The German economy is not only struggling with persistent economic headwinds, but is also having to adapt to changing structural conditions. This is affecting the industrial sector in particular, putting a strain on its export business and investments. The labour market, too, is now responding noticeably to the protracted weakness of economic activity. This is dampening private consumption. Against this backdrop, the German economy is set to stagnate in the winter half-year 2024‑25 and only begins to make a slow recovery over the course of 2025. Exports then gradually benefit from the growing sales markets, albeit to a lesser extent than used to be the case. After some delay, business investment also goes back up on the back of rising capacity utilisation and lower financing costs. Private consumption rises consistently, but is initially noticeably slowed by a temporary weakening of the labour market and a significant decline in wage growth. 

Calendar-adjusted real GDP falls again slightly in 2024, by 0.2 %, then grows by 0.2 % in 2025, 0.8 % in 2026 and 0.9 % in 2027. The growth outlook is thus revised sharply downwards relative to the June 2024 Forecast for Germany over the entire forecast horizon. This is primarily due to the more persistent weakness in the industrial sector, which is, in addition, largely considered to be structural now, and the consequently significantly gloomier outlook for exports and business investment. Private consumption is also less dynamic, no longer acting as an independent driver of the expected recovery. 

In spite of subdued economic activity, the inflation rate remains elevated in 2025, falling only slightly from 2.5 % this year to 2.4 % (as measured by the HICP). This is due to the temporarily steeper rise in food prices and the only slowly abating increase in the price of services. In the years that follow, however, the inflation rate in Germany gradually returns to 2 %, because the effects of previous monetary policy tightening linger and price pressures from labour costs decrease. Compared with the June Forecast, the inflation outlook has been revised downwards somewhat, mainly due to lower energy prices and lower wage growth.

The government deficit ratio decreases slightly, from 2.6 % in 2023 to 2.4 % in 2027. Although the expiry of measures put in place to address the energy crisis is providing some relief, other expenditure, such as social security, interest and defence spending, is climbing strongly. The debt ratio falls to 61.7 % in 2027 (2023: 62.9 %).

Current uncertainty factors influencing the Forecast concern, in particular, increasing protectionism, geopolitical conflicts, the impact of structural change and the orientation of future fiscal and economic policy following the Bundestag elections. All in all, as things now stand, risks to economic growth are predominantly tilted to the downside and risks to inflation to the upside.

Hopes back in the spring of a slowly strengthening recovery of the German economy were not realised. Instead of expanding markedly, real GDP declined somewhat in the summer half-year in seasonally adjusted terms. 1 Despite growing sales markets, exports contracted sharply. The impact of the German economy’s reduced competitiveness was thus more strongly felt than expected. Against this backdrop, compounded by declining output and a very low level of capacity utilisation in the industrial sector, firms dialled back their investment more substantially than anticipated. Housing investment also fell more sharply than predicted. Private consumption growth ultimately fell significantly short of expectations as well. Persistently weak economic activity, coupled with a more unfavourable development of the labour market, likely contributed to this. 

It is becoming increasingly apparent that the German economy is struggling not only with persistent economic headwinds, but also with considerable structural problems. It is under great pressure to adapt due to changing structural conditions both at home and abroad. This is mainly a problem for the export-oriented industrial sector. Domestically producing industrial firms must adjust, in particular, to the longer-term effects of the energy price shock triggered by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, 2 the requirements of the green transition to a carbon-neutral economy 3 and the consequences of demographic change. 4 Demanding regulatory requirements for enterprises 5 and uncertainty surrounding the economic policy conditions are also burdens here. 6 In addition, German firms are being confronted with increasing protectionist tendencies and growing competition from emerging markets. China, in particular, has gained considerable ground in the automotive and chemical industries and mechanical engineering – sectors which are particularly integral to German industry – as well as distinct market shares. 7  

