Non-final working translation

Last year, the government deficit ratio stood at around 2½ %. The expansionary fiscal stance will now drive it steeply upwards. The debt ratio will thus also rise considerably. The expansionary stance reflects strong growth in expenditure and – to a much lesser extent – tax cuts. It builds on a structural expenditure ratio of almost 50 %. Taxes and social contributions as a percentage of GDP were approaching 42 % in structural terms in 2025. Despite tax cuts, there are no signs of this ratio falling substantially, as social contribution rates are likely to rise significantly. High deficits have also been fairly common in previous periods of upheaval and crisis. Targeted credit-financed measures can help to overcome such challenges. However, in order to keep the debt ratio under control, large deficits must not become entrenched.

Although the deficit ratio fell slightly to 2.4 % in 2025, according to the January data release, the structural budgetary position deteriorated slightly. The deficit ratio decreased on balance due to the discontinuation of temporary crisis assistance measures (see the supplementary information entitled “The structural development of Germany’s government finances in 2025”). On the revenue side, higher social contribution rates were also a factor. There were positive one-off tax developments on top of this. Expenditure also saw dynamic growth. Higher social security fund expenditure and increased spending on personnel stood out, partly owing to their relatively large share of total expenditure. Investment and interest expenditure likewise rose significantly. 

The debt ratio stood at 63 % at the end of the third quarter of 2025 and is likely to have been similarly high at the end of the year. It probably amounted to around 65 % at the end of 2025 when also including Germany’s calculated shares in EU debt. 2

Over the course of this year and the next, the relaxed spending stance will cause the deficit and debt ratios to rise significantly. The Bundesbank expects a deficit ratio of approximately 4 % in 2026 and around 4½ % in 2027. At the central government level, higher defence spending will contribute to the growing deficit. Furthermore, central, state and local government as a whole will see additional investment in infrastructure as well as rising interest expenditure and tax relief. A growing deficit is also expected for the social security funds in 2026 and 2027. This is because expenditure on pensions, healthcare and long-term care will continue to rise significantly more strongly than earnings subject to compulsory contributions. At the same time, contribution rates are likely to be raised only moderately in these two years, as the pension insurance scheme will probably be able to finance its steeply increasing deficit from its reserves until the end of 2027. In addition, central government will temporarily be extending loans to the Federal Employment Agency, the long-term care insurance scheme and the health insurance scheme in order to avoid stronger deficit increases in those areas.

Without a change in course, the deficit ratio will keep rising towards 5 % in 2028. In particular, government expenditure will continue to climb steeply, and enterprises will receive some further tax relief. However, the deficit in the social security funds is likely to fall: The pension insurance scheme will then no longer be able to finance its financing gap solely from its reserves. Its contribution rate will therefore have to be raised sharply (see Chapter 5.1.2 “Longer-term development and Pension Commission”). In the absence of measures to curb expenditure in the social security funds, the overall contribution rate could rise to 44½ % by 2028 (2025: 42½ %).

The Federal Government’s plans provide for central government addressing the steep increase in consolidation that is required to comply with the debt brake. The national fiscal rules permit unlimited debt financing by central government to cover rising defence spending. In addition to this, the Infrastructure and Climate Neutrality Fund has large scope for borrowing. Nevertheless, unless countermeasures are taken, central government will significantly exceed its standard borrowing limit from 2028 onwards. This is due, amongst other things, to sharply rising interest expenditure and grants to the pension insurance scheme. At the same time, tax revenue growth will be fairly weak, not least owing to tax cuts. Furthermore, there will be no more available reserves in the core budget by then. The Federal Government closed the financing gap in its medium-term plan from summer 2025 by budgeting for non-specific global spending cuts. The Bundesbank’s forecast does not include these savings, as its forecast generally only includes measures that have already been specified.

Where intended to swiftly overcome challenges in defence and infrastructure, temporarily higher deficits are acceptable. There needs to be a reliable way forward with regard to bringing the high deficits back down, and a targeted focus on the challenges ahead. According to the results and plans, debt financing obtained under the expanded borrowing limits is not currently accompanied by equally increased spending on defence and infrastructure (see Chapter 3 “Central government finances” for more on this). 

