1 General government budget[1]

1.1 Outlook for 2024 and 2025

Only moderate changes in the general government deficit and debt ratio are currently on the cards, although a new course is likely to be set after the general election.

The deficit ratio will probably fall slightly in 2024 (2023: 2.6 %), and in the absence of new government bills, a further small decline appears likely for 2025. However, this is due to fairly strong, opposing developments.

The expiry of temporary measures previously in place to address the energy crisis is having a lowering effect on the deficit.[2] Overall, these measures increased the deficit by around 1½ % of GDP in 2023. Around half of these burdens were attributable to the electricity and gas price brakes, which expired at the end of 2023. Their expiry should not have a particularly restrictive impact on economic developments, as gas and electricity prices at the upstream stages are significantly lower again. In this respect, the brakes have had a similar effect to an automatic stabiliser. Paying out temporary wage components tax and social contribution-free (inflation compensation bonuses), which is currently the second largest expenditure item, is only possible until the end of 2024. This has caused significant revenue shortfalls for general government in 2023 and 2024.

By contrast, additional expenditure in some areas and the phase of economic weakness are increasing the deficit. The Armed Forces Fund and the Climate Fund are likely to have significantly higher outflows overall than in 2023. It remains difficult to gauge precisely what this will look like. The high inflation rates of recent years are continuing to leave their mark with a time lag, particularly in the form of sharply rising personnel expenditure, with the public sector lagging behind the private sector. At the same time, more subdued price dynamics and weak developments in the real economy are, when viewed in isolation, reducing growth in taxes and social contributions. In addition, weak economic developments are driving up labour market-related expenditure temporarily. Moreover, spending on pensions, healthcare and long-term care is rising dynamically. Overall, the social security funds are likely to record deficits and draw on their reserves, and that is in spite of considerably higher contribution rates (see also the supplementary information entitled “Social contribution rates to rise sharply”).

The debt ratio could fall moderately by the end of 2025 (end-2023: 62.9 %). Its decline is decelerating compared with the previous two years. This is because nominal GDP in the denominator is growing much more slowly, and the deficit ratio is only slightly lower. Viewed in isolation, a debt-financed generational capital fund would increase the debt ratio.

1.2 Fiscal policy facing challenges

The outlook for government finances depends to a significant extent on the course that is set for economic and fiscal policy. There is a consensus that Germany is facing significant challenges, particularly as a result of demographic change, high energy costs and global economic and geopolitical developments. In this context, the task of the state is, not least, to ensure adequate framework conditions for the social market economy. Central government has a pivotal role to play in this. However, state and local governments must also do their part in their respective spheres of responsibility.

From the Bundesbank’s perspective, sound government finances and binding fiscal rules are key to ensuring fiscal and economic resilience and tackling the challenges ahead. This is because adequate framework conditions must also include government debt staying within limits consistent with stability. Binding fiscal rules are there to safeguard this. To avoid overwhelming government finances even in view of the challenges faced at present, it is important to provide services efficiently and to review existing expenditure and special rules on taxes and social contributions.

In the case of a low debt ratio, a moderate increase in borrowing scope is then justifiable from a stability policy perspective. The Bundesbank has proposed a reformed debt brake with a two-tier borrowing limit that could be used to give preferential treatment to investment expenditure. For example, the first limit for structural net borrowing could be set at ½ % of GDP and the second limit at 1½ % of GDP. Any amount borrowed in the second tier would need to be demonstrably matched by that same amount of net investment.[3] The binding deficit ceiling, including protected expenditure (here: 1½ %), is crucial in order to reliably restrict the debt ratio. Under plausible assumptions, a deficit ratio of 1½ % of GDP would stabilise the debt ratio at around the 60 % reference value specified in the EU rules. Separately, compliance with the requirements set out in the EU rules must also be ensured.

It has not yet been decided what budget limits under the new EU fiscal rules will apply to Germany from 2025 onwards.[4] Germany itself has not yet submitted an adjustment plan for this purpose. Assessments conducted in June were already pointing to some need for consolidation.[5] Moreover, the comparatively unfavourable developments seen since then must additionally be taken into account. Germany’s plan should factor this in and implement the new fiscal rules stringently. This is the only way for the Federal Government to credibly advocate that the rules be applied throughout the European Union in a stability-oriented manner. The deficit and debt ratios in some Member States remain persistently high. The new rules should aim to change this. However, the great complexity of the requirements for country-specific budget limits has already become apparent. Moreover, the procedure in which the Member State, the European Commission and Ecofin set the budget limits is fairly opaque. It is now necessary to establish clear requirements and to explain and implement them in a comprehensible manner. In order to strengthen confidence in sound government finances in the euro area, it is important for the reformed rules to get off to a good start.

2 Budgetary development of central, state and local government

2.1 Tax revenue

2.1.1 Third quarter of 2024

Tax revenue rose by 1½ % in the third quarter (or +€3 billion). A sharp decline in income tax on dividends (-€6 billion) overshadowed otherwise solid growth. This fall was due to intra-year shifts compared with the previous year and a large dividend payment made last year raising revenue for that year. By contrast, revenue from the EU solidarity contribution introduced in response to the energy crisis had a bolstering effect. This is a special levy on the profits of companies in the fossil fuel sector, collected in the third quarter.[6]

Tax revenue

At 6½ %, growth in wage tax receipts was dynamic. Growth was thus stronger than in the first half of the year (see Table 5.1). The fact that taxable regular wage adjustments gradually replaced tax-free inflation compensation bonuses is likely to have played a role here. However, tax cuts at the beginning of the year – especially to compensate for the bracket creep of the previous year – are continuing to significantly slow growth.

