German fiscal policy is set to enter an expansionary phase following a significant relaxing of the debt brake by legislators. In the current year, however, the deficit looks set to decline initially. 2  Central and state governments will probably still be able to make only limited use of the new fiscal scope, as many measures will require lead time to implement. Spending on pensions, healthcare and long-term care will continue to climb steeply. However, higher contribution rates for the health insurance institutions and the long-term care insurance scheme mean that their revenue will also rise sharply. In addition, revenue from taxes and social contributions will be boosted considerably as tax and social contribution-exempt inflation compensation bonus payments cease and are replaced in part by wages that are subject to regular contributions. Taxes are also subject to other one-off developments, such as the sharp rise in revenue from withholding tax. On balance, the deficit ratio is likely to decline towards 2 % this year (2024: 2.7 %), while the debt ratio will probably increase somewhat (2024: 62.5 %).

From 2026 onwards, the deficit and debt ratios will then increase significantly. In 2026, the deficit ratio could rise to around 3½ %. In 2027, it could stand at around 4 % in both unadjusted and structural terms. 

Thus far, there are no signs of a decline in the general government deficit from 2028 onwards. Central government’s fiscal plans still envisage significant additional expenditure on defence (see Table 5.2 below). Aside from this, demographic developments will exert upward pressure on central government social spending, contribution rates and pension grants. The debt ratio is likely to remain on an upward path for the time being. Higher debt and rising average interest rates mean that interest burdens increase step by step. 

A higher deficit will be well manageable for a few years. Persistently high deficits and rising debt ratios would be problematic, however. This would further restrict future fiscal leeway and would not be compatible with EU rules.

Legislators expanded their scope for borrowing in order to strengthen defence capacities and government investment in infrastructure and climate protection. However, a significant part of this scope is now set to be put to other use (see the section entitled “Central government finances”). The fact that the expanded scope for borrowing will seemingly be used to plug existing budget gaps and finance projects not related to defence or infrastructure shows that it appears difficult to actually use earmarked funds only for their intended purpose. 

Irrespective of this, the deficit and debt ratios will have to fall again in due course following a transitional period in order to safeguard sound public finances. In particular, the EU rules require that the debt ratio be brought back to the 60 % reference value in the future. Germany’s exemption for defence spending within the framework of the EU rules ends in 2028. After that, it will be necessary to lower the deficit to reverse the upward trend in the debt ratio. 

The announced debt brake reform can be used to derive clear prospects for sound government finances again and to protect government investment on a lasting basis. The reform elements put forward by the Bundesbank lay out a path that leads back to a rules-based national fiscal policy and preserves the scope for investment. 3 To this end, they utilise borrowing limits to head towards a moderate structural general government deficit ratio of around 1 % to 1½ %. This would bring the debt ratio back to the EU reference value of 60 %. According to the proposals, the scope for borrowing is predominantly reserved for additional government fixed asset formation (measured against a comparable figure from 2024). Other elements will facilitate steady fiscal policymaking without weakening the binding effect of the rules. 

In addition to the national fiscal rules, Germany must comply with the new fiscal rules at the European level. To this end, the Federal Government has submitted its medium-term fiscal-structural plan (MTP) 4 and has requested use of the exemption for defence spending (national escape clause). The competent European bodies appear to have indicated their agreement to both (the supplementary information entitled “The EU fiscal guidelines for Germany explained” supplements the following).

With its MTP, Germany is requesting extensive fiscal (expenditure) leeway, which will initially permit a very expansionary policy stance (see Chart 5.1 below). Factors contributing to the considerable leeway are that the MTP:

Furthermore, Germany is making recourse to the exemption for defence spending, facilitating additional debt-financed defence spending. The defence exemption is designed (for all Member States) in such a way that it continues to increase the scope for expenditure after the end of 2028: the agreed expenditure growth rates are based on the higher expenditure level. The MTP does not yet take into account the sectoral exemption for defence spending, neither does it provide any information on defence expenditure planned on top of this. In this respect, the reported deficit and debt ratios are too low. 

In view of the particular challenges that it is currently facing, it is understandable that Germany has turned to the exemption for defence spending. 5 Under the EU rules, the additional defence expenditure permitted under this exemption will be appropriately defined and time-limited (which contrasts with the German debt brake).