The Bundesbank has submitted proposals to make more targeted use of the expanded scope for borrowing and to reliably safeguard sound government finances. 3  The forthcoming budget and fiscal plans and the planned reform of the debt brake present opportunities for this. In addition, state governments are faced with the task of ensuring, via effective budgetary oversight and reasonable appropriations, that local governments reduce their large deficits and that cash advances do not sharply increase again. 4 In the case of the pension, health and long-term care insurance schemes, it will be important for the upcoming reforms to rein in expenditure (see Chapter 5.1.3 “Longer-term development and Pension Commission” for more information on the pension insurance scheme), as levies on labour in Germany are already relatively high. Shifting burdens to the central government budget would add to the consolidation needs there. Central government still needs to sustainably counterfinance the December 2025 pension package, amongst other things. In view of demographic developments and the need for improvement in terms of defence and infrastructure, there is no doubt that the pressure on government finances is high. That being said, sound government finances are and will remain an essential basis for sustainable economic growth and reliable social systems. 

Tax revenue rose by a substantial 4½ % (+⁠ €41 billion) in 2025, partly owing to positive one-off developments. This growth was higher than had been anticipated on the basis of key macroeconomic reference variables, 6 fiscal drag and tax law amendments. 7 This was due, amongst other things, to the fact that taxable wage elements replaced tax-free inflation compensation bonuses paid out in the previous year. High growth in receipts from withholding tax on interest income and capital gains as well from inheritance tax also boosted tax growth significantly, probably for the most part temporarily.

Tax revenue thus remained slightly below the official tax estimate of October 2025 (−⁠ €2 billion) (see Chart 5.2 and Table 5.2). However, the downward revision could be even smaller owing to local government taxes, which have been unexpectedly positive to date. The deviation is attributable, in particular, to lower revenue from assessed income tax and VAT. In the case of local business tax, by contrast, there have been signs of a small upward revision thus far. 8  

Based on the most recent tax estimate and the legislative changes adoptedin the meantime, tax growth of 2 % is expected for the current year. 9  The recently adopted tax cuts will reduce growth by just over ½ percentage point. At the turn of the year, federal legislators reduced the VAT rate on meals in restaurants. In addition, energy-intensive enterprises and the agriculture sector continue to pay a low rate of electricity tax. The standard mileage allowance for income tax purposes was expanded, and labour income earned beyond retirement age will also be exempt from income tax by up to €24,000 per year (“active pension”). None of these new measures had been taken into account yet in the last tax estimate. Stronger developments in the particularly relevant nominal tax reference variables could have a countervailing effect. This is indicated by the revisions in the Federal Government’s Annual Economic Report 2026 relative to its 2025 autumn projection. 

Central government finances (core budgets and off-budget entities) closed the year with a steeply increased deficit of €84 billion (2024: €49 billion). The increase solely concerned the core budget. Adjusted for financial transactions, the deficit grew significantly less (by €19 billion); see Table 5.3, item 1.e. This is because financial transactions depressed the deficit by €14 billion in 2024, but raised it slightly in 2025.

Core budget in a year-on-year comparison

In the core budget, the deficit increased by €40 billion to €65 billion. Revenue fell by 2½ % and expenditure rose by 6 %. Central government taxes saw growth of 3½ %, but there was no one-off revenue as in the previous year. First, central government received no payments from the EU’s NGEU programme; in 2024, these had amounted to almost €14 billion. Second, repayments of crisis assistance transfers to central government were lower (−⁠ €7 billion). 10 Third, the core budget had assumed the reserves of the Digitalisation Fund when central government dissolved it in 2024 (−⁠ €4 billion). Fourth, proceeds from sales of shares fell (−⁠ €3½ billion). 

Total expenditure rose, in particular, due to green electricity subsidies (just over €16 billion). In the previous year, this had been financed by an off-budget entity (the Climate Fund). Spending on the acquisition of financial assets (financial transactions) grew by just over €10 billion. Specifically, Deutsche Bahn received a significantly expanded capital injection as well as central government loans for more favourable refinancing terms on its capital market debt. Additionally, in contrast to previous years, central government granted loans to the Federal Employment Agency, the statutory health insurance scheme and long-term care insurance scheme (totalling just over €4 billion). Defence expenditure (i.e. spending allocated to the Ministry of Defence) increased by €9 billion. Furthermore, central government paid out an additional €6½ billion in grants to the statutory pension insurance scheme. On the other hand, investment expenditure (excluding financial transactions, Table 5.3, item 4.a2) fell sharply, by almost €12 billion. This was partly due to central government shifting expenditure to the new debt-financed Infrastructure and Climate Neutrality Fund. 

