In 2024, inflation declined significantly around the world. The preceding years had seen the sharpest price increases in decades. This was due to the COVID-19 pandemic, its economic impact and the economic policy measures taken in response as well as to the repercussions of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. For many countries, price stability is coming within reach again. Energy prices, which had intensified the wave of inflation in many countries, fell sharply as of the summer of 2023. However, the tighter monetary policies pursued by many central banks around the globe has also contributed to more stable price developments.

In December 2024, consumer prices in the advanced economies rose by 2.8 % on the year. Twelve months earlier, inflation had stood at 3.3 %. In October 2022, it was 8.6 %. The underlying inflation rate excluding energy and food prices – known as the core inflation rate – also declined. This rate was 2.9 % last December, compared with 4.0 % one year ago. According to the latest forecast from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the inflation rate in the advanced economies is expected to decrease further to 2.1 % on average this year.

The global economy expanded moderately in 2024. Global economic growth was driven by buoyant economic activity in the United States. In addition, global industrial output picked up somewhat. Against this backdrop, global trade expanded significantly. However, this is likely to be due in part to transactions being brought forward, as many fear that trade policy restrictions will rise. 

According to IMF assessments, the global economy grew by 3.2 % last year. For 2025, IMF staff expect global economic activity to increase by 3.3 %. This growth could be lower if trade policy disputes escalate. There is also still a high risk that geopolitical conflicts will spread or that new conflicts will arise. Such developments could fragment the global economy even further.

The German economy remained in a pronounced period of weakness last year. Overall, economic activity in Germany has not increased for two and a half years. According to provisional figures from the Federal Statistical Office, German gross domestic product (GDP) contracted by 0.2 % last year in price and calendar adjusted terms. Economic activity in industry and the construction sector declined sharply. Amongst other reasons, this was attributable to weak demand for construction and capital goods due to sharp increases in financing costs. In addition, foreign demand for German industrial goods was lower, partly because of the German economy’s lower competitiveness. Last but not least, despite sharply rising wages, private consumption saw only slight growth.

The German economy is likely to gain little momentum for the time being. According to the Bundesbank’s December forecast, economic output in Germany will increase by 0.2 % this year after price and calendar adjustment. If trade policy conflicts were to intensify to a noticeable degree, the German economy, with its high dependence on foreign trade, would suffer considerably. However, the current weak growth in the German economy is due not only to cyclical factors. One of the longer-term structural causes is, in particular, the deterioration in its competitiveness, which, amongst other factors, has suffered as a result of the persistently elevated energy prices following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. However, increasing competitive pressure from China, as well as demographic change and the transition to a carbon-neutral economy, are also weighing on Germany’s growth prospects. In order to overcome this weak growth, it would be prudent to implement structural reforms that improve the institutional and regulatory framework in Germany and thus leverage untapped growth potential.

Price pressures in Germany eased significantly last year. According to the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), inflation fell from 3.8 % at the end of 2023 to 2.8 % in December 2024. The decline in the headline inflation rate was driven mainly by the normalisation of energy prices. At the same time, the associated base effect caused the inflation rate to rise somewhat again temporarily at the end of the year. 1 By contrast, the core inflation rate remained stubbornly high: at 3.3 % in December 2024, it was at a similar level to one year ago. 2 The more persistent momentum in core inflation was primarily attributable to high price increases in the services sector. Inflation in services prices may abate only slowly in 2025, too, as the effect from the large increases in wages will take hold with a certain delay. According to the Bundesbank’s December forecast, the rate of headline HICP inflation is expected to decline from 2.5 % in 2024 to 2.4 % on average this year. Potential increases in tariffs in the United States and associated retaliatory tariffs present an upward risk. 3

The economic situation in the euro area brightened slightly in the year under review. This was primarily attributable to the slow easing of the burdens that resulted from the sharp increases in prices in previous years. In particular, consumption strengthened even though private consumption rose less sharply than disposable income. Consumption also bolstered the services sectors, where economic activity expanded sharply. By contrast, manufacturing and construction saw a weak development. Amongst other factors, the sustained competitive weakness in international markets meant that the moderately growing global economy provided only limited stimulus. The low level of investment is likely to have been due in part to increased financing costs. The labour market remained healthy, the unemployment rate fell to a new low and the number of employees continued to rise. The downside of this development, however, is that there has been persistently weak growth in productivity. Overall, there have been no signs of a broad-based upswing so far.