Germany’s extension of the adjustment period to seven years also makes sense. However, this extension requires a reform package to justify it. Key parts of this package have yet to be fleshed out. It remains to be seen whether the targets for investment, employment and the reduction of bureaucracy, for example, will be achieved. 6  

In other areas, the rules are being stretched to a critical extent in order to create much greater fiscal scope. 

On the basis of the MTP, the deficit ratio could, in the meantime, reach around 6 % in line with the rules if Germany makes use of the expanded scope for expenditure. The debt ratio could then rise to 80 % by 2029 (see Chart 5.1 above). 7  The additional (estimated) scope for deficits arising from the defence exemption and the higher nominal GDP growth compared with the Commission’s assumptions 8 will build up over time. The scope resulting from the postponed consolidation is temporary, reaching its peak in 2026 and 2027. Additional deficits are also possible during budget implementation, provided that they do not exceed the limits of the control account. 

Overall, the MTP and the defence exemption give such a great amount of fiscal scope that the current central government plan could be compatible with them by 2029 (for more information on the plan, see the section entitled “Central government finances ”). On the basis of the Commission’s original figures for the EU requirements, central government planning would not have been compatible – not even with the exemption for defence spending. Deficit ratios would there probably have peaked at 3½ % to adhere to the rules. The debt ratio would then have reached around 70 %.

Initial experience with the reformed EU rules confirms that they are very complex and lack transparency. The rules leave a great deal of room for manoeuvre when it comes to deriving country-specific fiscal limits. It is very difficult to understand how this scope is used, as the rules are complex and information is not easily accessible. It is equally difficult to assess whether a country’s plans are compatible with the rules, and how the European Commission will assess compliance with the rules in concrete terms. With regard to the latter, there is, again, considerable room for manoeuvre. As before, it remains crucial that plans and rules are strictly applied and monitored going forward. Otherwise, the reformed EU rules will become meaningless and will fail to achieve their objective of promoting sound public finances (see the supplementary information “EU rules need to be strictly applied”).

Up to the end of June 2025, tax revenue rose by a dynamic 8 % (+€34 billion) compared with the first half of the previous year. However, growth rates are likely to weaken substantially in the second half of the year. 

For 2025 as a whole, from today’s perspective, it appears possible that tax revenue will slightly exceed the official tax estimate of May (+3½ %, excluding local government taxes). 10 The May estimate did not include the newly adopted tax relief measures for enterprises (see the section “Tax relief for enterprises”). In practice, however, these measures will not yet dampen revenue this year anyway.

Legislators have adopted various measures to improve investment conditions for firms. Corporation tax will thus fall in increments of 1 percentage point per year from 2028 onwards. As from 2032, the corporation tax rate will then be 10 %. For corporate profits subject to income tax, the tax on retained earnings will decline in steps from 2028 onwards. Furthermore, enterprises can make use of accelerated depreciation options for movable assets – provided that they purchase them by the end of 2027. Accelerated allowances are also available for electric vehicles (75 % depreciation rate in the year of purchase). In addition, legislators are expanding tax funding for research grants. 

The planned measures are generally suited to making Germany more attractive as a corporate investment location. The fact that the corporation tax rate will only fall from 2028 onwards puts the initial focus on promoting investment with accelerated write-downs. This means that some depreciation deductions can be made on investments while tax rates are higher, and future profits will be subject to the lower tax rates. The more generous research allowance will increase incentives to invest in innovation in Germany – with limited revenue losses. 11

The legislative package will result in significant but, in part, only temporary tax shortfalls. In the years 2026 to 2028, this means that tax revenue will grow by ½ percentage point less on an annual average. The revenue shortfalls resulting from lowering the corporation tax rate will then continue to rise significantly. In its final stage in 2032, the corporation tax rate will be 5 percentage points lower than at present. Currently, 5 percentage points is equivalent to annual revenue of €23 billion (including the solidarity surcharge, 2½ % of total tax revenue in 2025). Accelerated write-downs will initially reduce revenue significantly: shortfalls will peak in 2028, reaching €12½ billion. From 2029 onwards, they will decline again, and in the long term, subsequent additional revenue will largely compensate for the initial revenue shortfalls. This is because in the event of higher write-downs, tax-relevant profits are initially lower, but become later higher. Permanent tax relief for enterprises classified as corporations follows from the interplay of accelerated write-downs and lower corporate tax rates.