In the fourth quarter of 2024 and the first quarter of 2025, too, the German economy is unlikely to emerge from its stagnation. 8 The improved sentiment among firms back in the spring has deteriorated markedly again in recent months. Particularly in the industrial sector, business conditions deteriorated, according to ifo Institute, and firms are more pessimistic about their short-term prospects. Industrial output and exports are therefore likely to decline somewhat further. Business investment will also probably continue to decrease. The construction sector could slowly stabilise at a low level, but housing investment, in particular, will probably be weaker again at first. Although service providers are likely to provide some support in the short term, their business, too, weakened somewhat, according to surveys conducted by S&P Global and ifo Institute. Private consumption could at least provide limited impetus. Overall, however, economic output is likely to stagnate in the current winter half-year. Economic data for October, which were published after the Forecast was finalised, support this assessment and indicate a weak start to the fourth quarter. For instance, production in the industrial and construction sectors was, respectively, noticeably and slightly below third-quarter levels, and real retail sales did not quite manage to maintain their Q3 level either. 

The German economy will only slowly emerge from stagnation over the remainder of 2025. In particular, continuously rising and solidifying foreign demand suggests that the German economy will slowly return to a moderate expansion path over the course of next year. 9  The German export industry gradually begins to benefit from the increase in foreign demand, albeit to a lesser extent than was once the case due to strong competitive pressure. Exports thus gradually regain their footing. Private investment, by contrast, continues to decline for the time being. Private consumption will initially grow only weakly: contrary to expectations in previous forecasts, it is no longer a strong, independent driver of the recovery. This is mainly due to the fact that real disposable income is significantly weaker in view of a gloomier labour market outlook and lower wage growth. 

In 2026 and 2027, the pace of macroeconomic expansion stabilises somewhat. Exports generate moderate growth impulses. Business investment returns to an expansion path, bolstered by rising capacity utilisation and more favourable financing conditions. The latter, coupled with increasing real disposable income, also benefits private housing investment, which then embarks on a subdued recovery path too. Households see their purchasing power increase markedly again and increase their consumption somewhat more strongly. Taken together, government investment and consumption expenditure have a supportive effect throughout the forecast period. 

Under these conditions, the German economy grows only marginally next year, but somewhat more significantly in 2026 and 2027. Calendar-adjusted real GDP falls again slightly this year, by 0.2 %, then grows by 0.2 % in 2025, by 0.8 % in 2026 and by 0.9 % in 2027. The growth outlook is thus revised significantly downwards over the entire forecast period compared with the June Forecast – for 2025 most of all. This is primarily due to the more persistent weakness in the industrial sector, which is not only accompanied by a more persistent weakness in cyclical demand but is to a large extent considered to be structural now, too. The outlook for exports and industrial investment is thus considerably gloomier. The forecast for the increase in private consumption has also been revised sharply downwards. This reflects the significantly weaker labour market outlook, first and foremost.

As the outlook is weaker, also due to structural factors, the expected potential output growth of the German economy has been revised considerably downwards. Structural burden factors play a significant role in the subdued growth outlook, resulting in persistently weak estimates for potential output growth throughout the forecast horizon. The estimated potential rates between 2024 and 2027 stand at a mere 0.4 % per year. 10 The contributions to growth made by capital and total factor productivity (TFP) are lower than in the June projection, meaning that the recovery expected at that point in time will not materialise. 11 Beyond the forecast horizon, too, growth opportunities for the German economy appear very subdued from today’s perspective, and as long as supply-side measures remain unforeseeable in concrete terms, a revival of potential growth seems unlikely.   

The level of potential output in recent years is now also estimated to be significantly lower. In particular, the weak industrial activity that was already clearly discernible before the pandemic, and the slowdown in productivity growth following the financial crisis of 2008‑09, are indicative of major structural burdens stemming from factors that have been at play for some time. These include demographic change, the tendency towards declining efficiency gains from the digital transformation, 12 increasing protectionism, and also the trend slowdown in global trade that has been observed since the financial and economic crisis. 13  From today’s perspective, these dampening structural forces are deemed to be stronger, and consequently, there was a distinct downward revision to growth in potential output retroactively for the years 2014 to 2019. 14 At the same time, this means that the favourable development of economic activity in the years prior to the pandemic is classified as more cyclically induced.