Core budget relative to the budget plan

With the increase described above, the deficit remained €16 billion less than budgeted. Lower expenditure contributed somewhat more strongly to this than additional revenue. Of the latter, €3½ billion was attributable to taxes (including the global revenue shortfall budgeted as a precautionary item). Moreover, the budget plan had not factored in return flows of crisis assistance transfers from emergency borrowing (actual figure: €1½ billion) or programme-related revenue from the EU budget (actual figure: €1 billion). On the expenditure side, investment, in particular, remained below budget. This lower investment spending of €7½ billion was spread across several items. A notable portion of this can be assigned to the item for residual spending authorisations for construction measures from previous years, according to figures added up in accordance with the budget classification table scheme. An item for residual authorisations was earmarked as investment expenditure for the first time in 2025, helping to meet the new minimum investment ratio in the plan.

Core budget with regard to the debt brake

In the provisional settlement calculating the difference between the upper limit on borrowing (as determined under the debt brake rules) and the actual amount borrowed, 11 central government slightly exceeded the borrowing limit under the debt brake (by just under €½ billion; see Table 5.3, item 2.h-n). It thus failed to fulfil its objective of adhering exactly to the limit, despite the smaller than planned deficit. This is because nominal GDP growth was considerably higher than in the budget plan, reducing cyclically permissible borrowing by €10 billion. However, tax revenue was only €3½ billion higher than planned (including deduction of the budgeted global revenue shortfall), and the further debt brake-related relief compared with the plan was also unable to fully offset the lower borrowing limit. The amount by which the limit was exceeded is offset against the balance on the control account. However, this balance still stands at almost €58 billion thereafter.

The investment ratio in the core budget stood at 10 % in the budget plan, but ultimately worked out at just 8.7 % (Table 5.3, item 4.a4). To actually hit the minimum ratio, central government’s core budget would have needed to see an additional €6 billion in investment. The new Infrastructure and Climate Neutrality Fund was nevertheless able to borrow to finance its projects (including for investments shifted from the central government budget) because the requisite minimum investment ratio of 10 % only needs to be achieved in the budget plan. 12

All in all, it seems advisable to incorporate the actual investment ratio into the settlement. 13  This would provide better safeguards for additional investment. So far, investment has often come to less than the amounts budgeted for in the core budget. If the option to borrow is determined solely by what is in the budget plan, funds in the budget that are actually earmarked for investment are left available for other purposes. 

Central government borrowing for infrastructure purposes within the Infrastructure and Climate Neutrality Fund came to €14 billion. Defined as per the Bundesbank’s recommended definition, central government’s infrastructure investment in the core budget and the Infrastructure and Climate Neutrality Fund combined was slightly down on 2024. The Bundesbank uses a narrower definition of infrastructure investment. In comparison with the way central government counts investment expenditure in the budget, the Bundesbank definition disregards, in particular, items with no relation to government infrastructure (see Table 5.3, item 4.a3 for the expenditure included in the core budget). 14  

The exemption for defence spending allowed for borrowing of almost €29 billion (Table 5.3, item 2.f1). NATO expenditure from the core budget is likely to have risen significantly, but borrowing under the sectoral exemption was significantly higher. The sectoral exemption excludes defence spending above 1 % of GDP from the debt brake. The aim is to rapidly strengthen Germany’s defence capabilities within NATO. The Federal Ministry of Finance has not yet reported on the relevant developments in NATO spending in this regard. However, it has reported that defence spending has gone up by just over €9 billion 15 and Ukraine aid has been increased by €½ billion compared with 2024. These items closely align with the reach of the sectoral exemption. Other expenditure also falling under the sectoral exemption (total target: €5 billion) could have risen by just over €1 billion. 

Off-budget entities

Central government’s off-budget entities 16 recorded a deficit of just over €18 billion, which was slightly down on the previous year’s figure. In some cases, central government ended up bulking up reserves in off-budget entities through borrowing. Some burdens were also shifted to or from the core budget:

Central government is planning a further sharp increase in deficits this year. The deficit in the core budget is expected to increase by €33 billion compared with the 2025 result. Planned expenditure under the exemption for defence spending alone is up €29 billion on the 2025 outturn. An even bigger increase of €54 billion is envisaged in the case of the off-budget entities, 17 with the Infrastructure and Climate Neutrality Fund making up €34 billion of that. The Climate Fund contributes €7 billion to the overall increase, as it is set to generate a deficit again (€2 billion). The deficit in the Armed Forces Fund is expected to increase by a further €6 billion. The precautionary fund for inflation-indexed federal securities is now looking at a deficit of €5 billion. This is due to an upcoming payment that will compensate for the cumulative inflation over the lifetime of an inflation-indexed federal debt instrument upon redemption. The fund will be making this payment out of its reserves. The core budget’s recouping of transfers made in previous years for own securities holdings will also be a factor. 

