real economy. See, for example, Hassler et al. (2021). In the calculations, it is assumed that \( \sigma_{H} = − 9 \) , based on insights from the empirical literature (Atalay (2017), Barrot and Sauvagnat (2016) and Boehm et al. (2019)). The input-output tables are available up to 2020. As 2020 is strongly influenced by pandemic effects, energy-saving technology is only calculated until 2019 in this case. See Bruns et al. (2021) and Jo and Karnizova (2021). This definition is not clear-cut, as it is possible to lower emissions without burdening GDP even in the absence of energy efficiency gains. This is the case, for example, when the energy mix shifts towards lower-emission or non-fossil-based energy. Bruns et al. (2021) feed energy consumption into the estimation as a variable to obtain a more reliable estimate of energy efficiency shocks. Their analysis does not, however, include emissions in the estimation as an additional variable, which means that no conclusions can be drawn regarding the impact of energy efficiency gains on emissions.
4 Importance of energy efficiency as shown by the EMuSe model
5 Conclusion
6 List of references
By 2030, emissions have to be reduced by 65 % compared with 1990 levels. They had already been cut by around 46 % by 2023. In its “Fit for 55” package, the European Commission envisages a 55 % reduction in EU emissions by 2030 compared with 1990 levels. The stringency of targets in each country depends on the size of the nation’s economy. See Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (2022). Still, there is disagreement in the empirical literature as to the aggregate impact of higher carbon prices. While Metcalf and Stock (2023) arrive at a low estimate for the aggregate impact of higher carbon prices, Känzig (2023) finds they have a dampening effect on economic activity. See Acemoglu et al. (2012) and Network for Greening the Financial System (2023a). Newell et al. (1999) and Popp (2002) show that higher energy prices increase the incentive to develop energy-saving technologies. See Acemoglu et al. (2012) for a structural analysis. This could be reinforced by the government also promoting the development of technologies that contribute to reducing emissions alongside carbon pricing. See Acemoglu et al. (2012). This channel is also disregarded by assumption in the analysis. Empirical studies indicate that carbon pricing has a positive incentive effect on innovation. See Karmaker et al. (2021) and Aghion et al. (2016). However, it is difficult to estimate the strength of additional energy efficiency gains via this channel. The EMuSe model was developed at the Bundesbank and is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium ( DSGE ) model augmented by a multi-sectoral production structure and an environmental module. See Hinterlang et al. (2023) for technical documentation on the model. The two components are analysed separately in the model calculations. They can be combined in principle. Studies for the United States show, for example, that changes in energy-saving technology are an important driver of developments in emissions (Nordhaus (2013) and Jo and Karnizova (2021)). See Kriegler et al. (2014) or Bönke et al. (2023). There are multiple viewpoints in the academic debate about how well energy can be saved using other factors of production within production processes. Essentially, though, energy plays a special role in the production process and its degree of substitutability is very limited, at least in the short term (Stern (2019)). This approach is described in detail in Hassler et al. (2021). Based on the NACE classification, the following sectors are defined: Agriculture (A), parts of the manufacturing sector not covered by the EU Emissions Trading System ( EU ETS ), EU ETS parts of the manufacturing sector excluding the manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products (C17, C20, C23, C24), water supply (E), construction (F), wholesale and retail trade (G), transportation and storage (H), other services (I-N, R, S), and two energy sectors. There is a fossil energy sector comprising mining and quarrying (B) as well as the manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products (C19), and there is the electricity and gas supply sector (D35). This figure is consistent with the results presented in Joint Economic Forecast (2022) and Bönke et al. (2023). Energy intensity is measured as primary energy consumption relative to GDP , in line with the COP28 definition. Rebound effects may weaken the reduction in energy intensity compared with energy efficiency improvements, meaning that not all energy savings that would be technically possible are actually implemented. Once energy can be used more efficiently, production costs can be cut because energy consumption and the price of energy drop. These cost savings make it possible to increase production. As a result, demand for energy goes up again somewhat relative to other factors of production, and energy intensity falls somewhat less than it does immediately after the increase in energy efficiency. See, for example, Bruns et al. (2021) and Jo and Karnizova (2021). The importance of sectoral interlinkages for aggregate effects, particularly in the case of the introduction of a carbon price, was explained in Deutsche Bundesbank (2022). See, for example, Network for Greening the Financial System (2023b). This distinction is based on the model variant in Hinterlang et al. (2022). The analysis excludes economic damage caused by an excessive concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. As greenhouse gas emissions from the rest of the world are not included in this analysis and greenhouse gas emissions in Germany (and any reductions thereof) represent only a fraction of total emissions, it can be assumed that the impact over the period under consideration is negligible. The analysis in Deutsche Bundesbank (2022) on the physical impact of