4 German public finances: decline in deficit and debt ratios
German public finances are likely to continue to improve this year and next, with the decisive factor being the discontinuation of crisis assistance. The deficit ratio could decline to under 2 % this year, having stood at 2.5 % in 2023. The expiry of the energy price brakes will actually provide slightly more budgetary relief than it did in the previous year. However, this is counterbalanced by strong growth in several expenditure items, first and foremost, the Armed Forces Fund and the Climate Fund. The deficit ratio looks set to shrink further next year. This can mainly be explained by additional revenue as inflation compensation bonuses will again be subject to tax and social security contributions. Without this, the deficit ratio would probably more likely move sideways.
The debt ratio is also likely to decline, but this will be partially offset by increasing obligations arising from EU debt. The national debt ratio stood at 63.6 % at the end of 2023. However, this takes no account of the share of EU debt that Germany will ultimately have to shoulder. If this is factored into the debt ratio, it would have stood at an estimated 65.4 %. This ratio will fall less sharply than the national ratio, because EU debt will continue to rise significantly until 2026.
Overall, public finances are unlikely to have an excessively restrictive effect on economic developments this year or next. The concerns expressed in some quarters therefore seem exaggerated, and an economic upturn can be expected. In 2024, the general government deficit will decline in net terms purely due to the discontinuation of the energy price brakes. This should have only a minimal impact on economic growth, partly because upstream gas and electricity prices in 2024 are set to be lower again than in 2023. Looking ahead to the coming year, it is often overlooked that central government and its off-budget special funds still have broad leeway for deficits. These include deficits for cyclical burdens and financial transactions, the remaining reserves and the Armed Forces Fund’s leeway for deficits.
Federal budget and Climate Fund could develop more favourably in 2024 than planned. As a result, they could still have significant reserves going into 2025. The deficit in 2025 could thus be higher without violating the credit limit under the debt brake. Budget negotiations are currently difficult. However, this appears to be because considerably more funds have been requested as compared with the framework set out by the Ministry of Finance. In any case, central government’s scope for deficits, including its off-budget entities, is unlikely to be much lower than the deficit currently expected for 2024.
Further discussions are taking place with regard to the debt brake. The Bundesbank deems a stability-oriented reform to be worthy of consideration. As long as the debt brake applies consistently, it will be well able to safeguard sound government finances, even if the credit limit is moderately higher. Specifically, a higher credit limit seems acceptable given a debt ratio of below 60 %. If the national rules then ensure that the structural general government deficit ratio stays below 1½%, this should, generally speaking, also fulfil the new EU requirements. Any additional fiscal leeway from such a reform could, moreover, be reserved for particularly important tasks: a capped golden rule, as outlined by the Bundesbank, would allow additional leeway to be created in a more targeted manner, for net government investment, say. As an alternative to adjusting the net credit limit, Germany’s Basic Law (Grundgesetz) allows for a special fund with its own credit limit in some instances. A special fund of this nature could be designed in such a way that it expands the deficit scope in a comparable manner, meaning that it would not run counter to the basic considerations discussed above.