Looking ahead to 2027, developments in the intervening months have significantly reduced the need for action. From 2028 onwards, however, the need for action will still be large. The tax estimate from autumn 2025 occasioned a significant upward revision of around €7 billion per year compared with the estimates in summer 2025’s fiscal plan. This also made it possible to maintain the core budget reserve of €11 billion beyond 2026. These two factors alone could virtually halve the €34 billion need for action expected for 2027. In addition, central government could deploy the higher than planned reserves in the Climate Fund and the Flood Assistance Fund to ease the burden on its core budget. By contrast, looking ahead to 2028 and 2029, the needs for action remain very large – in the order of over €50 billion and €60 billion, respectively. 

Owing to these needs for action, it makes sense for central government to avoid adding to the burdens on its budget and to subject its existing expenditure and tax concessions to a rigorous review. With the social security funds beset by demographic pressures, the Federal Government has set up expert commissions tasked with finding ways to alleviate the funds’ spending pressures – and thereby ease the burden on central government finances. However, the benchmark figures for the 2027 draft budget and for the fiscal planning up to 2030, which are both due in the spring, cannot yet factor in any results from the commissions’ work. 

So as to better ensure that investment in infrastructure increases, it is important that the scope for borrowing afforded by the Infrastructure and Climate Neutrality Fund be used in a more targeted way. The best way to safeguard sound central government finances is through further reform of the debt brake. The Bundesbank has made concrete proposals regarding those points in recent months (see footnote 3). Those recommendations aim to make sure that, with debt service set to increase significantly going forward, Germany does actually see, as far as possible, a corresponding improvement in defence capabilities and infrastructure in return. They are also designed to reliably safeguard sound government finances, take the EU rules into account, and facilitate a relatively steady fiscal policy. 

State government core budgets posted a deficit of €7½ billion in 2025. This was on a par with last year, though positive one-off effects provided relief. Revenue rose by 4 % (just short of €20 billion). At 5 %, taxes rose somewhat more sharply, with one-off effects having a favourable effect: the payout period for tax-free and social contribution-exempt inflation compensation bonuses expired at the end of 2024, a one-off effect boosted revenue from inheritance tax, and withholding tax on interest income and capital gains saw particularly brisk growth. Resources from central government’s new Infrastructure and Climate Neutrality Fund were not yet disbursed to federal states in 2025. Total expenditure climbed by 4 % (+⁠ €20 billion), primarily driven by personnel expenditure (+⁠ €9 billion) – a major expenditure item – and payments to administrations (+⁠ €8 billion). The latter mainly comprise transfers to local governments, which increased by €6 billion. A significant drop in acquisitions of participating interests (−⁠ €3½ billion compared with the previous year’s high figure) exerted a deficit-reducing one-off effect. Fixed asset formation in the core budgets fell slightly. It should be borne in mind that around half of fixed asset formation takes place via the state governments’ off-budget entities (including universities) and their share recently rose. Fourth quarter results for the off-budget entities are not yet available.

Including off-budget entities, the state government deficit may have fallen somewhat in 2025. Following the three quarters for which data are available so far, off-budget entities had improved their result by €3 billion compared with the previous year.

Only seven federal states made use of the structural borrowing scope of up to 0.35 % of GDP available to them since 2025 (€15 billion for all federal states combined). 19  In doing so, the seven federal states planned structural borrowing of just under €5 billion in total. Saarland and Saxony-Anhalt still declared a state of emergency in 2025. Saarland planned to use emergency borrowing to finance the projects of its transformation fund, while Saxony-Anhalt intended to address the ongoing fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic and strengthen pandemic resilience. Meanwhile, the other federal states planned to balance their budgets without recourse to structural debt or emergency borrowing. Unlike for central government, however, settlement figures are not yet available for state government. It is thus still unclear to what extent federal states excused deficits as cyclical, excluded balances from financial transactions or drew on reserves. 20

Based on the plans as they currently stand, eleven federal states will use the new structural borrowing option in 2026. 21 If these federal states access all of the available funds, state government structural borrowing will increase to just under €9 billion. In view of the infrastructure backlog as well as the fact that some states already have high debt burdens and that state governments are responsible for the financial resources of their local governments, it is crucial to ensure that the new scope for deficits is used with caution.