The negative output gap will largely be closed by 2027. As a result of the revised estimate of potential output, the estimated output gap is smaller at the current end, thus also reducing the potential for catching up over the forecast period. However, the output gap is still negative at present. Now, the fact that aggregate demand is too weak is also likely to be a key factor in this again. 15 This is indicated by the ifo Institute’s survey data on production constraints, which largely show a shortage of orders or demand to be the biggest constraint on production. Given the expected recovery in economic activity, the output gap is largely closed by the end of the projection horizon in 2027.

The labour market was impacted noticeably by the ongoing weakness of the German economy – but it remains fairly robust. June expectations of an imminent recovery in the labour market did not come to fruition. Employment growth, which had previously already been muted, turned negative in recent months and unemployment went up more strongly than expected. After many years of very favourable labour market figures, this deterioration appears particularly striking. 16 However, this should not detract from the fact that the labour market essentially remains fairly robust, including compared with previous episodes of weak growth. The level of employment is high and unemployment is relatively low, and with firms caught between persistently weak demand and a demographically-induced structural shortage of skilled workers, they are avoiding major layoffs as far as possible. While firms significantly reduced their use of temporary agency employment, they have so far largely retained their core workforces, thereby also accepting lower labour productivity. 17 In addition, empty working time accounts and low overtime are pushing down average working hours. 18 For demographic reasons, many employees are currently entering retirement. This offers opportunities to shrink headcounts without compulsory redundancies, by not fully replacing staff. The number of vacancies decreased significantly in this context, but is still quite high by historical standards. This is partly because, in the context of structural change, some sectors are benefiting from increased labour demand. 19

Given that the German economy remains stagnant, employment is likely to decline in the current winter half-year as well. The longer business activity remains weak, the more likely it is that there will be increased layoffs in the manufacturing sector, in particular, but also in the trade sector, which is suffering from subdued consumption. This is indicated by the ifo Institute’s Employment Barometer, which is deep in negative territory here. However, seeing as the sectors benefiting from structural change are likely to continue hiring, the decline in employment should remain limited overall. Other leading indicators, such as the IAB labour market barometer, also suggest that the labour market is still fairly resilient overall. Nevertheless, unemployment is likely to see a further moderate increase. 20 Part of the reason for this is that there is less of a match between existing and in-demand jobs and qualifications due to shifts in the economic structure. 

The economic recovery gradually taking hold in the course of 2025 is initially unlikely to lead to increased hiring in the labour market. Employment is expected to go down again slightly in 2025. In conjunction with the decline in employment that has been ongoing since mid-2024, there is thus a marked decrease in the average number of persons in employment over 2025. However, existing staff should be put to greater use again over the course of the year, clawing back some of the depressed level of productivity and working hours. Against this backdrop, unemployment continues to rise well into next year. The labour market outlook for 2025 is thus distinctly weaker than in the June Forecast. 

Over the remainder of the forecast period, the labour market recovers again, but remains less tight than expected in previous forecasts. From 2026 onwards, the economic recovery leads to rising employment, falling unemployment and an increasing shortage of skilled workers. Working hours and labour productivity also recover further. The labour market is thereby faced with the challenging situation in which the labour supply shrinks from 2026 for reasons of demographics, even though individual labour force participation continues to rise and the assumed level of immigration is significant. 21 The pace at which refugees are being integrated into the labour market had recently improved markedly. 22 However, it takes time and effort to integrate both immigrants and the unemployed, of whom greater job and geographical mobility is required due to structural change. Unemployment therefore declines only moderately and, in 2027, will not yet have returned to its lowest levels from before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. 

As of next year, negotiated wages lose significant momentum in view of lower inflation rates, prolonged economic weakness and the deterioration in the labour market. Since the Forecast for Germany in June, negotiated wage agreements up to October have largely been higher than expected. However, employees have also ended up having to adjust their wage expectations in part to the changed economic environment. The metals and electrical engineering sector, for example, recently agreed on wage increases that are distinctly lower than the expectations expressed in the June Forecast; this was due to persistently weak economic activity and the pressure to adjust that the sector is facing. 23 Lower inflation rates, sluggish economic activity and weakened labour demand also suggest that, in general, more moderate agreements will be reached in the coming months than in previous years. Highly heterogeneous levels of activity in different sectors are thus likely to come to the fore. 24 Next year, the elimination of the inflation compensation bonuses also dampens wage growth, as these are only partly replaced by regular wage increases. Wage growth sees a sharp drop to 2.5 % on an annual average. In 2026, negotiated wages grow somewhat more strongly again. This is still under the influence of large agreements running for long terms that were reached during the period of high inflation, however; these are no longer relevant in 2027. The broadly normalised level of activity and the once again tighter labour market then lead to historically slightly above average growth in negotiated wages of 2.6 %. Compared with the June Forecast, the latest agreements, in particular, bring about a small upward revision in this year's forecast of negotiated wages. The weaker outlook for economic activity and the labour market only becomes more evident in subsequent years; the increase in negotiated wages for 2025 and 2026 has therefore been revised downwards noticeably. 