Revenue from profit-related taxes decreased by 8 % due to a one-off effect on income tax on dividends. Excluding this tax, it rose dynamically. The slump in income tax on dividends is due to the fact that a large dividend payment by a logistics company last year raised revenue for that year. In addition, this year dividend distributions were concentrated more in the second quarter – in 2023, these had been concentrated more in the third quarter. By contrast, withholding tax on interest income and capital gains continued to rise sharply. The increase is likely to be mainly attributable to a significant rise in interest income. This is because the average interest rate level for deposits was still noticeably higher than in the previous year. Revenue from assessed income tax rose considerably. Compensation for bracket creep slowed here too, albeit to a much lesser extent than wage tax. By contrast, revenue from corporation tax fell significantly. There was a moderate fall in advance payments for the current year, a major revenue item.

Revenue from VAT stagnated. Adjusted for the exceptionally high level of the previous year, however, it is likely to have risen significantly, by around 5 %. In August last year, there were a significant amount of lagged payments for periods further back in time. Adjusted for this effect, growth in VAT was probably also based on tax cuts that had expired: the reduced VAT rate on restaurant meals came to an end at the close of 2023. Natural gas and district heating rate cuts expired at the end of the first quarter of 2024.

**Table 5.1 Tax revenue**
Type of tax	Q1 to Q3				Estimate for 2024 ¹	Q3
	2023	2024	Year-on-year change		Year-on-year change	2023	2024	Year-on-year change
	€ billion		€ billion	%	%	€ billion		€ billion	%
Tax revenue
Total²	608.5	626.0	+ 17.5	+ 2.9	+ 3.1	208.7	212	+ 3.2	+ 1.6
of which:
Wage tax³	171.6	179.8	+ 8.2	+ 4.8	+ 5.3	56.4	60.1	+ 3.7	+ 6.5
Profit-related taxes	120.6	122.6	+ 2.0	+ 1.6	+ 1.4	42.5	39	− 3.5	− 8.2
of which:
Assessed income tax⁴	52.2	52.7	+ 0.5	+ 1.0	+ 0.2	17	18.8	+ 1.8	+ 10.4
Corporation tax⁵	33.0	29.2	− 3.8	− 11.5	− 9.9	9.9	8.7	− 1.2	− 12.2
Non-assessed taxes on earnings	29.8	26.7	− 3.0	− 10.2	− 8.9	13.4	7.3	− 6	− 45.1
Withholding tax on interest income and capital gains	5.7	13.9	+ 8.3	+ 146.5	+ 118	2.2	4.2	+ 2	+ 90.4
VAT⁶	216.9	221.2	+ 4.4	+ 2	+ 2.6	76.1	76.4	+ 0.3	+ 0.4
Other consumption-related taxes⁷	66.2	66.6	+ 0.4	+ 0.6	+ 0.4	22.9	22.7	− 0.2	− 0.8
Sources: Federal Ministry of Finance, Working Party on Tax Revenue Estimates and Bundesbank calculations. 1 According to official tax estimate of October 2024. 2 Comprises joint taxes as well as central government taxes and state government taxes. Including EU shares in German tax revenue, including customs duties, but excluding receipts from local government taxes. 3 Child benefits and subsidies for supplementary private pension plans deducted from revenue. 4 Employee refunds and research grants deducted from revenue. 5 Research grants deducted from revenue. 6 VAT and import VAT. 7 Taxes on energy, tobacco, insurance, motor vehicles, electricity, alcohol, air traffic, coffee, sparkling wine, intermediate products, alcopops, betting and lotteries, beer and fire protection.

2.1.2 Official tax estimate

According to the updated official tax estimate, tax revenue will go up by just under 3 % on the year in 2024. Legislative changes are reducing growth slightly.[7] Overall, the estimators expect tax growth to be somewhat stronger than suggested by the Federal Government’s macroeconomic assumptions and legislative changes. This is mainly due to cash developments thus far – first and foremost the sharp increase in tax revenue from interest income.

Wage tax revenue will rise by 5½ %, and thus on a similar scale to gross wages and salaries. Compensation for the high bracket creep of the previous year will reduce the growth rate by 4½ percentage points. However, this roughly corresponds to the additional revenue generated by price-related bracket creep plus real wage-related automatic income tax increases in the current year.[8]

Overall, profit-related taxes will rise slightly, which is due entirely to the strong growth in withholding tax on interest income and capital gains. Without this, revenue would fall markedly, largely in line with macroeconomic assumptions regarding the development of profits. Profit-related taxes are moving in different directions: there are sharp declines in both corporation tax and income tax on dividends. By contrast, assessed income tax and local business tax are moving sideways.

Revenue from VAT will only grow by 2½ %, despite the VAT rate cuts having come to an end. The major item nominal household consumption, which is based on the Federal Government’s autumn projection, is rising only moderately.

In 2025, tax revenue is projected to increase by 4½ %. The assumed macroeconomic developments actually point to growth of just 3 %. In particular, however, it will no longer be possible to pay out temporary wage components tax-free (inflation compensation bonus). Taken in isolation, this will boost growth in revenue from wage tax by 3 percentage points.[9]

For 2026, the tax estimate projects an increase of 4½ %, followed by an average of 3½ % in the subsequent years up to 2029. The increases are driven primarily by assumptions about macroeconomic growth and fiscal drag. Legislative changes will give a slight boost to growth in 2026. In 2028 and 2029, legislative changes will slow revenue growth down markedly: higher social contribution rates, in particular, will lead to shortfalls in revenue from wage tax and income tax. The estimate does not factor in the usual compensation for bracket creep because it is based on current legislation.