Growth prospects are also being dampened by geopolitical conflicts, uncertainty about global trade policy, and the reform gridlock in several European countries. According to provisional statistical data, real GDP in the euro area expanded by 0.7 % last year. The economy is likely to grow somewhat more strongly this year. The Eurosystem’s December projection estimates a growth rate of 1.1 %. This revival would be driven by the rising purchasing power of households, the improvement in financing conditions and the recovery in export activity.

Inflation rates, as measured by the HICP, fell markedly in the euro area during the year under review. The global decline in energy prices played the most decisive role here. However, the tightening of monetary policy over the past two and a half years also helped to stabilise price developments. Following an average of 5.4 % in 2023, the inflation rate stood at 2.4 % last year. Core inflation, when looking at the year as a whole, was slightly higher at 2.8 %. According to the Eurosystem’s December projection, inflation is likely to decline further, averaging 2.3 % for core inflation and 2.1 % for headline inflation this year. Eurosystem staff expect headline inflation to reach the inflation target of 2 % during the course of this year.

Against the backdrop of the improved inflation outlook, the ECB Governing Council began to gradually reduce the degree of monetary policy restriction last year. After the Governing Council raised the key interest rates ten times since July 2022 – which represented the strongest cycle of monetary policy tightening since the introduction of the euro – it implemented the first interest rate cut in June 2024. The three key interest rates were lowered by 0.25 percentage point each. Based on the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission, the ECB judged it appropriate to reduce the degree of monetary policy restriction. Further interest rate cuts followed in September, October and December, as inflation data broadly confirmed the inflation outlook. The inflation outlook was also affected by downside surprises in indicators of economic activity. 

In December, the deposit facility rate, through which the ECB Governing Council steers its monetary policy stance, reached 3 %. Following a further cut in January 2025, the deposit facility rate now stands at 2.75 %. The Governing Council is determined to ensure that inflation stabilises sustainably at its 2 % medium-term target. In this context, the Governing Council continues to stress that it will not pre-commit to a particular path of interest rates. The appropriate monetary policy stance will instead be data-dependent and will be determined using a meeting-by-meeting approach. Market participants expect that the monetary policy stance will be eased further this year. 4

The monetary policy framework was also adjusted through specific interest rate cuts in September 2024. While the deposit facility rate – which is relevant for monetary policy – was cut by 0.25 percentage point at each of the recent interest rate steps, the interest rates on main refinancing operations and on the marginal lending facility were lowered by 0.6 percentage point in a technical adjustment in September. The spread between the interest rates on the deposit facility and on main refinancing operations thus narrowed from 0.5 percentage point to 0.15 percentage point. By taking this step, the Governing Council is implementing its decision of 13 March 2024. By adjusting the monetary policy framework in this way, the Governing Council is working to ensure that short-term money market rates are closely aligned with its monetary policy decisions, even in an environment of diminishing excess liquidity. The Governing Council assumes that this measure will limit fluctuations in money market interest rates. Based on the experience gained, the Governing Council will review the key parameters of this operational framework in 2026. 