Actual earnings growth is initially weaker than that of negotiated wages. In the current year, growth in actual earnings is once again very high by historical standards, but it is already below that of negotiated wages. This is because actual earnings respond more quickly to the significant changes in macroeconomic conditions. On account of sluggish economic activity and the weakening labour market, for example, industrial groups reduce their profit-sharing and the number of paid overtime hours is reduced to a small amount. Only in 2027, when economic activity picks up and labour market tightness increases, do actual earnings again show slightly stronger growth than negotiated earnings. Labour costs, measured as compensation per employee, rise somewhat more strongly than actual earnings, especially in the coming year. This is due to an additional cost surge for employers in the form of higher social contribution rates. 25

Domestic inflation as measured by the GDP deflator declines to 2 % by 2027 on the back of profit margins normalising and an easing of pressure from unit labour costs. As in the previous year, economic output is slightly lower this year with employment still robust overall and wages rising strongly. As a result, domestic price pressures from unit labour costs remain very high. However, firms have been cushioning this pressure through lower profits for about a year now. In previous years, they were still able to expand their profit margins strongly, but the underlying conditions for this have largely changed. Aggregate demand, in particular, is now significantly weaker. Tighter monetary policy is likely to have been one factor here. Against this backdrop, aggregate profit margins fall strongly this year, roughly returning to their pre-pandemic levels. As measured by the GDP deflator, the previously significant domestic inflation will therefore fall significantly to 3.0 %, despite the substantial rise in unit labour costs. In the remainder of the forecast period, profit margins decline only marginally before stabilising in 2027, meaning that their contribution to further disinflation is only small. However, the rise in unit labour costs declines markedly from next year, as wage growth recedes and labour productivity slowly recovers. Against this backdrop, domestic inflation continues to decline markedly, to 2.0 % in 2027.

The inflation rate was lower than expected recently. Consumer price inflation, as measured by the HICP, stood at 2.4 % in November, 0.8 percentage point below the rate expected in the June Forecast for Germany, primarily because energy prices fell more sharply than expected. Food prices rose much more strongly than anticipated, however. The rate excluding energy and food (core rate) was roughly in line with expectations. Price increases for services tended to be stronger than expected, whilst inflation for non-energy industrial goods declined somewhat faster than projected. At 2.5 % in the current year overall, the inflation rate is expected to be slightly lower than expected in June.

Inflation remains elevated next year, mainly due to service price increases abating only slowly. The weak economy is generally having a price dampening effect on services, too. However, the previously sharp rise in wages is still exerting upward pressure on consumer prices with a certain time lag. 26 Particularly strong price increases as of the beginning of 2025 were announced for public transport and insurance services. 27 The rise in rents, too, is initially expected to be higher than average by historical standards, as existing rents are only slowly adjusting to the cost surges of recent years. In addition, forward-looking booking data suggest further strong price increases for package holidays in the coming months. 28 By contrast, inflation for non-energy industrial goods has already fallen markedly and is likely to decline further somewhat, partly in view of weak demand. The core rate overall is expected to decline from 3.3 % in 2024 to 2.4 % in 2025. By contrast, food prices will rise more strongly again next year. This is because agricultural producer prices are markedly higher, especially for milk fats. In addition, the recent very high wage growth in the retail sector is likely to still have an impact. Lastly, in 2025, energy prices no longer dampen the headline inflation rate as strongly as during this year. Energy commodity futures prices are on a slight downturn but this is partly offset by a further increase in the carbon price and a substantial rise in network charges for gas transmission. 29 Headline HICP inflation therefore drops only marginally to 2.4 % in 2025. 