2.1.3 Additional tax cuts initiated

The Federal Government had initiated or planned tax cuts (beyond what was covered by the tax estimate).[10] In particular, it intended to lower wage and income tax. Specifically, a shift in the 2025 income tax rates was planned in order to compensate for the bracket creep of 2024. Such compensation has been customary for some time now and is essentially undisputed in the political arena. The precise form it will take and the date of implementation are currently unclear. The Bundestag has already passed a bill to raise the income tax-free allowances for 2024 retroactively. This step is intended to take account of the price and wage increases that factor into the extrapolation of standard financial needs. It is due to be implemented in December 2024, which would reduce wage tax revenue from January 2025 onwards. Overall, the tax revenue shortfalls compared to the tax estimate are likely to amount to around 1 % of tax revenue ‒ if, in addition to the two measures (which have not yet been enacted), it is assumed that bracket creep will be broadly compensated for in 2025.

Additional shortfalls will arise in the years that follow if there is further compensation for the bracket creep of the previous year. The Federal Government had also been planning to introduce accelerated tax depreciation methods again. These plans appear to have been abandoned now ‒ but improving investment incentives will probably be on the agenda of a new Federal Government, too.

In general, there are also legal uncertainties, not least with regard to revenue from the solidarity surcharge (annual revenue: ¼ % of GDP). A constitutional complaint against the solidarity surcharge from 2020 onwards is currently underway. This poses revenue risks: the levying of the solidarity surcharge could be prohibited from a certain date onwards. Additionally, refunds could be ordered. As in previous years, real estate tax, which has been fundamentally reformed from 2025 onwards, is expected to increase slightly (revenue of ⅓ % of GDP). However, the details of how the tax is to be applied remain uncertain, particularly regarding the setting of multipliers, and there are some legal risks here, too.

2.1.4 Significant downward revision compared with May

Compared with the tax estimate of May 2024, the new tax estimate contains noticeable revenue shortfalls. In addition to the weaker developments seen this year, this is also due to less favourable macroeconomic assumptions. This year, net shortfalls will amount to €8½ billion. Next year, they will rise to €12½ billion and then remain roughly at that level. Estimates for the years from 2024 to 2028 are thus ¼ % of GDP lower than in May. This is due, first, to weak cash developments this year. Second, it heavily reflects less favourable macroeconomic assumptions, primarily those regarding profit-related taxes. Revenue is only slightly reduced by legislative changes that have been adopted in the meantime.

**Table 5.2: Official tax estimate figures and the Federal Government’s macroeconomic projections**
Item	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029
Tax revenue¹
€ billion	941.6	982.4	1,024.9	1,063.2	1,097.1	1,133.8
% of GDP	21.8	22.1	22.3	22.5	22.5	22.6
Year-on-year change (%)	2.8	4.3	4.3	3.7	3.2	3.3
Revision compared with previous tax estimate (€ billion)	− 8.7	− 12.7	− 11.6	− 11.7	− 13.4	.
Memo item: Revenue shortfalls due to envisaged tax relief (€ billion)
Upcoming changes in tax legislation²	− 0.4	− 3.42	− 1.4	− 2.1	− 2.2	− 2.1
Revenue shortfalls if bracket creep is compensated for in same manner as previously from 2025³	.	− 5.4	− 9.9	− 14.1	− 18.7	− 23.6
Real GDP growth (%)
Autumn projection (October 2024)	− 0.2	1.1	1.6	0.9	0.9	0.9
Spring projection (April 2024)	0.3	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	.
Nominal GDP growth (%)
Autumn projection (October 2024)	3.0	3.0	3.5	2.9	2.9	2.9
Spring projection (April 2024)	3.0	2.8	3.0	3.0	3.0	.
Sources: Working Party on Tax Revenue Estimates and Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action. 1 Including EU shares in German tax revenue, including customs duties, including receipts from local government taxes, 2 Annual Tax Act 2024 (Jahressteuergesetz 2024) and Act on Tax Exemption up to the Minimum Subsistence Level 2024 (Gesetz zur steuerlichen Freistellung des Existenzminimums 2024). 3 Since 2014, the income tax scale has been shifted year after year, usually in line with the estimated inflation of the previous year. The figures shown here are the revenue shortfalls that will result if this practice is continued. The calculations are roughly estimated and are based on the Federal Government’s current autumn projection and wage tax receipts based on current tax estimates as defined in the national accounts. The basic income tax allowance is also shifted in line with the inflation rate of the previous year.

2.2 Central government finances

2.2.1 Third quarter of 2024

The deficit of central government including off-budget entities was markedly higher in the third quarter of 2024 than in the previous year. The increase was primarily due to one-off effects. The deficit climbed from €9 billion to just over €19 billion. On balance, this was mainly due to a sharp rise in the Climate Fund’s deficit.

In the core budget, the deficit fell slightly. At 7½ %, central government revenue rose steeply. Tax revenue climbed by 3½ %, bolstered by a decline in deductions for transfers to the EU budget, whilst other current revenue grew strongly. The HGV toll, for instance, rose steeply (on account of the surcharge for greenhouse gas emissions). Additional revenue of €2 billion was generated by the dissolution of the Digitalisation Fund and the transfer of reserves to the core budget. Expenditure grew only slightly less strongly than revenue. The increase in the former was chiefly due to the fact that interest expenditure was lower in the previous year on account of a one-off effect: payments to be made at the start of July 2023 were already being recorded in the second quarter, while this year, they were recorded in the third quarter again. On balance, the interest expenditure rise totalling €6 billion compared with the same quarter of the previous year was almost exclusively attributable to this effect.

Fiscal balance of central government's core budget

The deficit in the off-budget entities rose sharply due to strong outflows of funds and a revenue-side one-off effect in the Climate Fund.