The Eurosystem’s balance sheet shrank further in 2024. Total assets shrank by nearly €500 billion over the course of the year, after having already fallen by around €1,000 billion in 2023. The year under review saw the maturation of the last outstanding targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs), totalling €392 billion. In addition, there was a marked increase in the pace of the reduction of monetary policy asset holdings. Under the asset purchase programme (APP), reinvestments had already been discontinued at the beginning of July 2023. Under the pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP), only around half of the maturing funds were reinvested between July and December 2024, and these last reinvestments were also discontinued at the turn of the year. As a result, asset holdings under the APP and PEPP will continue to shrink this year. Commercial banks’ interest-bearing deposits with the Eurosystem will therefore decline as well. 

Whilst interest expenditure on banks’ deposits is likely to continue to reach high levels in the context of continued low interest income, it is likely to decline over the course of the year. This effect was already reflected in the Bundesbank’s profit and loss accounts in 2022 and 2023. These burdens continued in the year under review as well; for a detailed explanation, see the following supplementary information.

The deficit ratio for German government finances remained unchanged at 2.6 % last year. On the one hand, the gas and electricity price brakes ended in 2023, which significantly relieved the budgets when compared with the previous year. As energy prices have fallen considerably in the meantime, this is unlikely to have had a substantial impact on economic activity. Government revenue has also grown quite dynamically, which was due, amongst other factors, to rising social security contribution rates. On the other hand, public finances were strained by strong growth in expenditure, particularly for the Armed Forces Fund and the Climate Fund, human resources and interest, and pensions, long-term care and health.

The government debt ratio may have fallen slightly in 2024. The debt ratio reached 62.4 % in the third quarter of 2024, compared with 62.9 % at the end of 2023. This decline was slower than it had been before, mainly because nominal GDP in the denominator saw weaker growth than in the previous year. 

Little movement in government finances is also expected for this year. On the one hand, the end of tax-free and social contribution-exempt inflation compensation bonuses will generate significant additional revenue. On the other hand, the weak economy is likely to make itself felt to a greater degree and expenditure is likely to continue to grow dynamically. After the Bundestag election, a new government will set the course for future economic and fiscal policy. 

The persistent weak growth in Germany makes it more urgent to address its structural challenges. In the social market economy, the government has the specific task of ensuring adequate framework conditions. Sound public finances and binding fiscal rules are an important foundation for tackling the current challenges in a credible and sustainable manner. A further solid foundation stone is in place when government services are provided efficiently. If existing tasks and tax exemptions are reviewed critically on a regular basis, there will be scope for tackling new challenges.

At present, many are arguing that the debt brake is preventing the government from taking the necessary steps to enable Germany to overcome its weak growth. It is important that the state does not, for example, neglect infrastructure. Implementation has been lacking here in recent years, despite fiscal leeway being available. Ultimately, it is a matter of successfully setting the correct priorities and implementing the correct projects. Nevertheless, in the Bundesbank’s view, moderately higher deficit margins are certainly justifiable given a low government debt ratio. Furthermore, if additional leeway is channelled partly into government investment, this can create vital impetus. The Bundesbank has put forward proposals to achieve this goal. 5  

In the euro area, the situation with regard to public finances has barely eased in the past year. Some Member States continue to face significant fiscal challenges. According to the Eurosystem's December projection, the government deficit is likely to have fallen somewhat in a year-on-year comparison, declining to 3.2 %. In 2023, there was still a shortfall of 3.6 % overall. Nevertheless, the government debt ratio rose again. Having reached 87.4 % at the end of 2023, it climbed to 88.2 % in the third quarter of 2024. More than one in two persons in the euro area lives in a Member State with a debt ratio higher than 100 %. The old EU fiscal rules have not ensured a sustainable decline in government debt ratios. In spring, a decision to change these rules was made. However, the new fiscal framework also allows extensive scope for decision-making and negotiation. Based on initial experience, the rules and the determination of requirements seem to be complicated and mostly opaque. It is becoming apparent that high debt ratios will hardly decline at all in the coming years, even if the rules are complied with. 