In the remainder of the forecast period, the inflation rate in Germany gradually returns to 2 %. Monetary policy tightening still has an impact and the pressure exerted by unit labour costs continues to ease. The core rate therefore initially drops to 1.9 % in 2026. With the recovery in economic activity and the return to an almost normal level of aggregate capacity utilisation, it rises slightly to 2.0 % in 2027. Food inflation declines somewhat again in 2026 and 2027, but still remains elevated. This is because prices for agricultural commodities and labour costs continue to generate above-average price impulses, albeit with a declining tendency. Energy prices go back up noticeably in 2026, especially as the national carbon price continues to rise, while the fall in market prices for energy is assumed to be significantly less strong than in the previous year. Energy components are then expected to have a slight dampening effect again in 2027. This is mainly due to the assumption that the national carbon price will be transferred to the European ETS2 and that a slightly lower carbon price will therefore be set. 30 Headline inflation falls to 2.1 % in 2026 and 1.9 % in 2027. This means that over the entire forecast horizon the outlook for inflation improved slightly compared to the June Forecast.

There is only a slight fall in the deficit ratio from 2.6 % in 2023 to 2.5 % in 2024, even though the extensive burdens caused by the energy price brakes have dropped (see the supplementary information entitled Underlying conditions for the Forecast for Germany). This is because spending on the Armed Forces Fund and the Climate Fund, staff and interest, as well as on pensions, healthcare and long-term care, is rising sharply. In addition, tax refunds stemming from a court ruling on capital gains tax are placing a one-off burden. 31 At the same time, revenue is still showing quite dynamic growth, especially as wages are rising strongly and contribution rates to the social security funds are going up.

In 2025, the deficit ratio remains unchanged at 2.5 %, although the revenue and expenditure ratios continue to rise significantly. Significant budgetary relief compensates for corresponding burdens elsewhere. On the one hand, significant additional revenue is generated by the fact that fees subject to compulsory contributions are taking the place of tax- and social contribution-exempt inflation compensation bonuses in some cases. In addition, the court ruling on capital gains taxes is no longer applicable, and transfers to Ukraine are less of a burden. On the other hand, the weak economy is becoming more noticeable as the nominal reference variables of taxes and social contributions rise more slowly. Furthermore, in some areas expenditure is still growing at dynamics similar to 2024. The deficit in the social security funds shows little change on balance: health and long-term care insurance schemes are increasing contribution rates once again, thus reducing their deficits overall. By contrast, the unemployment insurance scheme and, above all, the pension insurance scheme are expanding their deficits. Reserves are used to prevent contribution rates from rising here as well in order to offset the deficit.

The deficit ratios for 2026 and 2027 are both 2.4 %, with only a small change in the revenue and expenditure ratios. The Forecast assumes that central, state and local government spending will lose momentum due to budgetary strains, especially in the areas of personnel, intermediate consumption and investment. Growth in expenditure on pensions, healthcare and long-term care will continue to outpace that of the reference variable for social security contributions. The health and long-term care insurance schemes continue to avoid incurring deficits through renewed increases in contribution rates. However, there is significant growth in the pension insurance scheme’s deficit. 

The structural deficit ratio remains relatively stable at around 2 % over the forecast horizon from 2024 to 2027. This ratio factors out temporary influences (primarily crisis measures and economic activity). Around three-quarters of the structural deficit is attributable to central government (including its off-budget entities). Using its own calculation method, central government initially computes significantly higher cyclical burdens on its budget and first uses up its disposable reserves. This makes it easier for central government to comply with the debt brake borrowing limit, as cyclical deficits and deficits financed from reserves are not counted towards the limit. In 2026 and 2027 in particular, the results forecast here indicate a marked overshooting of the borrowing limit, however. In addition, the Armed Forces Fund is estimated to record a deficit of ½ % of GDP in each of these two years. At the end of 2027, the forecast expects it to still have a residual borrowing authorisation of ¼ % of GDP.