climate change on the economy as a whole shows gradual global warming having a very small effect on the German economy up until 2020. The effects of other physical risks, such as extreme weather events, were not investigated. The results presented here refer to Jüppner et al. (2024). Aggregate effects stemming from the allocation of resources – for example, towards research and development of energy-saving technologies – are excluded. Hulten (2001) describes technological progress of such an exogenous nature as “manna from heaven”. There are studies that analyse the impact of carbon pricing in the context of the European Union Emissions Trading System ( EU ETS ) on the overall technological progress (total factor productivity) of enterprises or sectors. In some cases, only small or insignificant effects are found (see, for example, D’Arcangelo et al. (2022) and Joltreau und Sommerfeld (2019)). Evidence on the impact of carbon prices on energy-saving technological progress has only been examined to a limited extent thus far. When working with simulation calculations, it can be taken into account by investigating scenarios with different assumptions regarding the evolution of energy efficiency. For example, this is the approach employed by the Network for Greening the Financial System ( NGFS ) (see Network for Greening the Financial System (2023b)). How revenue from carbon pricing can be used for climate-friendly investment is also not examined here. For more information, see, for example, Andrés et al. (2024). We also refrain from analysing the implications of international linkages, such as the spillover effects of energy-saving technologies or carbon pricing in Germany and abroad. The carbon price in the model initially leans on the predefined price pathway of the national emissions trading system (nEHS) up to 2026. The carbon price in the model is set so that the price of fossil energy in the first year after the carbon price is levied reflects the percentage increase in the price of fossil fuels as a result of the carbon price. The carbon price of €45 levied in Germany caused fuel prices to rise by 6.75 % relative to 2019 (Federal Ministry of Finance (2022) and ADAC (2024)). As the impact of the pandemic in particular distorted prices in 2020, 2019 was chosen as the pre-carbon price reference year. The carbon price in Germany was introduced back in 2021 at a low level. However, since the model simulations first apply from 2024 and the model in the 2023 reference scenario does not include a carbon price, the carbon price is introduced at a higher level in the model and the increase in the price of fossil fuels caused by the higher carbon price is taken into account from 2024. The carbon price continues to rise in the model until 2026 in line with the actual price pathway, increasing by a rate of 22 % and 18 % in 2025 and 2026, respectively. Since a separate European emissions trading system is to be introduced for nEHS sectors from 2027, the price pathway is based on allowance prices under the EU ETS . From 2027 onwards, the carbon price climbs at an annual rate of 7.8 % until 2030 to reach the projected value of around €88, which corresponds to the average price for emission allowances in 2023 (Federal Environment Agency (2023)). There are still minor restrictions when it comes to the price pathway. First, there are sectors that are covered by the EU ETS and that already pay the higher carbon price. The carbon price for these sectors is thus somewhat lower between 2024 and 2026. Second, the fossil energy sector is taxed in the simulations. This sector is composed of sectors C19 and B. While sector C19 has to pay a carbon price, sector B has not yet been included in either of the two emission trading schemes. Other contributions from the literature that predict a decline in output after the introduction of a carbon price include, for example, Hinterlang et al. (2022) and Bönke et al. (2023). The model simulations do not make any further assumptions about economic developments up to 2030. It should be stressed that this is not an economic projection. The simulations focus exclusively on the contribution of the two components: energy efficiency improvements and carbon pricing. The carbon price has considerable advantages when it comes to putting it into practice. It is easy to implement and functions as a tax on emissions that makes fossil fuels more expensive. It thus acts as an incentive, prompting a reduction in demand for fossil energy or emissions directly. No preliminary investment or funding programmes are necessary and the instrument’s impact unfolds almost immediately after its introduction (see Brand et al. (2023)). In addition, it can be adjusted flexibly depending on how effective it is being. Ultimately, it is also likely to have a positive incentive effect on investment in lower-emission technologies. In the model simulations, energy-saving technology only exists in the corporate sector. Energy efficiency with regard to households’ consumption is assumed not to change. It is far more difficult to determine. Thus, the figure for energy-saving technology as an aggregate tends to be at the lower end. In principle, efficiency gains in the household sector could also contribute to reducing aggregate energy demand and thus energy intensity. Further innovations, such as neutral technological progress, are not included in the simulations. Such advancements can trigger an increase in energy demand and thus also push up demand for fossil energy. Emissions would increase. If firms did not become more efficient in terms of energy use in this case, they would cut fewer emissions than in the status quo scenario. A similar study conducted by Bönke et al. (2023) also concludes that a relatively high carbon price is necessary to achieve the emission targets if energy-saving technological progress evolves in the same way as in the past. See Federal Environment Agency (2024).