Following a moderate surplus in the same quarter of the previous year, the Climate Fund recorded a large deficit of €9 billion. The green electricity subsidies financed by the Climate Fund this year added €5 billion to the deficit on their own. On top of this, investment grants issued saw fairly strong growth of €2 billion. Meanwhile, the fund generated €3 billion less from greenhouse gas emission allowances. This is ultimately due to a one-off effect, as sales of allowances were postponed to the final quarter.
In the Armed Forces Fund, the deficit climbed by €2½ billion to just over €4 billion. This increase reflects additional spending on procurement.
The Digitalisation Fund is being dissolved and its reserves transferred to the core budget. In the third quarter, this resulted in a €2 billion deficit (following only a slight deficit in the same period of the previous year).
In the Economic Stabilisation Fund (ESF), by contrast, the fact that energy price assistance had ceased at the end of 2023 brought relief this year. The assistance measures had contributed €3 billion to the deficit in the same quarter of 2023. In 2024, a surplus of €4½ billion in the ESF was generated by somewhat higher repayments of coronavirus and energy price assistance loans.

Fiscal balances of central government's off-budget entities

2.2.2 2024 as a whole

From the current perspective, the core budget deficit is likely to remain considerably below the estimated €49 billion. According to the October tax estimate, tax revenue will be €3½ billion below budget estimates (after deducting global revenue shortfalls of €2 billion). However, this will be offset by unbudgeted privatisation proceeds of €3½ billion.[11] On the expenditure side, despite additional burdens from the basic allowance, there is set to be significant relief on balance relative to the budget plan. Lower interest expenditure and personnel spending, not least, are on the cards. In addition, planned loans of €12 billion to the generational capital fund are no longer expected, as the pension package was not ultimately passed prior to the collapse of the coalition government. Overall, the deficit in the core budget could thus be smaller than planned – by somewhat more than this sum of €12 billion.

The coalition government collapsed in November. A previously planned supplementary budget for 2024 has not been approved, but this could still happen. The government draft has been passed on to the Bundestag, which could yet update it and make amendments beyond that. A supplementary budget would have to comply with the requirements of the debt brake.

An updated supplementary budget is likely to open up some scope with regard to the debt brake. As previously described, fiscal developments in 2024 are expected to be better than planned. However, some major factors are not counted towards the debt brake. For instance, the relief relative to the budget plan described above primarily concerns financial transactions. Higher than planned privatisation proceeds and lower than planned expenditure on the generational capital fund do not have any positive effect on structural net borrowing relevant to the debt brake. However, the scope for borrowing under the debt brake will expand considerably, as the debt brake-relevant cyclical burden on the budget resulting from the weaker than projected development of nominal GDP is set to be substantially higher (by around €12 billion, based on the Federal Government’s autumn projection).

Overall, then, it seems plausible that the upper limit of the debt brake will be undershot significantly – by more than €10 billion – in 2024.[12] In view of this, the Bundestag could decide to make less recourse to the reserve than originally planned. However, it could also incorporate new measures into the supplementary budget in order to make full use of the room in the budget. The Federal Government’s draft supplementary budget, for instance, provided for increased transfers of €10 billion to the Climate Fund. Additional aid for Ukraine, measures to promote investment and subsidies for energy costs (grid fees) are just some of the measures currently under discussion. In view of the interim management of the budget foreseeable for 2025, investment projects could be brought forward, were a voting majority to support this.

The deficit of the off-budget entities is likely to be somewhat lower than planned. This is on account of very disparate factors.

The debt-financed Armed Forces Fund looks set to record a smaller than planned deficit. After the first three quarters of the year, only one-half of its budgeted funds had been spent. The obligations arising from procurement contracts reported at the budget outturn for 2023 and the usual delays in new contracts suggest that the planned deficit of €20 billion will be significantly undershot.

The deficit in the Climate Fund is likely to be somewhat lower than planned, even excluding additional government grants from the central government’s draft supplementary budget. After three quarters, the deficit stood at €24 billion – already fairly close to the projected €29 billion. However, with estimated annual revenues of just over €20 billion, it appears that around three-quarters of the receipts from emission allowances sales were still outstanding. Despite far higher than planned expenditure on green electricity subsidies laid down in the Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz – EEG), then, a somewhat more favourable than expected result is on the cards. Specifically, grants of €4 billion towards a chip manufacturing plant in Saxony-Anhalt that were planned this year are not the only funds that will no longer be spent. Without further central government grants, though, only a small part of the reserve (amounting to just over €29 billion at the start of 2024) is likely to remain for expenditure already planned for subsequent years.

Lastly, there are surpluses in off-budget entities for which no economic plans have been published. In the first instance, this concerns the ESF, which will receive repayments of emergency assistance loans granted during the coronavirus pandemic and energy price crisis. As at the end of the first three quarters of the year, this had already generated a surplus of €8½ billion. In addition, there are no economic plans for pension provision units such as the civil servants’ pension reserve and the civil servants’ pension fund. At the end of the first three quarters, these off-budget entities recorded a surplus of €2½ billion.

2.2.3 Plans for 2025

Now that the coalition government has collapsed, the Bundestag is not expected to adopt a budget for 2025 before a new election is held. The adjustment meeting that was originally meant to take place by the morning of 15 November 2024 was cancelled.

In the absence of a valid budget plan at the start of the new year, the rules for interim management of the budget will apply. Under these rules, any government spending to fulfil legal and contractual obligations is authorised, though the government has little scope for additional expenditure. However, extrabudgetary expenditure is an option in the event of unforeseeable and unavoidable needs arising. For the financing of total expenditure, there is scope for borrowing in addition to regular revenue. According to Article 111 of the Basic Law, the government may borrow up to one-quarter of the total amount of the previous year’s budget – a figure in the order of €120 billion. However, it must be borne in mind that the much tighter restrictions under the debt brake still apply and must be met when the 2025 budget is approved in due course.