While people in Germany still pay in cash for around half of all payments, the trend towards cashless payments has continued. This was demonstrated in a study on payment behaviour in Germany in 2023, which was published by the Bundesbank in 2024. Compared with 2021, the share of cash payments fell from 58 % to 51 %. Measured in terms of sales, around one-quarter of the total was paid in cash. Given a choice, most respondents prefer cashless means of payment. At the same time, however, there exists a desire to continue using cash in the future. How this can be done as cost-effectively and efficiently as possible is being discussed in a solutions-oriented manner as part of the National Cash Forum, which was launched in 2024 with the Bundesbank as chair. In its “Cash of the future ” study at the beginning of 2024, the Bundesbank presented three scenarios detailing the extent to which cash could be used in the future. 6

The Bundesbank’s study on payment behaviour in Germany also showed that debit cards are the most used cashless means of payment, as they were used to pay for just over one-third of total expenditure. They were followed by credit transfers and direct debits, which accounted for 20 % of total expenditure, and credit cards, which accounted for 10 %. Mobile payment methods are particularly common among younger respondents and exhibit high rates of growth: compared with 2021, their share of all payments tripled from 2 % to 6 %. Acceptance of cashless means of payment has risen significantly among payees. It stood at 81 % in 2023, which represents an increase of 20 percentage points compared with 2021.

Cash and debit cards are the most cost-effective means of payment in Germany from a consumer perspective. Cash incurs the lowest costs per payment transaction for the consumer, while debit cards are cheapest in relation to the amount of money spent. Paying with a credit card would, in any case, be considerably more expensive. These are the conclusions drawn by a study entitled “Kosten von Bargeld und Kartenzahlungen aus Verbrauchersicht ”, (“Costs of cash and card payments from a consumer perspective”, in German only), which was carried out on behalf of the Bundesbank and published in 2024.

In the future, consumers will continue to be free to choose their own means of payment at all times. This is safeguarded by the Bundesbank together with the ECB and the other central banks in Europe. Another of their shared tasks is providing secure and efficient infrastructure for cashless payments. This also includes real-time credit transfers in euro, known as instant payments. These are executed almost immediately and can be initiated around the clock within the EU and the European Economic Area. In future, retailers in particular could benefit from faster availability of money, lower costs and clear cost structures at both physical and online points of sale.

In April 2024, the EU Instant Payments Regulation entered into force. All credit institutions offering SEPA credit transfers must be able to receive real-time credit transfers on behalf of their customers from 9 January 2025 and to send them from 9 October 2025. In addition, the fees for these transfers must not be higher than for traditional SEPA credit transfers. An IBAN name check, which will be mandatory from 9 October 2025, is intended to help prevent erroneous transfers and protect against fraud.

Real-time transfers can, in principle, also be offered by innovative account-to-account payment services, such as the Wero digital wallet. Wero was launched in July 2024 by 16 banks from five European countries as part of the European Payments Initiative (EPI). It enables payments between individuals and will soon also be used in e-commerce.

The Eurosystem enables credit institutions to use TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) to settle real-time transfers as part of TARGET Services. In 2024, both the number of participating institutions and the number of payments settled via TIPS went up significantly. Amongst other factors, this was because Sweden’s central bank joined TIPS and the Swedish market has processed real-time payments in Swedish krona via TIPS since February 2024. It is currently planned that payments in Danish krone will also be settled via TIPS in 2025. In future, it will be possible to process cross-currency payments, too.

Stability and settlement volumes in the Eurosystem’s TARGET Services are at a high level. TARGET2-Securities – the TARGET Service for the settlement of securities – is enjoying new all-time highs in volumes after additional central securities depositories joined in autumn 2023. The Eurosystem Collateral Management System (ECMS), an additional TARGET Service, will be added in 2025. It will be used to manage monetary policy collateral. In October 2024, the ECB Governing Council decided to reschedule the launch of the ECMS to 16 June 2025 so as to give all stakeholders more time to prepare.