The new Federal Government is planning to see steeply rising deficits in the core budget and off-budget entities in 2025. 12 The overall deficit is expected to increase from €49 billion in 2024 to €146 billion in the current year (see Table 5.2 for these and the subsequent figures, overall deficit: item 1.d). Central government deficits are thus considerably higher than planned by the previous Federal Government in the summer of 2024 (total deficit at that time: around €90 billion). 

The high deficits are possible because legislators eased the debt brake considerably in March. 13 With the aim of strengthening defence capabilities and government investment, they expanded the scope for borrowing: with the sectoral exemption for defence spending, central government can now make unlimited use of debt financing to finance defence spending exceeding 1 % of GDP 14 in the core budget (and in addition, the Armed Forces Fund still had a remaining borrowing authorisation of €77 billion at the beginning of the year (see Table 5.2, item 3.b); apparently in view of commitments already made, this will be used up by the end of 2027). There is an additional debt financing volume of €500 billion for the Infrastructure and Climate Neutrality Fund, which will extend over 12 years.

The deficit for the 2025 financial year is structured as follows.

The deficit of central government including off-budget entities was markedly lower in the first half of 2025 than in the same period of the previous year. It contracted from €27 billion to just under €16 billion. This was due, in particular, to dynamic growth in tax revenue. However, the fact that central government now records discounts on an accruals basis, thus reducing interest expenditure booked in the budget, also played a role.

In the core budget, the deficit is likely to be significantly higher in the second half of the year than in the previous year. The previous year’s balance was buoyed by almost €14 billion in EU funds from the NextGenerationEU (NGEU) fund (see Table 5.2, item 4.b2) and €8½ billion in repayments of crisis assistance funds. This type of revenue is likely to be less significant in the current year. In addition, growth in tax revenue is likely to weaken significantly and further increases in expenditure are likely to have a negative impact on the deficit. 

For the year as a whole, the deficit in the core budget is nevertheless likely to remain considerably below the planned €82 billion. Tax revenue could develop more favourably than planned. In addition, ample provisions appear to have been made for expenditure-side burdens in the draft budget. Defence spending, in particular, could rise less sharply. Budgeted amounts for personnel and investment, for example, also seem high, both in terms of the half-year result and the 2024 result. 

The deficit of the off-budget entities is also likely to be considerably lower than planned (€64 billion). 15 In the first half of the year, it stood at €2½ billion. In the Armed Forces Fund, expenditure and thus the deficit even declined somewhat. The planned deficit increase of €7 billion for the year as a whole is not on the cards. As the Infrastructure and Climate Neutrality Fund has not yet been established, it seems unlikely that the estimated €37 billion will be fully disbursed by the end of the year. In addition, €10 billion of these overall funds will be apportioned to the Climate Fund, meaning that the deficit there could be lower than planned.

The Federal Government is planning to further significantly increase its deficit next year to a total of €191 billion (see Table 5.2, item 1.d). The increase of €45 billion compared with the 2025 plans is spread across both the core budget and off-budget entities. 

The deficit in the core budget is set to expand by a further €18 billion to €100 billion compared with the plan for the current year. Revenue will decline slightly. Tax revenue will be €3 billion lower than the planned figure for 2025. Central government is expecting a sharp rise in transfers to the EU budget and is planning tax cuts. This will be alleviated by an inflow of almost €11 billion from the EU’s NGEU fund in 2026. Because of a delayed partial drawdown, the funds will not be received as revenue in 2025. On the expenditure side, central government is expecting growth of 3½ % (+€17½ billion). This is due to rising expenditure in connection with the sectoral exemption for defence spending (+€22 billion). To this extent, this also allows for greater debt financing. By contrast, central government is planning to significantly reduce its net acquisition of financial assets as against the current year. It does not intend to provide Deutsche Bahn with any additional capital or any more loans to repay the enterprise’s higher-interest loans. 16 Instead, Deutsche Bahn is set to receive additional investment grants from the Infrastructure and Climate Neutrality Fund as of 2026.

With regard to the debt brake, the planned deficit of €100 billion in the core budget is structured as follows: 

Overall, as things now stand, the core budget could, in the coming year as well, have a better closing balance than estimated in the draft. Some of the budget estimates appear to be deliberately cautious. In particular, this is the case for the EU contributions (even when offsetting against the estimated global revenue increases of €4 billion) and defence spending. In addition, the estimates for investment and personnel costs seem fairly high in some cases.

For the off-budget entities, the government is still reckoning with a significantly growing overall deficit in 2026. This is driven mainly by the estimates for the Infrastructure and Climate Neutrality Fund.