The state government deficit for 2026 is difficult to predict. This is partly due to the Infrastructure and Climate Neutrality Fund, via which the federal states receive funds from central government and can thus relieve their budgets. The extent to which the federal states actually use the new structural borrowing scope is not the only relevant factor for the state government deficit. 22 As in 2025, state governments will probably excuse additional deficits to some degree as cyclical, acquire financial assets beyond the debt brake borrowing and draw on reserves. The deficits would thus be significantly higher than structural net borrowing under the debt brakes. By contrast, if the federal states draw on resources from the Infrastructure and Climate Neutrality Fund, this will have a negative impact on central government’s budget balance. State governments have the option of using these resources to expand their investment and investment grants to their local governments. However, they could also use the funds for projects that they would otherwise have financed themselves, thereby reducing their deficits.

The finances of the statutory pension insurance scheme deteriorated perceptibly in 2025. Its deficit amounted to almost €4 billion and probably increased by around €2 billion compared with 2024. 23 The sustainability reserve fell to just over €41 billion at the end of 2025 (just under 1.4 times the scheme’s monthly expenditure). Nevertheless, its funds still exceeded the statutory minimum of 0.2 times the scheme’s monthly expenditure by a significant €35 billion. 

At 5½ %, growth in expenditure was much stronger than that in revenue. On an annual average, pensions rose by 4 % per capita. The number of pensions grew by ½ %. The pension insurance scheme also paid out even higher flat-rate supplements for persons drawing reduced earning capacity pensions. In addition, expenditure on pension recipients’ health insurance rose significantly as a result of the sharp increase in the supplementary contribution rates set by the statutory health insurance institutions. 24 Total revenue went up by almost 5 %. Alongside significant wage increases, this was due to the fact that earnings subject to compulsory contributions were replacing tax-free and social contribution-exempt inflation compensation bonuses from the previous year. 

The financial situation is likely to deteriorate further in 2026 and 2027. According to the pension insurance report, 25 the deficit will expand to €9½ billion in 2026 and will probably rise to more than €18 billion in 2027. As per the report, revenue, like earnings subject to compulsory contributions, will increase by 3½ % and 3 %, respectively. Expenditure growth will be significantly stronger, at 4½ % and almost 5½ %, respectively. The gap between growth in expenditure and that in revenue will thus widen every year. As a result, the financing gap will increase and the sustainability reserve will shrink rapidly. 

In 2028, a sharp increase in the contribution rate is likely to be necessary in order to maintain the minimum reserve level. According to the pension insurance report, the contribution rate will then rise from its current level of 18.6 % to 19.8 %. 

Pension finances will increasingly be burdened by demographic shifts as particularly large birth cohorts gradually enter retirement. The number of pensions in payment will thus rise steeply. This will put pressure on both the expenditure and revenue sides. Under current legislation, the contribution rate will then have to be raised further, possibly reaching just over 21 % by the end of the 2030s. The replacement rate is the key metric for expenditure developments. This will remain unchanged at 48 % until 2031 based on the recently adopted pension package. 26 Under current legislation, it will then fall gradually. According to the pension insurance report, it will be around 45 % at the end of the next decade. A rising contribution rate and a falling replacement rate are also likely in the years that follow based on current legislation. 27

The Federal Government is planning a comprehensive pension reform. The Pension Commission has been tasked with submitting proposals on this by the middle of this year. The Federal Government set up the Pension Commission at the end of last year, shortly after the adoption of its latest pension package. Its members comprise academic experts and political representatives. 

In order to alleviate the pressures on pension finances and the central government budget, it would make sense to reduce the financial incentives for early retirement and to link the retirement age to life expectancy after 2030. This would boost employment and strengthen the contribution base. Full pensions, i.e. pensions without any benefit reductions, after 45 years of contributions create incentives for early retirement: while paying the same contributions overall, beneficiaries receive higher pension entitlements than insurees of the same age with fewer years of insurance. This goes against the equivalence principle, which ensures that pension entitlements are linked to contributions paid. Moreover, longer life expectancy and unchanged statutory retirement ages also mean a lower ratio of years of employment to years of retirement. 28 In order to counteract this, after 2030, the minimum age for the earliest possible entry into retirement and the statutory retirement age could be linked to life expectancy, which will probably continue to rise. These measures would not only strengthen the revenue base of the pension insurance scheme, they would also limit expenditure growth. As a result, the rise in the contribution rate would be less sharp, which would also ease the burden on the central government budget. Furthermore, longer working lives support potential growth and the general government revenue base.