The Eurosystem supports the G20's objective of making cross-border payments cheaper, faster and more transparent. Internationally harmonised messaging standards in payments are intended to help achieve this. Progress has already been made on the global harmonisation of ISO 20022 messages. In addition, the G20 drafted initial guidelines on harmonising application programming interfaces (API) and thus enabling modern, standardised access to banks’ internal processing systems. Finally, the G20 worked on connecting real-time payment systems. In this context, the Eurosystem carried out experiments concerning the cross-border linkage of TIPS with various systems, including within the Bank of International Settlements’ Project Nexus.

Central bank digital currency (CBDC) will be a key future topic for the Bundesbank. In the euro area, the digital euro could be made available to households and enterprises as an additional means of payment. Like euro banknotes, it would be issued by the euro area central banks. Households and enterprises would receive digital euro from banks and other payment service providers. In addition to this type of retail CBDC, which is intended for use by everyone, a wholesale CBDC could be used for transactions between commercial banks. 

The Eurosystem has been exploring the possibility of introducing a digital euro since October 2021. The project is currently in the preparation phase and progressed as planned in 2024. The focus was on drafting uniform rules on how the digital euro should be used. In addition, potential providers of technical components, such as an offline solution or an app for the digital euro, were identified. However, central infrastructure functions are to be developed by the Eurosystem itself. The Bundesbank hopes to take on a key role here. With this in mind, it established its new Directorate General Digital Euro in 2024. 

The ECB Governing Council cannot make a decision on whether to introduce a digital euro until the European Union’s legislative process is complete. A draft regulation is currently being discussed in the Council of the European Union and in the European Parliament. The Eurosystem will take into account any additional legislative requirements when designing the digital euro.

Tokenisation and distributed ledger technology (DLT) could transform the entire financial sector. This applies, in particular, to the issuance, safekeeping, execution and settlement of tokenised securities. In order to fully exploit the advantages of DLT and safeguard financial stability at the same time, the cash leg settlement of these wholesale transactions in secure central bank money, or wholesale CBDC, is being examined. 

Between May and November 2024, the Eurosystem tested various methods of settling DLT-based financial market transactions in central bank money. Three interoperability solutions linking the world of DLT to the Eurosystem’s conventional payment systems were tested. One was developed by the Bundesbank, one by the Banca d’Italia and one by the Banque de France. In total, more than 60 institutions tested the settlement of transactions in test environments (experiments) and in live systems (trials). 

The DLT-based Trigger Solution was developed by the Bundesbank. This solution links market participants’ DLT platforms to TARGET Services. It is based on the first Trigger Solution that was developed and successfully tested together with Deutsche Börse and the Finance Agency back in 2021 and then subsequently adapted to the new framework conditions following the transition from TARGET2 to T2. The Bundesbank’s Trigger Solution was tested in 8 experiments and 15 trials, receiving positive market feedback. The results are now being evaluated by the Eurosystem. 

To promote dialogue and the exchange of information with market participants, the Bundesbank has established a national market contact group; this is the national counterpart to the European New Technologies for Wholesale Settlement Contact Group (NTW-CG). These groups both include representatives from banks, market infrastructures, innovative financial service providers and central banks, amongst others.

The German financial system has coped well overall with the period of exceptionally strong growth in interest rates; however, the macro-financial environment remains challenging. Both German banks and other financial intermediaries such as insurers and investment funds have weathered the interest rate reversal well and are proving stable. The major vulnerabilities stemming from the period of low interest rates have so far been diminishing in an orderly manner, albeit only gradually. 7

Commercial real estate prices have not declined any further over the course of the year. However, given the low number of transactions, the risk that prices will drop again remains elevated. Liquidity risks in open-end real estate funds could amplify developments in the commercial real estate market. Redemption notice periods and minimum holding periods are keeping the liquidity risks of open-end retail real estate funds contained. 