There is a moderate decline in the Maastricht debt ratio from 62.9 % at the end of 2023 to 61.7 % at the end of 2027. Central, state and local government deficits lead to a significant increase in debt. Nominal GDP growth in the denominator is not sufficient to stabilise the ratio. However, the government will be repaying debt related to the coronavirus and energy price assistance loans and bad bank portfolios from the financial crisis. The deficits in the social security funds do not increase government debt, as they are financed from reserves. From today’s perspective, the share of EU debt (especially that incurred through NGEU) which Germany ultimately has to repay on a pro rata basis is just over 2 % of GDP in 2027. This is not included in the Maastricht debt ratio. 

The macroeconomic forecast presented here is subject to a number of uncertainties. Risks currently exist, in particular, in relation to growing protectionism, geopolitical conflicts and the impact of structural change on the German economy. Following the Bundestag elections, fiscal and economic policy could also see significant change. All in all, risks to economic growth are currently tilted to the downside and risks to inflation to the upside.

Rising geopolitical tensions or increased protectionist measures entail significant downside risks to economic output and upside risks to inflation. Should Russia’s war against Ukraine or the conflicts in the Middle East intensify or spread, this could constrict the supply of energy commodities in the global market and disrupt supply chains. Via rising import prices, this would directly increase inflation in Germany and constrain economic activity. Growing trade policy tensions would probably have similar effects. This threat will become fairly imminent if the incoming US administration implements its announced trade policy plans – especially in the event of huge tariff increases and possible retaliatory measures. In such a risk scenario, the German economy would probably suffer considerably; see the supplementary information below. 32  

A higher carbon price could increase inflation. This forecast assumes a decline in the carbon price in 2027 from the national price cap for 2026 (€65 per tonne of CO₂) to the target price cap of €59 per tonne when the European emissions trading system ETS2 is launched. As the ETS2 price will generally be formed on the market and the volume of allowances, including those released from the market stability reserve, is limited, it is possible that this cap may be exceeded. The assumed dampening effect on energy prices could therefore fail to materialise, or prices could even go up. Simulations suggest that, to achieve the climate protection targets, a greater reduction in emissions is needed than would appear achievable with the carbon prices planned thus far. 33 If the volume of ETS2 allowances were set in accordance with the target, this could result in a higher price despite use of the market stability reserve. Should ETS2 prices turn out to be markedly higher, this would increase inflation and tend to dampen economic output.

The structural changes in Germany and abroad could have an even greater impact on the German economy and dampen potential output more strongly than previously estimated. The quantification of this impact on the German economy and estimated potential output is subject to a high level of uncertainty. This forecast (like previous ones) already contains marked downward revisions of potential output, which could turn out later to have been too large. 34 Nevertheless, there is a risk that some of the structural problems will prove even more burdensome, or the adjustment processes even more lengthy, than currently expected. This would further diminish growth opportunities for the German economy and dampen the GDP outlook. For example, the weakness in productivity could last longer, the German export industry could benefit even less from growing sales markets, or private investment could decline more sharply still. Private consumption could then turn out to be weaker, as the labour market would probably experience greater cooling and wage growth would be lower. If the latter were to outweigh weaker productivity, this would also dampen inflation. In view of the low potential growth and possible large additional adverse shocks ahead, the German economy is closer to a recession – in the sense of an overall significant, longer lasting and broad-based decline in economic output, with persistent underutilisation of aggregate capacity.

List of references

Bernard, S., L. de Greef, I. Hurst, A. Kaya, I. Liadze and B. Naisbitt (2024), The effects of higher US tariffs, NiGEM Topical Feature, National Institute Global Economic Outlook, Autumn 2024, pp. 48‑62.

Carrière-Swallow, Y., M. Firat, D. Furceri and D. Jimenez (2024), State-Dependent Exchange Rate Pass-Through, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics.

Cavallo A., F. Lippi and K. Miyahara (2024), Large shocks travel fast, American Economic Review: Insights, Vol. 6, No 4, pp. 558‑574.

CESifo (2024): Who’s afraid of Trump in the White House? How German firms view the US election, Econpol Policy Brief, 65/2024, October, Vol. 8.

Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget (2024), The Fiscal Impact of the Harris and Trump Campaign Plans, US Budget Watch 2024, 28 October 2024.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2024a), Forecast for Germany: German economy slowly regaining its footing ‒ outlook up to 2026, Monthly Report, June 2024.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2024b), Monthly Report, November 2024. 