All in all, interim budgetary management ensures stable fiscal policy and does not commit the government to pursuing an austerity policy. For instance, there are already extensive obligations for 2025 in the off-budget entities that can be fulfilled just as well under interim budgetary management. Extrabudgetary expenditure can be used to respond to emergency situations. However, the timely adoption of a central government budget for 2025 would open up greater political scope. Accompanying economic plans would then also grant additional spending authorisations for off-budget entities.

One judicial risk concerns revenue from the solidarity surcharge. On 12 November 2024, the Federal Constitutional Court heard a constitutional complaint regarding this surcharge.[13] Rulings on such matters usually follow within a few months, i.e. a ruling can be presumably expected in 2025. The revenue of €13 billion expected in 2025, according to the tax estimate, is deemed to be at increased risk on account of the surcharge. The Federal Constitutional Court could also require that revenue from previous years be repaid.

2.3 State government budgets

State government core budgets closed the third quarter with a slight surplus of €½ billion. This represented a significant deterioration of just under €6 billion compared with the same quarter of the previous year. A one-off effect in Hesse played a key role here.[14] Revenue rose by 2½ %, with tax revenue seeing a 3 % increase. Expenditure grew considerably, by 7 % (+€8 billion). Spending on personnel, a large expenditure item, rose by 5 %. Other operating expenditure grew even more strongly, admittedly for the most part with a time lag due to price increases.

State government fiscal balance

In the first half of the year, the earnings of state government core budgets and off-budget entities deteriorated significantly, by €7 billion. They thus recorded a deficit of €3½ billion. Although taxes rose substantially, by 4½ %, overall revenue saw only sluggish growth of 1½ %. In particular, revenue from economic activity fell significantly: Hamburg received a very large dividend payment last year that will not be made in the current year.[15] Expenditure grew significantly more strongly, at 4½ %. This was mainly due to the steep increase in personnel expenditure. Inflation compensation bonuses had been paid out in the first half of the year, for instance.

For the year as a whole, the result is expected to deteriorate significantly on the year (2023: deficit of just over €½ billion). According to the current tax estimate, tax revenue for the year as a whole will see only moderate growth of 2½ %, which suggests that growth will be very subdued in the final quarter. Expenditure is expected to increase at a significantly faster rate than revenue, not least as a result of the sharp rise in prices. This is also the case for spending on personnel, a major expenditure item – though this will probably rise more slowly in the second half of the year than in the first half.

From the current perspective, state government finances look set to improve slightly next year. Although personnel expenditure is likely to see continued marked growth as a result of wage adjustments, the strained budgetary situation will probably weigh on other expenditure categories – not least transfers to local government. At the same time, tax revenue growth could accelerate slightly again. On balance, then, revenue could rise somewhat more strongly than expenditure.

3 Social security funds

3.1 Pension insurance scheme

3.1.1 Outlook for 2024

The statutory pension insurance scheme recorded a deficit of €4½ billion in the third quarter. This was €1 billion higher than a year previously. Rising by 5½ %, revenue went up sharply. Without central government’s funding cut, the rise would have been just under ½ percentage point higher. At 6 %, expenditure grew even more strongly, with pensions increasing by 4½ % at mid-year. Compared with the previous year, the number of pensions also saw accelerated growth of ½ percentage point. Just over ½ percentage point of the increase in expenditure is attributable to new flat-rate supplements for persons who began drawing their reduced earning capacity pensions between 2001 and 2018.[16]

Finances of the German statutory pension insurance scheme

The pension insurance scheme could close 2024 with a deficit. In the same quarter of the previous year, it posted a surplus of €1½ billion. After the first three quarters, the pension insurance scheme recorded a cumulated deficit of €4½ billion (previous year: deficit of just over €2½ billion). In the fourth quarter, a significant seasonal surplus is usually generated, as contribution receipts from bonuses are expected. In addition, earnings subject to compulsory contributions are increasingly replacing social contribution-exempt inflation compensation bonuses; this is likely to raise receipts somewhat more significantly than has been the case so far this year. At around €44 billion, the free reserves (sustainability reserve) would continue to considerably exceed the minimum value of 0.2 times the scheme’s monthly expenditure (around €5½ billion).

3.1.2 Outlook for the coming years

In 2025, the deficit is likely to expand considerably.[17] Contribution receipts are expected to increase markedly, not least because of earnings subject to compulsory contributions replacing social contribution-exempt inflation compensation bonuses. In addition, expenditure is likely to continue seeing fairly dynamic growth: pensions are set to be raised considerably in mid-2025. The number of pensions is likely to increase even more rapidly due to demographic factors. This will be accompanied by additional expenditure of another almost €1½ billion on the supplement to pensions for reduced earning capacity that was introduced in mid-2024.

From the mid-2020s onwards, demographic factors will weigh significantly more heavily on pension funds. On the expenditure side, the pressure will increase as particularly large birth cohorts reach retirement age. This will also weigh on revenue. Contribution rates will then have to rise considerably (see also the supplementary information entitled “Social contribution rates to rise sharply”).

3.2 Federal Employment Agency

The Federal Employment Agency achieved a balanced budget in the third quarter, following a surplus of €1 billion one year previously.[18] This deterioration was driven by a steep increase in expenditure (+17 %), above all on unemployment benefits (+19 %). This is chiefly attributable to a significantly higher number of recipients (+13 %). Active labour market policy expenditure also rose sharply (+14 %). Administrative spending increased by 10½ %, with the Federal Employment Agency substantially raising transfers to its civil servants’ pension fund. At 6 %, Federal Employment Agency revenue also grew considerably, but to a much lesser extent than expenditure.