Weak economic activity is weighing on the corporate sector. Credit risk is increasingly materialising, but credit risk indicator levels show no cause for concern by historical standards. Geopolitical tensions are elevating macroeconomic uncertainty and entail significant downside potential for macroeconomic developments in Germany. In addition, enterprises face the challenge of dealing with longer-term structural changes such as the transition to a climate-neutral economy and an ageing population.

German banks’ profitability continued to show positive developments. On the liabilities side of their balance sheets, this was due to continued relatively low interest rates in deposit business and correspondingly low funding costs – partly as a result of the lower key interest rates. On the assets side, low-interest loans and bonds matured and were replaced by ones with higher interest. Unrealised losses among banks and insurers decreased, but are still substantial in some cases.

The German banking system’s capital base remains sound. Thanks to their capital reserves, most banks are also able to cope with larger losses without falling below the regulatory minimum requirements. This was confirmed by the 2024 LSI stress test, a survey of small and medium-sized banks (less significant institutions, or LSIs) conducted by the Bundesbank and the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin). 8 The package of macroprudential measures adopted in January 2022 contributed to good capitalisation. 9

In 2024, the provisions of the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCAR) came into force. 10 Since the first Bitcoin block was mined in 2009, thousands of different crypto-assets have been created worldwide. A series of scandals, bankruptcies and crises have exposed the system as a source of potential risk. With MiCAR, the EU has taken a pioneering role in the regulation of crypto markets. MiCAR is intended to increase protection for investors, contribute to the functioning of the markets and maintain financial stability. The regulation also creates legal certainty for innovations related to distributed ledger technology. 11

Since the outbreak of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, cyberattacks on the financial sector have increased significantly. These cyberattacks have so far caused only moderate damage. However, the attack surface is tending to grow as a result of increasing digitalisation and the high level of operational connectivity both within the financial sector and between financial enterprises and IT service providers. This makes the financial sector more vulnerable to system-wide disruptions, including those that are not caused by targeted attacks. One prominent example was the major global disruption in July 2024 caused by a faulty update to widely used software.

The Bundesbank itself was also subject to cyberattacks again last year. There were an increasing number of distributed denial of service attacks. These attacks target a server with so many requests that it can no longer handle the volume of requests and, in the worst case scenario, collapses. There were also attacks on third-party providers whose systems are closely linked to the Bundesbank’s data. Although these attacks were successfully repelled, these developments underline the need to make our IT infrastructure even more resilient and to consistently minimise the attack surface. The Bundesbank will provide even more targeted protection for its IT landscape – which has taken on its current shape over years of development – in order to ensure maximum security, even in the increasingly globally networked environment. 

The European response to cyber risks is embodied in the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA). 12 DORA aims to strengthen the resilience of the financial sector and establish a uniform level of protection in the area of information and communication technology (ICT). It harmonises ICT risk management requirements across the EU and for the entire financial sector. It thus replaces existing national and sector-specific requirements. By adopting technical and organisational measures, financial entities must ensure that they can maintain business continuity and resume normal operations even in the event of a severe ICT-related incident. In addition, large enterprises must now regularly undergo ethical hacking exercises conducted in accordance with DORA or the relevant regulatory standard. The TIBER framework should also be used in this context. In its ongoing supervision of financial entities’ compliance with DORA requirements, the Bundesbank is able to build on its many years of experience and will make targeted use of its expertise. 13

With regard to the risk situation, BaFin and the Bundesbank have defined four supervisory priorities for the current year as part of the national supervisory programme for 2025 to 2027: first, the economic environment, including the commercial real estate market; second, IT security; third, governance, including business models; and fourth, interest rate developments. These priorities are closely aligned with the priorities of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). In addition, the topics of climate change, sustainability and economic transformation, digital transformation and demographic change have been set as medium-term supervisory priorities up to 2027.