Deutsche Bundesbank (2024c), Domestic investment barriers faced by German enterprises, Monthly Report, May 2024.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2024d), Wage developments in Germany: current situation, comparison with the euro area, and outlook, Monthly Report, October 2024.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2024e), Risks facing Germany as a result of its economic ties with China, Monthly Report, January 2024, pp. 11‑29.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2024f), Energy efficiency improvements: implications for carbon emissions and economic output in Germany, Monthly Report, April 2024.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2024g), The impact of seasonal temperature anomalies on global food commodity prices, Monthly Report, August 2024, pp. 17 ff.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2023a), The impact of digitalisation on labour productivity growth, Monthly Report, March 2023, pp. 43‑65.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2023b), Germany as a business location: selected aspects of current dependencies and medium-term challenges, Monthly Report, September 2023, pp. 15‑35.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2023c), Arduous recovery amid high and only gradually easing inflation – outlook for the German economy up to 2025, Monthly Report, June 2023, pp. 13‑37.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2022a), Impact of permanently higher energy costs on German potential output, Monthly Report, December 2022, pp. 29‑30.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2022b), Potential macroeconomic consequences of the war in Ukraine – simulations based on a severe risk scenario, Monthly Report, April 2022, pp. 13‑29.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2020), The impact of trade policy uncertainty, Monthly Report, January 2020, pp. 57‑60.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2019a), The impact of wages on prices in Germany: evidence from selected empirical analyses, Monthly Report, September 2019, pp. 15‑37.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2019b), The impact of the Climate Package on economic growth and inflation, Monthly Report, December 2019, pp. 29‑33.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2017), Demographic change, immigration and the potential output of the German economy, Monthly Report, April 2017, pp. 35‑47.

Dullien, S., S. Stephan and T. Theobald (2024), US-Wahlen: Trumps Zollpläne würden auch deutsche Wirtschaft empfindlich treffen, IMK Kommentar No 12, October 2024.

European Central Bank (2024), Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, December 2024.

Felbermayr, G., J. Hinz and R. J. Langhammer (2024), US Trade Policy After 2024: What is At Stake for Europe?, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiel Policy Brief No 178, October 2024.

Goldman Sachs (2024a), Implications of Higher Tariffs for Euro Area and US Monetary Policy, presentation by J. Hatzius, ECB Forum on Central Banking, Sintra, July 2024.

Goldman Sachs (2024b), Euro Area Outlook 2025: Under Pressure, European Economics Analyst, November 2024.

Haertel, T., B. Hamburg and V. Kusin (2022), The macroeconometric model of the Bundesbank revisited, Deutsche Bundesbank Technical Paper, No 01/2022.

Hantzsche, A., M. Lopresto and G. Young (2018), Using NiGEM in Uncertain Times: Introduction and Overview of NiGEM, National Institute Economic Review, Vol. 244 (1), pp. R1–R14.

ifo Institute (2024), Der Investitionsstandort Deutschland aus Unternehmenssicht, ifo Schnelldienst, 2024, 77, No 03, pp. 52‑58.

International Monetary Fund (2024), Risk Assessment Surrounding the World Economic Outlook’s Baseline Projections, World Economic Outlook: Policy Pivot, Rising Threats, October 2024, pp. 24‑27.

McKibbin, W., M. Hogan and M. Noland (2024), The International Economic Implications of a Second Trump Presidency, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper 24‑20, September 2024.

Obst, T., J. Matthes and S. Sultan (2024), What if Trump is re-elected?, German Economic Institute, IW-Report 14/2024, March 2024.

Ortega, E., and C. Osbat (2020), Exchange rate pass-through in the euro area and EU countries, ECB Occasional Paper Series, No 241.

Schnorrenberger, R., Schwind, P. and E. Wieland (2024), Forecasting HICP package holidays with forward-looking booking data, Deutsche Bundesbank Technical Paper 04/2024.

Zandi, M., B. Lacerda and J. Begley (2024), Assessing the Macroeconomic Consequences of Harris vs. Trump, Moody’s Analytics Analysis, August 2024.