The government’s fiscal plan envisages very large deficits up to 2029, the final year of the fiscal plan. The combined deficit of the core budget and off-budget entities is set to reach €186 billion in the final year. Central government’s structural deficit will gradually climb to almost 4 % of GDP. Overall, the government has budgeted for net borrowing by central government, including the special funds, to the tune of €850 billion in the period from 2025 to 2029, based on a debt level of roughly €1,730 billion at the end of 2024. Central government debt as a percentage of GDP would rise from around 40 % to 52 %. 

In the core budget, total revenue will grow only moderately up to 2029.

The sharp increase in the core budget deficit is due to rising defence spending, which is no longer subject to the borrowing constraints of the debt brake. 

By contrast, total (structural) expenditure excluding defence spending will not increase up to 2029.  Spending by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and for debt service will go up sharply. In the pension insurance scheme, the costs of planned increases in benefits will be borne by central government (increase in the “mothers’ pension” and extension of the 48 % minimum threshold for the replacement rate; see “Pension policy plans weighing on central government budget ”). Aside from this, central government grants are largely linked to growth in gross wages and salaries per employee and in the pension contribution rate. The contribution rate will rise sharply before the end of this decade. Interest expenditure (see Table 5.2, item 4.a5) will be affected by multiple adverse factors. The high level of new borrowing will increasingly have an effect, for example. In addition, the Armed Forces Fund’s debt service will weigh on the core budget from 2028 onwards. Before then, central government will have covered these burdens from the fund’s borrowing scope, which will at that time have been fully utilised. On top of that, average interest rates will go up as long-dated debt instruments from the low interest rate period still need to be refinanced. Finally, there will be extensive repayment obligations for emergency funds borrowed by central government to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. 

Overall, this gives rise to a strongly growing need for action in the core budget from 2027 onwards, in order to comply with the debt brake. This still needs to be achieved so as not to exceed the already very high planned deficits. In the final year of 2029, it is set to reach around €74 billion (see Table 5.2, item 4.a6). Overall, this amount corresponds to roughly 17 % of estimated tax revenue. An even larger cut would be needed on the expenditure side, especially because adjustments to defence spending would only affect borrowing scope in the sectoral exemption and some expenditure, such as interest, is not available for budget relief measures.

It seems almost inconceivable for the action that is required to be even close to being covered by a structural acceleration of GDP growth. 19 Prudent fiscal planning should find a path towards sound finances that is not predicated on optimistic growth assumptions. In any case, given the action required in its fiscal plan up to 2029, the Federal Government will need to adjust its fiscal stance significantly as time progresses. 

Irrespective of the action required in the plans, the expanded scope for borrowing is not sustainable and is not compatible with EU rules in the longer term. Exempting large-scale defence spending from the borrowing limit over the longer term does not appear sustainable, nor does it seem to have a sound economic justification. It would cause the debt ratio to rise further, and growing debt service would make the available fiscal scope smaller and smaller. At the same time, demographic challenges are having more and more of an impact on government finances. As a central anchor of stability in the euro area, Germany also has a particular duty to comply with the EU’s fiscal rules without stretching their limits too much. The borrowing limit under the current debt brake is obviously too broad for this. There is a prospect of EU rules for the years up to 2029 that could be compatible with current central government plans (see “EU rules: Germany has submitted plan”). In future, however, the EU rules will require significantly lower deficits than the debt brake rules, as well as a declining debt ratio. 

It is therefore important to align the national fiscal rules with sound government finances once more. The announced further reform of the debt brake provides an opportunity to do so. 20  Further reform would be inadequate if it essentially established a successor to the temporary Infrastructure and Climate Neutrality Fund. Instead, it must also aim to bring debt financing back within sustainable confines in the future. To do this, the threshold of 1 % of GDP, from which defence spending can be financed by borrowing, would have to be gradually raised and ultimately fully phased out. The proposals made by the Bundesbank in early March still appear well suited for further developing the debt brake. 21