In the field of financial market services, the Bundesbank supports public institutions of central and state government with a broad range of services and investments. It manages the securities portfolios of numerous central and state government special funds, which cover a large number of bonds, shares and certain fund units. The Bundesbank assumes the trading activities, custody account management and securities settlement associated with portfolio management. It also takes care of risk monitoring and reporting and helps its customers with analyses. In addition, it provides support for securities issuance and offers services to foreign central banks. The Bundesbank does not pursue these activities for profit. It offers its services as the government’s fiscal agent without itself charging fees. 

Last year, the Bundesbank decided to expand its offerings of financial market services. For example, it has taken over the management of additional portfolios from federal states. It has introduced sustainability reporting in order to enable its customers to better meet the increased transparency requirements with regard to sustainability. In addition, the Bundesbank began developing a “multi-tenant bidding system” in 2024 in order to be able to offer other public issuers issuance services that were previously reserved for central government, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). Last year, the Bundesbank also organised its first customer forum for central banks and international organisations. Together with other major central banks, it provided information on investment opportunities and other banking services in their respective currencies.

Since July 2024, a new feature in the field of statistics has been the inflation update on the Bundesbank’s website: a short report with an overview table on current inflation developments in Germany, measured by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices. This measure of inflation is calculated by the Federal Statistical Office alongside the national consumer price index (CPI) and is incorporated into the European inflation rate published by Eurostat. In addition to the HICP rate published by the Federal Statistical Office for the entire basket of goods, the Bundesbank also reports a core rate. It obtains this rate by stripping out energy and food prices, which are generally subject to significant fluctuation. In addition, the overview table presents the annual rates of change in the HICP for energy, food, non-energy industrial goods, and services. The inflation update allows the Bundesbank to supplement its reporting on inflation in Germany with these aspects, which are particularly important for monetary policy issues.

The Bundesbank regularly reached out to the general public. Amongst other activities, the Bundesbank held 1,771 economic education events nationwide in 2024. It also further expanded its digital offerings. The e-book “Geld verstehen digital” (”Understanding money”) has already received two awards. The most recent of these was the MEDEA Award, a European prize for digital educational media. One new digital education programme for schools is the virtual exhibition “Von Inflation und Stabilität” (”On inflation and stability”). The exhibition presents important historical epochs of German monetary history in an accessible way. In 2024, the Money Museum in Frankfurt am Main was also attended by 49,243 visitors. This was due not least to the special exhibition “GELD in Karikatur und Satire” (”MONEY in caricature and satire”), which was extended until May 2024 as a result of its great success.

As is tradition, the Bundesbank also sought regular exchange with renowned international scholars in 2024. As part of the Bundesbank Invited Speaker Series, Bundesbank President Joachim Nagel discussed economic resilience with Markus Brunnermeier (Princeton University), the digital euro with Peter Bofinger (University of Würzburg) and the topic of “too big to fail” with Beatrice Weder Di Mauro (CEPR). In 2024, the Bundesbank’s Research Centre and the Dutch and Swedish central banks jointly organised an international conference on issues of financial stability featuring renowned experts. The topics under discussion included dealing with interest rate risk for the banking sector, the design of countercyclical capital buffers for banks, and unconventional monetary policy and its interactions with financial stability. 

The Bundesbank has set the course to ensure that it is fit for the future with its new Strategy 2027. Like the economy and society as a whole, the Bundesbank must also respond to the challenges posed by technological change, environmental changes and rising geopolitical tensions. With its new strategy, the Bundesbank will, in future, steer a targeted and impact-oriented course in line with defined services. Its internal analytical capacities are also to be further developed in a forward-looking manner using modern technologies and an expanded set of methodologies. 

As part of its comprehensive modernisation programme dubbed “Wandel” (“Change”), the Bundesbank has improved its strategy development, governance, process management and organisational structure. The first business units started to implement the programme in the summer of 2024, and further business units will follow in the coming months. The targeted changes should be implemented in all areas of the Bundesbank by the end of 2027. The aim is to be able to respond even more quickly to complex, changing requirements in the future. This will ensure that the Bundesbank remains an important and influential component of the Eurosystem and European banking supervision going forward.