The Federal Employment Agency posted a deficit of just over €4 billion in 2025. 29 Insolvency benefit and winter employment compensation, which are funded via specific contributions, generated a surplus of €½ billion. 30 The core budget, which is financed by contributions, posted a deficit of €4½ billion. Once the free reserves of just over €3 billion had been used up, a gap of €1½ billion remained. Central government closed this gap with a multi-year loan. 31

Compared with the previous year, the Federal Employment Agency’s outturn deteriorated significantly (2024: deficit of €½ billion), mainly because unemployment benefits – a major expenditure item – increased sharply. Revenue growth was strong, at 7 %, which was partly due to the rise in the contribution rate for insolvency benefit payments. However, expenditure growth was more than twice as high (+⁠ 15 %). At 19 %, unemployment benefits saw an even steeper rise, particularly because of the growing number of recipients (+⁠ 11 %). Active labour market policy expenditure also increased sharply (+⁠ 15 %). While the number of persons involved in measures tended to stagnate, central government transferred non-insurance-related tasks from the basic welfare allowance scheme in its budget to the Federal Employment Agency’s budget (just under €1 billion). 

The Federal Employment Agency expects its finances to improve only a little this year, anticipating a deficit of €3½ billion in its core budget. A deficit of €4 billion is projected for the contribution budget, which central government will then fully offset with loans. Otherwise, it would have been necessary to increase the contribution rate to the Federal Employment Agency. It is thus presumed that central government loans totalling €5½ billion will be recorded at the end of 2026. The Federal Employment Agency is expected to repay these funds from surpluses once the economic situation improves. Its planned revenue is 3 % higher than the figure for 2025. Growth in contribution receipts is expected to be markedly weaker than in the previous year. Expenditure on unemployment benefits is expected to increase by only 1 % compared with the previous year’s figure. While per capita payments will rise, the Federal Government expects that the labour market will recover to some extent and that the number of benefit recipients will thus fall somewhat. Looking at active labour market policy measures, the Federal Employment Agency projects strong growth.

The Federal Employment Agency’s planned outturn appears plausible: according to the Bundesbank’s December 2025 Forecast for Germany, 32 the labour market is developing less favourably than assumed in the Federal Employment Agency’s budget. This will put pressure on the Federal Employment Agency’s finances that is not accounted for in its plans. However, it often tends to have quite generous expenditure appropriations for active labour market policy. It should therefore nevertheless achieve its planned outturn. 

This article is based on data available up to 17 February 2026, 11:00.

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Deutsche Bundesbank (2025f), Early, standard, late: when insurees retire and how pension benefit reductions and increases could be determined, Monthly Report, June 2025. 

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Deutsche Bundesbank (2023), Public finances , Monthly Report, November 2023.

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Federal Ministry of Finance (2026), Vorläufiger Abschluss von Bundeshaushalt, KTF und SVIK 2025 , Monatsbericht, January 2026, pp. 10‑30. 

Federal Ministry of Finance (2025a), Haushaltsrechnung des Bundes 2024 , Vol. 1, May 2025.

Federal Ministry of Finance (2025b), Stabilitätsrat schafft Transparenz über Nutzung neuer Verschuldungsmöglichkeiten durch Bund und Länder , press release, 34th meeting of the Stability Council on 9 December 2025. 

Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2025), Rentenversicherungsbericht 2025 , November 2025.

Ministry of Finance for Hesse (2025), Nachtragshaushalt 2025 und Soforthilfe für Kommunen beschlossen , press release of 13 November 2025.

Ministry of Finance for Lower Saxony (2025), Nachtragshaushalt 2025 und Haushalt 2026 – Sofortprogramm zur Stärkung von Investitionen und zur Entlastung der Kommunen .

Press Office of the Senate of the Free Hanseatic City of Bremen (2025), Senat bringt Nachtragshaushalte 2025 auf den Weg. Landesregierung unterstützt mit Neuverschuldung beide Kommunen , press release of 28 October 2025.