Finances of the Federal Employment Agency

The Federal Employment Agency could also achieve a broadly balanced result for the year as a whole. This would represent a deterioration on the previous year (2023: +€3 billion). A surplus of €2 billion was still envisaged in the budget plan. At the end of the first three quarters, the Federal Employment Agency recorded a cumulated deficit of €1 billion (previous year: +€1½ billion). A surplus is regularly generated in the final quarter of the year owing to contributions paid on seasonal bonuses. Compounding this, contributions are likely to rise sharply, partly because regular wage components are increasingly replacing social contribution-exempt inflation compensation bonuses. However, there are no signs of spending growth tailing off. Expenditure is thus likely to rise much more sharply than revenue.

A deficit is expected next year as unemployment rises and average per capita benefits increase along with wages. The Federal Employment Agency’s contribution receipts are likely to continue growing markedly, especially as regular wages come to replace social contribution-exempt inflation compensation bonuses. However, unemployment is likely to rise, and average per capita benefits will probably increase significantly owing to the strong wage developments to date. On top of this, federal legislators have decided to reimburse the Federal Employment Agency less in administrative costs for recipients of the civic allowance in order to relieve the pressure on their own budget, increasing the deficit once more. In view of the Federal Government’s autumn 2024 assumptions regarding macroeconomic developments, the Federal Employment Agency anticipates a deficit of almost €1½ billion next year.

Social contribution rates to rise sharply

Social contribution rates will rise sharply next year. In view of demographic trends, they are expected to rise significantly in the years ahead, too.

Developments in 2025

The average contribution rate to the statutory health insurance (SHI) scheme will rise sharply in 2025. This is due to significant increases in benefits spending. For 2025, the group of SHI estimators has calculated a notional supplementary contribution rate of 2.5 % to cover expenditure. In light of cash reserves being largely depleted, it appears plausible that the actual average supplementary contribution rate will also rise to around 2.5 %. That would amount to an increase of 0.7 percentage point. Altogether, then, the average overall contribution rate to the SHI scheme would be around 17 %.

A higher contribution rate to the public long-term care insurance scheme is also expected next year. It was only back in mid-2023 that legislators significantly raised the general contribution rate, increasing it by 0.35 percentage point to 3.4 %.[1] However, as expenditure is rising more strongly than contributions this year, a considerable deficit is on the cards for 2024. As a result, the scheme’s reserves will presumably only reach their minimum target this year. While spending growth is likely to weaken somewhat next year, it will probably still remain strong. The Federal Ministry of Health has therefore decided to raise the contribution rate by 0.2 percentage point in order to secure funding.

Social contributions to the SHI and long-term care insurance schemes have the same effect as taxes and therefore reduce incentives to work. This is due to the fact that contributions increase alongside wages up to the contribution assessment ceiling, whereas the benefits received by an insured person are largely independent of the amount they have paid in contributions.[2] The one exception is sick pay (around 6½ % of SHI scheme expenditure), which is paid out as needed in line with contribution payments.

The higher contribution rates to the SHI and long-term care insurance schemes will also raise the overall social contribution rate in 2025. Following on from a prolonged period of being broadly stable, this is likely to bring the contribution rate close to its previous peak. In recent years, the strong growth in employment, the pause in demographic change (largely stable pension numbers) and expenditure-saving reforms have been the main factors to significantly alleviate the financial pressure on the social security schemes. Employment benefited from factors such as structural reforms in the labour market in the early 2000s. The contribution rates to the unemployment insurance scheme and, to a lesser extent, the pension insurance scheme fell by a total of almost 5 percentage points from their respective peaks in the 2000s up to and including 2024 (see Chart 5.7). In the same period, however, the contribution rates to the SHI and long-term care insurance schemes rose sharply, going up by 4 percentage points. This was due to numerous benefit expansions and high cost pressures.

Parts of the social security schemes are subsidised out of the central government budget and thus create an additional tax wedge. Since the early 2000s, government funds to the social security schemes have increased only moderately more strongly overall than the contribution base.[3]

Contribution rates of the social security schemes and overall social contribution rate

Developments in the years ahead

Looking ahead, the overall social contribution rate is set to continue rising. This is because demographic trends will result in dynamic expenditure growth. Growing numbers of individuals in older, larger birth cohorts will reach retirement age and leave the labour market. Taken in isolation, this will weigh on the government revenue base. Pension expenditure, in particular, will rise sharply as well due to the number of individuals entering retirement. Following a slight lag, the shift in the age pyramid will then also increasingly affect spending by the SHI and long-term care insurance schemes. This is because the lion’s share of this expenditure will be on old or very old insured persons. In the SHI scheme, medical and technological advances could further increase spending pressures.[4]

There are no official projections for the long-term development of social contribution rates. The Federal Government’s annual pension insurance report shows how the finances of the pension insurance scheme, including the contribution rate and the level of benefits, will develop over the next 15 years according to its projections.[5] However, projections covering a far longer horizon of around 50 years would be a useful tool for assessing benefit adjustments – such as in the Ageing Reports of the European Commission.[6] Furthermore, there are no official long-term projections for the SHI and long-term care insurance schemes outlining at least the effects of those demographic developments that are foreseeable. It is important for persons subject to compulsory contributions to keep prospective contribution rate increases in mind. Otherwise, there is a danger that this aspect will not be sufficiently taken into account in discussions on benefit adjustments and expansions. The Federal Government should therefore be more transparent.

Appropriate reforms can rein in expenditure increases, thereby counteracting the pressure on contribution rates. There are starting points for reform in all three pillars of the social security schemes in which significantly rising contribution rates are foreseeable.