State government budgets could have a better closing balance this year than in the previous year. Last year, they closed with a deficit of €18 billion (core budgets and off-budget entities). As usual, the current intra-year state government figures are difficult to interpret, but are already pointing to an improvement. While the core budgets were balanced when closing out the first half of 2024, they posted a surplus of €1½ billion in the first half of 2025. The off-budget entities also had a slightly improved result in the first quarter (data for the second quarter are not yet available). A year-on-year improvement for state government as a whole also appears possible over the remainder of the year. On the one hand, growth in tax revenue is likely to be slower in the second half of the year than in the first half. On the other hand, significant deficit-increasing special factors from the previous year will not be present in the second half of the year. 22 In addition, central government intends to transfer the first €8½ billion from the Infrastructure and Climate Neutrality Fund to state governments over the course of the year. State governments will likely pass on some of these funds to local governments and use some for their own new projects. However, some of the amount will probably also reduce their deficit, because in the short term they will probably only be able to implement new projects on a smaller scale at best. For this reason, they are also unlikely to be able to use the new structural borrowing scope of 0.35 % of GDP (around €15 billion) 23 for new projects in the short term. The greater scope is most likely to cover deficits that were expected anyway 24 or to enable additional reserves to be built up. 25

In the coming years, too, state governments will gain additional fiscal leeway from grants from the Infrastructure and Climate Neutrality Fund and greater scope for their own borrowing (0.35 % of GDP). There are no signs at present that they will use this space to significantly strengthen their investment. State and local governments are not legally obligated to use their shares in the Infrastructure and Climate Neutrality Fund exclusively for additional investment. A number of state governments apparently placed explicit emphasis on this during negotiations on the legislation. There is thus no guarantee that the existing infrastructure challenges will be tackled swiftly and urgently. As is the case for central government, it would therefore be advisable to better safeguard the additionality of resources from this special fund going forward.

The broader scope for borrowing by state governments is likely to be accompanied by higher state government debt, which will narrow future fiscal space and increase the likelihood of difficulties. This is particularly critical for federal states already carrying excessive debt, such as Bremen or Saarland. Overall, the new scope for borrowing increases the risk of state governments becoming overburdened. Effective fiscal surveillance by the Stability Council is more important than ever to identify any difficulties at an early stage. Transparent state government finances are therefore urgently needed. 26  

The financial situation of the statutory pension insurance scheme is likely to deteriorate significantly in 2025, and a considerable deficit is expected (2024: deficit of almost €1 billion). The pension insurance scheme already posted a deficit of €2½ billion in the first half of 2025. That deficit is likely to be significantly larger by the end of the year. Over the year as a whole, revenue is likely to be distinctly higher year on year. It helps that earnings subject to compulsory contributions are to some extent replacing tax and contribution-exempt inflation compensation bonuses (which were paid in the first half of 2024, in particular). However, expenditure is likely to go up much more. First, pensions will rise sharply by an annual average of just over 4 % (mid-2025 adjustment of just over 3½ %). Second, the number of pensions is rising markedly. Third, there are the much higher supplementary contributions 27 to the statutory health insurance scheme. 28

Next year, the deficit is likely to see a further significant expansion. Expenditure will probably continue to grow more strongly than the revenue base. The contribution rate will remain unchanged until the pension insurance scheme has brought its sustainability reserve back down to the statutory minimum. At mid-year, the reserve amounted to just under 1.4 times the scheme’s monthly expenditure (€41½ billion). The Federal Government is planning to raise this lower limit from 0.2 to 0.3 times the scheme’s monthly expenditure to better safeguard the pension insurance scheme’s liquidity throughout the year. The reserve will then amount to €9½ billion. As things currently stand, it may be necessary to increase the contribution rate in 2027.

The Federal Government intends to extend the 48 % threshold for the replacement rate beyond the end of the year up to 2031 and to increase the “mothers’ pension”. 29 Central government is expected to cover the additional expenditure and make additional transfers. This appears logical in the case of the mothers’ pension, 30 as these payments are not covered by contributions. In the case of the threshold, however, a central government grant fits less well with the system. This is a general pension increase that does not actually have to be funded by central government in an equivalent pay-as-you-go system.

Overall, there is a strong case for creating a clearer and more understandable framework for central government grants in future. The current framework gives the impression that financing burdens are distributed between central government and the statutory pension insurance scheme mainly based on budgetary situations rather than objective criteria. To make these financial relationships more transparent in future, central government should indicate which benefits of the pension insurance scheme it classifies as non-insurance-related and thus not covered by contributions, and why. It should then finance these benefits via grants (from its tax funds) in a rule-based manner.

The grants for the extended threshold will mean a permanent extra burden of considerable size for the central government budget. The current plan is for the threshold to stay at 48 % until 2031. Without the extension, the replacement rate would be just under 47 % in 2031. Once the threshold ceases to apply, the sustainability factor will dampen pension adjustments again. 31 However, as the starting level will be higher, central government will bear permanent additional burdens after 2031 as well (see Chart 5.9). 