Financing pressures resulting from demographic change can be reduced for the pension insurance scheme: incentives for early retirement could be minimised and the retirement age linked to rising life expectancy. Full pensions without any deductions after 45 years of contributions are a financial incentive for early retirement, and the standard deductions for early retirement could be set too low. As life expectancy rises, positive effects on pension funding will be observed if the retirement age is linked to life expectancy after 2031: the pension insurance scheme’s receipts would receive a boost and the rise in pension expenditure would be curbed.[7] In addition, consideration could be given to including additional contribution years in the replacement rate calculation in view of the higher retirement age.[8] This would mean that as the retirement age rose from 65 to 67, the contribution period on which the standard pension is based would gradually be increased. For example, starting in 2031, the replacement rate would be based on 47 years of contributions instead of 45. This link could then be maintained in line with future changes in the statutory retirement age.[9]

Structural reforms and efficiency gains could limit the strong trend increase in spending on benefits in the SHI scheme. For example, a stronger focus on preventive healthcare and health promotion could help reduce healthcare spending in the long term.[10] In the fields of both outpatient and inpatient care, inefficiencies could be minimised by reducing disincentives and coordination problems.[11] Improving digitalisation and the use of treatment and procedure data for the scientific evaluation of treatments and procedures also appears important. Overall, such measures could help prevent unnecessary duplicate testing and make treatments and procedures more efficient and at the same time more effective. Insured persons could also be made more cost aware, for example by bringing in some sort of surgery visit charge or charging certain deductibles.

Looking at the long-term care insurance scheme, the main decision to be made concerns the scope of insurance. One option would be for the scheme’s partial insurance model to be retained or reinforced. Alternatively, there are calls in some quarters for the long-term care insurance scheme to be transformed into a relatively comprehensive full insurance model. If recipients of long-term care no longer needed to rely on private assets and were only required to draw on their income to a very limited extent, this would go hand in hand with considerably higher social contributions (levied in the same way as taxes) for all insured persons. In a partial insurance model, costs of long-term care are ultimately covered by assistance for long-term care for those who are eligible. This assistance is currently granted where recipients of long-term care do not have sufficient financial resources of their own.

Central government’s financial situation is strained. Government funds to the social security schemes can only be increased by additionally raising taxes or making cuts elsewhere. Additional central government funds are sometimes seen as a way to plug the funding gaps that are on the horizon for the social security schemes. However, according to current fiscal planning, there is no leeway in the central government budget and it faces major challenges in other areas. In any case, it would be helpful if central government made the funds it allocates to the social security schemes more transparent and easier to understand. To this end, it could name and quantify the benefits that it classifies as non-contribution-based and therefore intends to finance out of government funds. The long-term projections for the social security schemes (see above) would then also shed light on central government’s financing needs in this regard.

The general contribution rate to the public long-term care insurance scheme applies to persons subject to compulsory contributions who have one child. The rate is higher for childless persons (4 %) and lower for those with multiple children.
This distinguishes the SHI and long-term care insurance schemes from the unemployment and pension insurance schemes: the benefits provided by the latter two schemes increase in line with the insured person’s contribution payments, all other things being equal. The contributions then have a less distortive effect. See also Deutsche Bundesbank (2024d).
Central government introduced a regular grant for the SHI scheme. However, liquidity support for the unemployment insurance scheme was no longer provided and the relative weight of government funds to the pension insurance scheme decreased. This is due to the fact that these are mostly adjusted in line with per capita wages and contribution rates. Given the strong growth in employment, contributions paid went up more strongly than the government funds.
For more information, see Karmann et al. (2016) and European Commission (2024).
See Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2023). Longer-term projections for the pension insurance scheme can be found, for example, in Deutsche Bundesbank (2023). See Federal Ministry of Finance (2024) and European Commission (2024) for information on long-term expenditure increases due to demographic factors.
According to the Commission’s report, age-related expenditure as a percentage of GDP will increase by 2 percentage points over the next 50 years. Long-term projections are subject to a high degree of uncertainty. The results should not be interpreted as point forecasts, either. Nevertheless, these projections are important: they highlight key trends, present relationships between individual variables and illustrate the impact of reforms from today’s perspective.
See Deutsche Bundesbank (2023).
For information on the dynamic adjustment of the replacement rate, see Deutsche Bundesbank (2019).
The Federal Government originally planned to expand on the pension benefits granted under the current legal framework (extension to the threshold of 48 % for the replacement rate). This would significantly increase the demographic pressure on social contributions. The extent to which this pension reform will be implemented currently remains unclear. See Deutsche Bundesbank (2023) for the implications of the planned pension package.
The weaker focus on preventive healthcare is due to risk structure compensation in its current form in the SHI scheme. This arrangement entails the health insurance institutions receiving the expected costs for their insured persons each year. Health insurance institutions that make cost savings within that year then have a financial advantage. By contrast, long-term investment in prevention and new forms of care put individual health insurance institutions at a financial disadvantage; see also Reif et al. (2024).
The German Council of Economic Experts and the Advisory Council on the Assessment of Developments in the Health Care System formulated recommendations in their respective reports in 2018; see German Council of Economic Experts (2018) and Advisory Council on the Assessment of Developments in the Health Care System (2018).

List of references

Darvas, Z., L. Welslau and J. Zettelmeyer (2024), The implications of the European Union's new fiscal rules, Bruegel, Policy Brief Issue 10/2024.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2024a), German government budget in times of crisis – developments in the period 2020 to 2023, Monthly Report, February 2024, pp. 59‑64.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2024b), Public finances, Monthly Report, August 2024.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2024c), State government finances in 2023: situation worsens, but structural balance still in surplus, Monthly Report, October 2024.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2024d), An international comparison of the tax wedge on labour: the difference between pension contributions and taxes, Monthly Report, June 2024.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2023), Public finances, Monthly Report, November 2023, pp. 61‑85.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2022), Inflation-induced bracket creep in the income tax scale, Monthly Report, June 2022, pp. 63‑73.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2019), Long-term outlook for the statutory pension insurance scheme, Monthly Report, October 2019, pp. 53‑81.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2018), Public finances, Monthly Report, November 2018, pp. 54‑65.