The Federal Government wants to make it easier for people to work beyond the statutory retirement age. To do this, it is lifting the ban on temporary contracts for people previously employed on a permanent basis by the same employer. Taken in isolation, this is likely to provide positive impetus for the labour market. Lifting the ban makes it possible for people to go from a previous permanent contract to a temporary contract after reaching the standard retirement age. This has not been possible before now. 32

On the other hand, the planned tax break for income earned after the statutory retirement age seems to make less sense. In many cases, financial considerations are not the reason why people work after reaching retirement age. There are thus likely to be free-rider effects, which will put a strain on the already tight central government budget. Depending on their design, studies identify losses in general government tax revenue of between €1½ billion and €3 billion per year. 33 In addition, special tax rules open up opportunities for creative tax accounting. This also runs counter to the Federal Government’s objective of reducing administrative burdens. A more convincing way to make working beyond the statutory retirement age more financially attractive would be ending the burden of pension contributions during this phase of life. So far, the employer contribution has been a special levy, as it does not give rise to any additional entitlements in the statutory pension insurance scheme. 34

It would seem logical to adjust the age limits as a way of increasing employment and easing the burden on pension finances. The minimum age for the earliest possible entry into retirement and, after 2031, the statutory retirement age as well could be linked to life expectancy. 35 The special rule that enables employees with an exceptionally long employment history to retire earlier while still drawing a reduction-free pension could also be scrapped. As well as providing positive impetus for older people to participate in the labour force, such measures would dampen the demographic pressure on government finances. 

Aside from this, it would be advisable to review the reductions and increases in the pension insurance scheme and adapt them to changed conditions. 36 The aim would be for the decision to retire early or late not to be distorted by financial incentives.

The Federal Employment Agency posted a deficit of €3 billion in the first half of 2025 (first half of 2024: €1 billion). A significant deficit is likely to be recorded for the year as a whole, too, as payments for unemployment benefits will go up significantly. This deficit is likely to be higher than planned (€1½ billion) because of less favourable labour market developments. This year it could exceed the available reserves (end-2024: €3 billion). In its budget plans for 2025, central government has made provision for a multi-year loan of up to €2½ billion in case of need. And for the coming year, central government’s draft budget contains a loan of almost €4 billion. The Federal Employment Agency is then expected to repay all the loans out of surpluses over the coming years as the anticipated wider economic recovery gets under way. After that, it will have to build up reserves again.

This article is based on data available up to 20 August 2025, 11:00.

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Deutsche Bundesbank (2025b), Forecast for Germany: US tariffs initially weigh on economic growth; fiscal policy provides impetus with a delay, Monthly Report, June 2025.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2025c), Sound public finances, stronger investment: a proposal to reform the debt brake, Monthly Report, March 2025.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2025d), Early, standard, late: when insurees retire and how pension benefit reductions and increases could be determined, Monthly Report, June 2025.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2024a), State government finances in 2023: situation worsens, but structural balance still in surplus, Monthly Report, October 2024.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2024b), Public finances, Monthly Report, August 2024.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2023a), The growing significance of central government’s off-budget entities , Monthly Report, June 2023. 

Deutsche Bundesbank (2023b), Public finances , Monthly Report, November 2023.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2019), Long-term outlook for the statutory pension insurance scheme , Monthly Report, October 2019.

Deutsche Bundesbank (2016), Key central government budget data in connection with the debt brake , Monthly Report, February 2016, pp. 68‑69.

dpa (2025), Angespannte Haushaltslage: Landtag beschließt ersten Nachtragshaushalt für 2025 , Süddeutsche Zeitung, dpa:250723‑930‑831961/3, July 2025.

Schleswig-Holstein State Parliament (2025), Land beschließt ersten Nachtragshaushalt , Plenum-Online: Newsticker, 23 July 2025.

Santoleri, P., A. Mina, A. Di Minin and I. Martelli (2024), The causal effects of R&D grants: Evidence from a regression discontinuity , Review of Economics and Statistics, 106(6): pp. 1495‑1510, November 2024.

Schleswig-Holstein State Constitutional Court (2025), Urteil vom 14. Februar 2025 – LVerfG 1/24 – Verfassungsmäßigkeit von Notkrediten im Landeshaushalt 2024 , February 2025.