European Commission (2024), 2024 Ageing Report. Economic and Budgetary Projections for the EU Member States (2022‑2070), Institutional Paper 279, April 2024.

Federal Ministry of Finance (2024), Sechster Bericht zur Tragfähigkeit der öffentlichen Finanzen.

Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2023), Rentenversicherungsbericht 2023.

German Advisory Council on the Assessment of Developments in the Health Care System (2018), Bedarfsgerechte Steuerung der Gesundheitsversorgung, Gutachten 2018, June 2018.

German Council of Economic Experts (2018), Für mehr Strukturwandel in der Krankenhausversorgung, joint press release of the German Council of Economic Experts and the German Advisory Council on the Assessment of Developments in the Health Care System, December 2018.

Independent Advisory Board of the Stability Council (2024), Extraordinary statement on the application of the new EU budget rules in Germany, autumn 2024, October 2024.

Karmann, A., F. Rösel and M. Schneider (2016), Produktivitätsmotor Gesundheitswirtschaft: Finanziert sich der medizinisch-technische Fortschritt selbst? ifo Working Paper No 214, April 2016.

Reif, S., S. Schubert and A. Wambach (2024), Reformvorschlag für einen nachhaltigen Risikostrukturausgleich, ZEW Policy Brief, No 3/2024, March 2024.

The section entitled “General government budget” relates to data from the national accounts and Maastricht debt. This is followed by reporting on budgetary developments (government finance statistics) in the areas for which data are available for the third quarter of 2024.
For more details, see Deutsche Bundesbank (2024a).
Net investment is investment after deducting write-downs. Replacement investment would not be debt-financed in line with a golden rule, which is why it is omitted from the second tier. Alternatively, special expenditure could be given similarly preferential treatment by means of special funds.
Ecofin will determine the requirements for the Member States on the basis of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans and the recommendations of the European Commission. Ecofin’s decision is scheduled for the beginning of 2025. For information on the new EU rules with a focus on their application in Germany, see Independent Advisory Board to the Stability Council (2024).
See Darvas et al. (2024). Given a four-year plan, Germany has a consolidation requirement of 0.1 % of GDP on average per year. Given a seven-year plan, only marginal annual consolidation is identified (the prerequisite for an extended plan is a reform programme to be reviewed by the Commission in due course).
The EU solidarity contribution applies to profits in 2022 and 2023 only. This generated government revenue of just under €2 billion this year from taxation for 2022. The tax estimate expects revenue of €1 billion next year.
The official tax estimate only takes account of legislative changes that are already in force.
Inflation and real income growth automatically lead to higher tax burdens via the progressive income tax scale. In recent years, federal legislators have regularly compensated for the inflation-driven increase in average tax rates (see also Deutsche Bundesbank (2022)).
The tax estimate expects tax refunds from 2025 onwards on the basis of a Federal Fiscal Court ruling. Between 2026 and 2029, these will amount to an annual average of €1½ billion. In the national accounts, the sum of the expected repayments at the time of the ruling’s announcement in 2024 is recognised as expenditure (asset transfer).
These are not yet included in the tax estimate. They include bills passed by the Bundestag but not yet by the Bundesrat (Act on Tax Exemption up to the Minimum Subsistence Level 2024 (Gesetz zur steuerlichen Freistellung des Existenzminimums 2024), Annual Tax Act 2024 (Jahressteuergesetz 2024)) and other draft legislation (Tax Development Act (Steuerfortentwicklungsgesetz), Act on the Modernisation and Reduction of Bureaucracy in Electricity and Energy Tax Law (Gesetz zur Modernisierung und zum Bürokratieabbau im Strom- und Energiesteuerrecht), Second Act to Strengthen Occupational Pensions (Zweites Betriebsrentenstärkungsgesetz)).
Although fairly high revenue of €13 billion from the EU off-budget entity NextGenerationEU (NGEU) is still outstanding, nothing thus far suggests that the budget estimates might be missed.
The actual amount could even be a mid-single-digit billion higher if the accruals-basis accounting of interest expenditure already planned for 2025 were to be brought forward to 2024. See Deutsche Bundesbank (2024b).
The solidarity surcharge is a surtax on income tax, which is paid solely to central government. Deviation from the usual distribution of income tax revenue between central government, state governments and local governments is subject to certain conditions. For a discussion on the continuation of the solidarity surcharge beyond 2020, see Deutsche Bundesbank (2018), p. 60.
Hesse withdrew silent contributions from its Landesbank (without impacting its budget) and transferred €2 billion from the core budget to the bank by way of compensation. Capital contributions are classed as recoverable, as the state anticipates income from dividends and interest. The capital contribution is thus considered a financial transaction. Hesse’s debt brake therefore enables credit financing.
See also Deutsche Bundesbank (2024c).
Since July 2024, the pension insurance scheme has been paying a flat-rate supplement to persons who began drawing their reduced earning capacity pensions between 2001 and 2018. These supplements are likely to have contributed €½ billion to the deficit in the third quarter. The pension insurance scheme will pay out almost €1½ billion in supplements in 2024 as a whole.
The Federal Government had previously planned to cut government contributions to the pension insurance scheme on an ad hoc basis by just over an additional €1 billion. The legal provisions to this effect had not yet been made when the coalition government collapsed, however. Central government had already reduced its funding by just over €1 billion per year for the years 2024 to 2027 in order to relieve the pressure on its budget.
In the core budget, i.e. excluding the civil servants’ pension fund of the Federal Employment Agency. The transfers to this fund come out of the core budget, but lead to a surplus for the fund.

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